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Executive Summary 
Connected, software-based systems are a driver in advancing the technology of transportation 
systems. Advanced automated and autonomous vehicles, together with electrification, will help 
reduce congestion, accidents and emissions. Meanwhile, vehicle manufacturers see advanced 
technology as enhancing their products in a competitive market. However, as many decades of 
using home and enterprise computer systems have shown, connectivity allows a system to 
become a target for criminal intentions. Cyber-based threats to any system are a problem; in 
transportation, there is the added safety implication of dealing with moving vehicles and the 
passengers within. 
 
For this report, the main BeARCAT (Baselining, Automation and Response for CAV Testbed 
Cyber Security) project partners are WMG at the University of Warwick, Cisco, and Telefonica, with 
support from Millbrook. In this report, subject matter experts have addressed connected vehicle 
and infrastructure security assessments. It is one of three work packages responding to an 
Innovate UK Connected and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) cyber-security feasibility study. Each work 
package covers one of the three requirements of the study. This report addresses the 
measurement and maintenance of cyber resilience and identification of vulnerabilities, the second 
work package addresses the specifications of a physical test facility, while the third work package 
explores the business case. 
 
This report discusses the technologies underpinning connected vehicular systems and cyber 
security threats to those technologies. It is a baseline for understanding the security implications of 
CAVs, and those of the communication systems that enable or enhance their operation. Cyber 
security is not a problem that is fully solvable because of the fundamental nature of computers, 
communications and software. Instead, the threat from attack is a problem to be reduced to an 
acceptable level of risk. The testing techniques to assess cyber threats and achieve risk reduction, 
thus enabling and improving cyber resilience, are discussed. 
 
The connected transportation ecosystem is a large and complex super-system which must be 
assimilated by numerous stakeholders. Understanding and testing complex technologies can be 
aided by technology itself. Software tools, supporting systems and physical test facilities will be 
required to perform the threat assessment and cyber security testing of CAVs, and the roadside 
infrastructure, communications systems and cloud services with which the CAVs interact. 
Automation of testing will be essential as the testing task is substantial and CAVs will operate 
within a multiagent environment. 
 
This report provides: 
 
1. A discussion of the techniques required to systematically address cyber threats and reduce 
risks to improve the CAV ecosystem’s resilience. This is framed within a CAV testing 
Security Framework, which can be used as the basis of a certification process. 
2. It summarises the technologies used within the CAV ecosystem, with emphasis on the 
communication technologies used between CAV and cloud services, an important area of 
the ecosystem.  
 
Cyber security incidents are inevitable. Real-world incidents have occurred, and researchers 
continue to find security issues with vehicular systems with regularity. A systematic response to 
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incidents and a meaningful security testing framework will be required throughout the lifecycle of 
CAVs and the supporting ecosystem. 
Recommendations 
• Future investment in a CAV security testbed would be beneficial to the UK’s emerging CAV 
industry and ecosystem, and to the communications and cyber security domains. The 
investment would provide a foundation for world-leading research in CAV and communications 
security assessments, risk reduction and cyber resilience techniques. 
• Communications infrastructure and cloud services are areas of the CAV industry that are 
identified as requiring focus for cyber security investment. There has been and continues to be, 
substantial interest in the cyber security issues related to in-vehicle and sensor systems. This 
continues to be important, however, the CAV communications and cloud services technologies 
would benefit from equal attention as they become increasingly part of the marketplace. 
• Investment in the design and development of a CAV cyber testing Security Framework to 
benefit the UK’s transport and communications CNIs. 
• It is important to realise that C-V2X may yet become the global automotive connectivity 
standard and we need to prepare for that, with testing, evaluation and development of the 
standards. 
• It is not certain how C-V2X will interact with DSRC, if at all, but further research is required in 
this area to establish the best way forward for the UK. 
• A special focus should be given to the communication system required to support real-time 
V2V, which is unlikely to be C-V2X or DSRC in the near term.   
• Certification of the cyber security testing process is required. Procedures based around ISO 
SAE 21434, which can be regarded as a superset of the UNECE CSMS, are likely to be 
embraced by vehicle manufacturers. 
 
The several areas that would benefit from research investment to accelerate the adoption of a CAV 
and communications testing Security Framework are: 
 
• Investment to research and develop the Security Framework for the CAV ecosystem. 
• Investment in new software tooling to support, disseminate and keep relevant the framework. 
• Investment to research and develop a CAV ecosystem security testing knowledge base as part 
of the framework. 
• Investment to encourage stakeholders to engage and network to exchange information and 
resources on cyber security threats to the CAV ecosystem. 
 
The UK is a leader in cyber, vehicle and communications technology and can provide, and does 
provide, centres of excellence in understanding, testing and countering threats. That skill base can 
be used to protect the CAV ecosystem, and aid the development of the UK CAV industry, and 
contribute to the overall UK cyber security expertise. This report provides the relevant stakeholders 
with the baseline information to fully develop an industry-relevant Security Framework. The overall 
goal of the Security Framework is to keep the cyber security risks in the CAV ecosystem to a 
residual level, maintaining CAV cyber resilience. 
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1. Introduction 
Communications and transport are two of the UK’s 13 Critical National Infrastructures (CNIs). 
Vehicle connectivity, the connected car, is now common, with most manufacturers highlighting 
connectivity and the value-added services that it brings as a selling point. Communications 
methods including mobile, satellite, radio and Wi-Fi enabled vehicle connectivity. Mobile networks 
provide “Carrier Grade” security and include 3G, 4G and Long Term Evolution (LTE), plus 5G 
technology. Vehicles and vehicle users can now connect to remote services, however, as the 
decades of using traditional Information Technology (IT) systems have demonstrated, any 
connected system is a target for malicious intent via a cyber attack. This has already been proven 
to be true with real-world vehicle hacking incidents having taken place, and researchers have 
demonstrated the ability to compromise connected vehicles. This is a concern, not only from the 
security of the communications systems but also the safety of all road users and the general 
public. 
 
Another area of technological growth within the transportation sector is the development of highly 
automated in-vehicle systems including Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS). Such 
systems can detect drivers drifting out of marked lanes on the roadway, provide cruise control that 
can steer a vehicle within a lane, or provide collision detection and avoidance. In the future, ‘self-
driving’ vehicles should eventually allow journeys to be taken without human intervention. These 
Connected Automated Vehicles and Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are highly 
reliant on digital systems. This includes systems being used to aid vehicle control, whose internal 
operation rely upon increasingly complex algorithms and decision-making processes. A CAV is a 
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and their kinetic nature has safety implications. 
 
Knowing such systems may be subject to a cyber attack requires stakeholders to invest in 
techniques that can mitigate such a threat. This report examines the cyber security threats to the 
CAV ecosystem and how a CAV Cyber Test Facility (CTF) could be used to assess and mitigate 
those threats. 
1.1. Report Objectives 
This report presents the argument for a holistic Security Framework to address the long-term 
mitigation of the cyber security risks to the CAV ecosystem. The framework provides a model, 
or architecture, for cyber security and cyber resilience testing processes. The operation of the 
framework will be supported by a specialised testing facility and proving ground, the CTF, that 
can provide the support infrastructure and services necessary for the CAV ecosystem 
stakeholders to achieve the goal of minimising risk from potential cyber attack incidents. 
 
This report does not present a final framework design; indeed, the rate of technological change 
means that any security framework or process evolves as technology changes. However, it 
does provide a strong foundation for a CAV security framework that can be built upon by the 
CAV industry to become a national working practice for CAV security testing. 
 
This report was produced in response to the Innovate UK funding competition1 to address 
feasibility studies in CAV cyber security. It addresses the requirement to “find ways to measure 
and maintain cyber-physical resilience and identify vulnerabilities” within the CAV ecosystem. 
 
1 https://apply-for-innovation-funding.service.gov.uk/competition/430/overview 
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1.2. Associated Reports 
This report is one of three providing recommendations for addressing cyber security and cyber 
resilience in the CAV ecosystem. It has been written by the consortium on the BeARCAT 
Project (in alphabetical order) Cisco, Millbrook, Telefonica and WMG (University of Warwick). 
The two companion reports address the physical infrastructure requirements for the CTF, and 
the business case for CAV ecosystem security testing within the UK, see Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Stakeholders 
The stakeholders are numerous as the CAV ecosystem crosses engineering and social domain 
boundaries: 
 
• Vehicle original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
• Vehicle retailers and service centres 
• Mobile Network Operators (MNO) 
• Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) 
• Telecommunications service providers (business-to-business and business-to-
consumer) and equipment manufacturers 
• Information technology and cloud providers 
• Roadway infrastructure providers and highway authorities 
• Trade bodies and organisations 
• Standards bodies 
BeARCAT CAV Cyber Security Testing Summary Report 
 
WP1 – 
Connected 
Vehicle & 
Infrastructure 
Security 
Assessment 
 
 
 
WP2 – Test 
Facility 
CyberSec Ops 
Requirement 
 
 
WP3 – Business 
Case 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Work Package 1 (WP1) in relation to Project BeARCAT outputs 
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• Consumer device manufacturers and digital assistant operators 
• Automotive component and tier suppliers 
 
The CAV cyber security concerns for these organisational entities will vary, however, our 
connected society means that security issues have the potential to impact different points 
within the ecosystem. Cyber security concerns include: 
 
• Mass or localised disruption to transportation and communications systems. 
• Tracking and accessing vehicles. 
• Tracking and endangering individuals. 
• Covert surveillance and theft of data, audio, and video information. 
• Cyber crime for financial gain, for example, using ransomware. 
• Cyber vandalism by disaffected individuals. 
• Protection of manufacturers’ digital intellectual property (IP), including insider threats.  
 
Specific challenges are facing the development and deployment of connected and automated 
vehicle systems. The design process for such systems typically takes multiple years, with the 
physical components of a vehicle being determined two to three years before the vehicle is ‘in 
production’. Although there has been significant progress concerning the ability to update 
firmware and software within a vehicle, not all vehicle systems have this capability. Also, there 
are regulatory issues to such updates that, at the time of writing, are still be addressed. For 
example, a software update changing the operation of a vehicle to an extent that it may impact 
the vehicle’s type approval, or insurance risk. 
 
Vehicle system manufacturers are faced with an environment where cyber security threats and 
attacks continue to evolve, long after the components for a vehicle system have been finalised. 
Furthermore, the vehicle system manufacturer may be responsible for the cyber security of the 
vehicle for up to the lifetime of the vehicle (typically 10-15 years). This creates a situation 
whereby the effectiveness of the cyber security solutions that are deployed within a vehicle 
system degrade before the vehicle has started production and will continue throughout the 
vehicle’s life.  
 
For the above reasons, CNIs and CPSs must be designed and tested for cyber resilience, able 
to withstand, deflect and nullify cyber attacks and continue to operate securely and safely 
throughout the lifetime of the system. To achieve this, the various stakeholders within the 
communications and transportation ecosystem need to cooperate to ensure that they not only 
reduce the cyber security risks in their products, but they do not increase the risks to the 
products with which they interconnect. A vehicular cyber security test facility that provides a 
centre of excellence for combining physical testing capabilities with expert knowledge in 
vehicles, automotive systems, communications technology, cyber security and systems 
engineering will be a world-class and world-leading asset for the UK transport industry. 
1.4. Report Contents 
The report describes the technology that currently exists within the CAV ecosystem and how it 
can be impacted by cyber security incidents. It discusses many of the cyber security concepts 
within the current cyber security domain, and how they apply to CAVs, mobile networks, 
communications systems and infrastructure. The proposed security framework is described, 
beginning with the need to define an industry reference architecture that allows stakeholders to 
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understand the scope of the CAV ecosystem. The reference architecture enables different 
stakeholders to view any aspect of the CAV ecosystem, and from that view perform a cyber 
security threat analysis. 
 
The threat analysis begins with threat modelling to determine the risks to systems, from end-to-
end. There are many threat modelling techniques, with a few of the most used techniques 
being discussed within this report. Threat modelling allows for risks to be evaluated and 
ranked; again, different risk assessment techniques exist, and the most popular methods are 
reviewed. Once risks have been identified, they need to be mitigated within the designs of the 
system and its sub-assemblies. The systems then need to be subjected to testing, to ensure 
that the applied mitigation is enough to reduce the risk to a residual level. 
 
The principle aim of this report is to address the need within the UK transportation ecosystem 
(and the wider global community) to develop a Security Framework, see section 2, for 
performing cyber security testing and assessment of CAVS and the supporting infrastructure. It 
specifically focuses on the communications subsystems within the vehicle and, importantly, the 
onward connectivity, via mobile networks, to infrastructure and cloud servers and services. 
Whilst the internal vehicular systems are equally important, there is already extensive research 
in that area, which is ongoing. However, extra-vehicular communication requires equal 
investment in security research and development (R&D) effort. This is due to the rapid growth 
in the use of cloud-based services for the CAV ecosystem and the development and adoption 
of future services such as Automated Vehicle fleet management. Mobile networks provide so-
called “Carrier Grade security” and as such are of great interest for the V2X & V2I 
communication. To this end, recommendations are provided on developing a UK CAV Security 
Framework, including a discussion on certification requirements and the lifetime management 
of any constructed facility and the framework's maintenance, an important point due to the 
ever-changing technological landscape. 
1.5. Report Challenges and Notes 
The BeARCAT project feasibility study was run over a short time span, during the first three 
months of 2020. This period coincided with a worldwide coronavirus pandemic. The short 
project duration, and the impact of the pandemic, has not prevented the completion of the 
report. However, there may be areas that could benefit from further study, review and proof-
reading. 
 
The report studies the domain of cyber security. This term may be written as cybersecurity, 
which is common in the Americas and international standards and publications. In the text, the 
term cyber security is used which is common in UK documents, unless it is quoted from 
elsewhere, for example, the title of a referenced publication. Similarly, the phrase cyber attack 
is often hyphenated, but in this report, it follows cyber security and is not hyphenated. 
 
The project partners acknowledge grant-funding by Innovate UK and CCAV, and for the 
opportunity to produce this report. 
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2. Overview of the Security Framework 
Testing of any vehicle is a complex process, testing CAVs and their interactions will add to the 
complexity. On top of that, cyber security testing is challenging due to the need to look beyond the 
functional specifications of systems. To aid with the security testing challenge a framework is 
provided to help the stakeholders understand the various interactions within the security testing 
process. The high-level view of the framework is provided in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Holistic cyber security framework for CAV cyber test facility 
 
The major sections of the framework are: 
 
• Inputs: System Under Test (SUT) or Devices Under Test (DUT), CAVs and communication 
systems, even sub-systems and devices. 
• Security Analysis: A systematic way of modelling the threats to a system and assessing 
the security risks, threat modelling and risk assessment, conducted by the testing centre is 
covered in this report. 
• Knowledge: Technology and the threat landscape changes; the framework needs to 
account for changes. Testing centres should maintain knowledge of attacks, mitigation, and 
new technology, working nationally and internationally with other security professionals.  
• Tests: The security tests to mitigate risks and determine system resilience, an overview of 
security testing is provided in this report. There will be many tests that are recommended 
from security analysis, mitigation analysis, certification guidance, resilience analysis; 
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however, the selection of tests will also be based on the capability of the testing centre, as 
well as the available time and resource.  
• Test Centre: The testing happens at a physical location, the physical requirements and 
operation of a CTF are addressed in the Work Package 2 companion report. Testing 
centres will need to work with a national Vehicle Certification Authority, which already exists 
to coordinate and apply the current Type Approval process.  
• Outputs: Certification against the tests (pass/fail) and profiles of risk and resilience. These 
feed into a systems Lifecycle Management, especially when a real-world incident requires a 
re-test and system update. For security, outputs are not one-time assessments but should 
be revised proactively and periodically upon updates to the knowledge record. There is an 
assumption of evolving threats (proactively testing) and normal system operational changes 
(periodically testing) when doing the assessments. Incident management must be handled 
through a CAV or systems lifecycle. 
 
Using the above Security Framework overview, it is possible to see where the different sections of 
this report fit into the security testing map. This helps assimilate the amount of information provided 
on the various technical aspects of the CAV ecosystem, the communications infrastructure, and 
security testing methods provided in this report. 
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3. Definition of V2V, V2I, V2C and Similar 
The CAV ecosystem has many interactions amongst entities. In this section, some of the 
terminology used for those interactions is discussed for those unfamiliar with the terms. 
V2X communication connects vehicles to ‘everything’, which includes Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), 
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Cloud (V2C) and Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P). 
Connectivity may be achieved using several different communications technologies and solutions, 
including by Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) with the Intelligent Transport 
System 5 GHz Access Layer (ITS-G5), Cellular V2X (C-V2X), 3G/4G/5G mobile systems, and Wi-
Fi technologies. 
DSRC is an 802.11p-based vehicle wireless communication technology that enables highly secure, 
high-speed direct communication between vehicles and the surrounding infrastructure, without 
involving the mobile network infrastructure. It is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) specified standard for V2V and other forms of V2X communications. 
 
Figure 3. An architecture of V2X communications 
3.1. V2V Communication 
Direct communication between a vehicle and other vehicles to support safety-critical and 
latency-sensitive applications, exchanging information such as trajectory, speed, brake status 
and others sharing the road information. V2V communication uses DSRC/ITS-G5 or C-V2X 
(LTE direct) technology.  
3.2. V2I Communication 
Communication between a vehicle and an infrastructure/roadside unit (RSU) to support 
applications such as traffic management, transmitting messages for upcoming changes in 
road/traffic signs, traffic signal violations and congestion information. V2I communication 
typically uses DSRC/ITS-G5 or C-V2X technology.  
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3.3. V2C Communication 
Communication between a vehicle and a cloud to support remotely hosted applications. 
Analysis based on the cloud can provide vehicle diagnostics, anomaly detection, firmware 
updates and security authentication as well as consumer-facing connected car services, such 
as connected infotainment and navigation, firmware updates and security authentication. V2C 
communication typically uses mobile communications technologies such as 3G, 4G/LTE and 
will include 5G in the future, more commonly known as C-V2X.  
3.4. V2P Communication 
Direct communication between a vehicle and a pedestrian to support pedestrian safety 
applications, enabling collision prediction, providing collision alert to driver, a pedestrian 
(though connected handheld devices) or both. The ‘pedestrian’ ‘encompasses various 
vulnerable road users’ including pedestrians, cyclists, wheelchair users and passengers 
embarking and disembarking buses and trains. 
3.5. C-V2X Communication 
The Mobile C-V2X is a 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard describing a 
technology to achieve the V2X requirements. C-V2X is an alternative to 802.11p. Pre-
commercial C-V2X deployments have recently gained momentum with support from multiple 
automakers. 
3.6. Examples of Use Cases for V2C 
Vehicle telemetry can offer the manufacturer significant insights into the operational behaviour 
and performance of the vehicle, as well as the ability to understand their customer base in 
greater detail. The data may also open other business relationships such as vehicle insurance 
(own or partnered) and shared mobility services. Telemetry can reveal if the windscreen wipers 
are used, and if so, how often. It can reveal if functions within the vehicle are being used or not 
– which may then help the manufacturer to determine if they should continue to develop a 
feature or potentially withdraw it. In addition, to for some vehicle manufacturers, the collection 
of telemetry information combined with data from sensors such as cameras, is extremely 
valuable in providing ‘training data’ for Advanced Driver Assistance Services (ADAS) and 
systems that may offer forms of automated driving (SAE J3016 Levels 3, 4 & 52) in the future. 
 
While vehicle telemetry monitoring may appear to be a valuable service to the owner/user of 
the vehicle, the greatest value is perhaps to the vehicle manufacturer themselves in the ability 
to gather information from the vehicle fleet. This information has applications in vehicle 
manufacture and supply chain. This can be vital in helping manage the number of vehicles 
impacted by recall notices and the associated warranty costs. As the importance of electronics 
and software has grown, so has complexity, with some vehicles now having well over 100 
million lines of code. Detecting and mitigating issues that may impact the vehicle fleet is vital to 
vehicle manufacturers. 
 
2 SAE (2018) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), ‘SAE J3016-201806: Taxonomy and Definitions for 
Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles’  
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In 2016, the United States had ~11.5 million trucks registered, with a growth rate of ~400,000 
new trucks being added each year3. The total vehicle fleet accrued over 285,000 million miles 
travelled in one year. For industries such as freight haulage, vehicle telemetry is an 
increasingly valuable, an asset4, helping to improve operating efficiency of vehicles and the 
safety of their drivers. Analysis of data including individual driving patterns and behaviour, 
traffic on routes and weather conditions can yield actionable insights that reduce time in transit 
and avoidable idle times.  
 
More directly, a 2013 report identified that fuel represents 39 percent of the annual operating 
costs of the average truck in the United States with an average running cost of $180,0005.  
Reducing fuel usage and the across an entire vehicle fleet by as little as 2-3 percent can have 
significant financial benefits, as well as reducing environmental impact. 
 
Vehicle fleet operators often gather their own telemetry, independent of vehicle manufacturers 
by incorporating their own sensors and communications equipment into their fleet of vehicles. 
Fleet operators’ use of telemetry is a direct input into business operations, which can help drive 
efficiency improvements and profitability. For freight haulers, their vehicle fleet must spend 
most of their time in motion moving goods. Their areas of focus include: 
 
• Idle time. Any time a vehicle isn’t moving, such as when it’s being unloaded, it costs 
money. If a vehicle misses its slot at a distribution centre and has to wait, time is lost along 
with profits. Even processes such as presenting identification and providing manifest 
information is an area for optimization. Data transmitted between the vehicle and the 
distribution centre can ensure that slots aren’t missed, which leads to efficiency 
improvements on all sides. 
• Fuel costs. Fuel is one of the primary costs for haulers. Saving even a small percentage 
can make a difference in profitability. Tracking issues such as headwinds and other 
weather events can lead to fuel savings. Using telemetry from their fleet, companies can 
make routing decisions to avoid bad weather, but it requires access to near-real-time 
information and processing capability. 
 
It is useful to understand what information may be contained within the data collected from 
Connected Vehicles. There is of course a wide range of data that can be collected, and one 
must bear in mind that the breadth of data may also reflect the price-point of the vehicle 
(budget, mid-range, luxury).  
 
The following example is taken from a luxury vehicle maker: vehicle telemetry includes 
information relating to the vehicle being involved in an accident such as the fact that the 
airbags have been deployed or the sensors have been activated. Further data includes the fuel 
amount, the distance to empty status, the odometer value, the distance to service status, the 
coolant level, the washer fluid level, the brake fluid status, the brake pad wear, the tyre 
pressure, tyre pressure sensor failure, engine malfunction, the oil level, the door and window 
status, if seatbelts are buckled or not, and information from any sensors, for example, in the 
 
3 https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/safety/data-and-statistics/413361/fmcsa-pocket-
guide-2018-final-508-compliant-1.pdf  
4 https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/ask-an-expert-capturing-fleet-impact-
from-telematics  
5 https://www.thetruckersreport.com/infographics/cost-of-trucking/  
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car, on the steering wheel, or from camera information, including if the cab is open, boot open, 
bonnet open status, battery information including voltage, emissions information and whether 
the alarm is armed or sounding. 
 
As more sensors are added to vehicles, not only will vehicle manufacturers gather information 
about the performance and operation of the vehicle itself but may also gather data generated 
from the sensors themselves. This does not mean that such data is gathered continuously but 
rather that vehicle systems may transmit a form of the sensor data in cases of ‘interest’ such as 
an accident or an unexpected set of telemetry data being recorded. Such information is of 
interest to not only the vehicle makers but potentially to organisations such as insurance 
companies. 
 
As one can see from the information collection details, the manufacturers are collecting far 
more information than just fault conditions. The position and movement information can include 
details such as braking and acceleration styles. Traction-control indications can help determine 
road conditions at a location. Some vehicle makers and mapping service providers are starting 
to use such information to identify roadway hazards such as potholes. 
 
When considering consumer-centric V2C applications, the most well-known are those providing 
in-car entertainment, or what is known as In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI). As with other forms of 
consumer entertainment, the methods by which consumers access their entertainment has 
changed and will continue to change. Not that long ago, many cars were fitted with a CD player 
as part of the integrated car audio system. That is now relatively rare with that media being 
replaced by a USB port or a Bluetooth interface to enable the use of media streamed from a 
paired device. The IVI system unit continues to evolve, running a full operating system. Many 
include high-resolution touch-screen capabilities and an automotive navigation system. Some 
offer broadcast television receiving functions, more advanced solutions including the ability to 
run smartphone-like applications and connected to additional entertainment services, examples 
include Spotify and Netflix. These applications require communications connectivity to the 
infotainment service provider, which will mean, Internet access over a mobile network 
connection. 
 
In the Automotive industry, a debate about the vehicle manufacturer’s role in the infotainment 
value-chain is underway. One camp offers the position that the vehicle manufacturer has no 
real role to play anymore, ‘disintermediation’. The car can be viewed as an advanced paired 
Bluetooth accessory, enabling the user to play media from a connected personal 
communications device with some infotainment systems offering connection solutions such as 
Apple Carplay and Android Auto. Further, that navigation services will be delivered to the 
connected personal device, doing away with the need to offer an integrated navigation service 
within the vehicle.  
 
The alternative position suggests that the vehicle manufacturer can participate in the 
infotainment value-chain, offering a variety of integrated and connected experiences, with 
infotainment systems that include versions of applications such as Spotify and Google Maps. If 
the media is delivered via an integrated infotainment system, the dataflow is often from the 
infotainment service provider (such as Spotify) via the vehicle manufacturer’s digital real estate, 
through the mobile service provider and on to the vehicle. In some cases, the data stream may 
be from the infotainment service provider through the mobile service provider and on to the 
vehicle.  
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When considering navigation services, one must consider that many integrated solutions retain 
map information on local storage within the vehicle (such as a flash drive). Periodic map 
updates may be provided to the vehicle over a mobile connection. ‘Layer information’ such as 
live traffic congestion updates and road construction notifications are received by the vehicle 
over the mobile communications network.  
4. Threat Analysis, from Reference Architecture to 
Risk Mitigation 
4.1. Introduction 
With the continuously increasing use of software in vehicles, network connectivity to the 
outside world, and the variety of applications and services from the vehicle manufacturer and 
third-parties, security must be of primary concern. The attack surface is growing both inside 
and outside the vehicle, where it now extends to the end-to-end connectivity path, from the 
vehicle, through the various communications networks and on to the cloud and computing 
providers. Attacks against application servers now constitute the largest exploit, with recorded 
incidents at 25%, according to Upstream Security’s 2020 Global Automotive Cybersecurity 
Report6, up from 21% in 2018. Attacks may not be against the vehicle manufacturer itself but 
instead targeting providers (telematics, navigation, infotainment) providing services on behalf of 
the vehicle manufacturer to the vehicle. A successful attack represents a highly impactful 
incident with the potential for considerable damage to the vehicle manufacturer’s reputation, 
magnified by the fact that the impact of the attack is not against one vehicle but rather the 
vehicle manufacturer’s vehicle fleet. 
 
The emerging transport ecosystem sees vehicle connectivity, powertrain electrification and 
autonomous operation as the new paradigms. The CPSs that these emerging vehicles 
represent are enabled by two key technologies, software in embedded computers and 
communications. Vehicles have been increasingly reliant on computer technology for the last 
three decades, with various subsystems controlled by ECUs and increasing amounts of on-
board computational capacity. With CAVs, those previously isolated computers now have 
wireless connections to the outside world. A connected computer becomes a target for various 
threat actors with malicious intent, from lone hackers, to criminals, to nation-state actors. 
Threats to connected systems are well established in the modern world, and the kinetic nature 
of transportation adds a further dimension, since it impacts upon the safety of the vehicle 
occupants, other road users and infrastructure. To maintain safety requires the consideration of 
cyber security in this new transportation era. This requires a new framework under which all the 
stakeholders in the industry can develop the processes needed to minimise risks. 
 
The complexity of the emerging CAV ecosystem necessitates a common understanding 
amongst all the various stakeholders. This can be provided by a reference architecture (RA), 
an agreed description of the CAV ecosystem, summarising its various entities, subs-systems 
and inter-communication links. The RA is then used to map out the various attack surfaces 
within this system-of-systems. These aid a threat modelling process to determine the potential 
 
6 https://www.upstream.auto/upstream-security-global-automotive-cybersecurity-report-2020/ 
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risks to the systems, and the mitigations that are required to reduce the risks to an acceptable 
level. 
 
This section introduces the RA and its use as a starting point for threat modelling. Threat 
modelling approaches are then described. The outcome of threat modelling will provide risk 
mitigation measures, and a method to assess risks is given. Mitigation is addressed by 
implementing security measures, re-engineering systems (if required or possible), or making 
design changes. The mitigation will require various testing methods to be applied to ensure it 
has been correctly deployed. 
4.2. A Reference Architecture as a Security Framework 
Foundation 
An architectural diagram is useful for understanding the operation of any complex system. 
CAVs will operate within a transportation ecosystem, with different functions being provided by 
the various entities and actors. The ecosystem includes the road infrastructure, the vehicles 
travelling on the roads, traffic control systems, communication networks and operation 
management centres. The resulting complexity of CAVs, and the systems to which they 
connect, makes vehicular transportation a complex multi-agent system-of-systems, essentially 
a collective. The goal of the RA is to convey the complexity of this collective in an efficient 
manner to allow for assessment of cyber security issues. 
4.2.1. Introduction to Reference Architectures 
Architecture has moved beyond its original meaning to convey the design of a building. A 
complex system uses architecture to provide: 
 
“The fundamental organisation of a system embodied in its components, their relationships 
to each other, and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design and evolution.”7 
 
The developers of the Unified Modelling Language (UML), Booch, Jacobson, and 
Rumbaugh, understood the importance of architectural diagrams for complex software 
projects. They made architecture a key aspect of their Rational Unified Process (RUP)8. 
When the Systems Modelling Language (SysML) extended UML to handle model-based 
systems engineering (MBSE), architecture was maintained as a fundamentally important 
concept and an essential part of systems engineering9, going so far as defining an 
Architectural Framework to aid constructing architectures. 
 
The military uses architecture as an aid to operational effectiveness and uses the 
Architecture Framework concept seen in SysML for architecture design. The United 
Kingdom's (UK) Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF)10 was developed 
 
7 ISO and IEC (2007) ISO/IEC 42010 IEEE Std 1471-2000 Systems and software engineering - 
Recommended practice for architectural description of software-intensive systems. New York 
8 Philippe Kruchten (2004) The Rational Unified Process: An Introduction. 3rd ed. Addison-Wesley, ISBN 
0321197704 
9 Simon Perry (2013) SysML for Systems Engineering: A Model-Based Approach. 2nd ed. Computing. 
Institution of Engineering and Technology, ISBN 9781849196512 
10 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/mod-architecture-framework 
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from the US Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) and aided the 
development of the NATO Architecture Framework (NAF). 
 
SysML stresses the importance of conveying understanding. Architecture is a complete, but 
abstracted, representation of a system. It is a high-level model and a starting point for 
further detail. However, the stakeholders of a system, and the architects, must understand 
the model. The process of building the architectural model includes agreement on inherent 
concepts and terminology. The ontology of the architecture (the categories, properties and 
relationships of concepts and entities) reduces the risk of misunderstanding of system 
functionality. 
 
Whilst architecture is often used during the design, construction and deployment of a 
system, it is also important for the ongoing evolution and future use of the system. It 
ensures the interoperability of new components and the management of system change. 
These factors are what makes an architecture a reference architecture11, as such it needs 
to track system changes and reflect system operation, a process that can be covered in 
SysML by Life Cycles. The need for an architecture to reflect the ongoing use and design of 
the system is important when using it for cyber security threat modelling. 
4.2.2. Reference Architecture to Identify a Target of Evaluation 
The elicitation of cyber security risks, via attack surface analysis, is a goal when using a RA 
for cyber security testing of systems. CAVs, the systems with which they communicate and 
interact, and any other environmental considerations, are a system-of-systems 
transportation collective that will require adequate coverage from any threat modelling 
process. Ensuring adequate coverage is challenging due to the finite time and cost limits 
that exist for any system building and testing process. However, RAs can aid the 
systematic application of threat modelling, and thus, aids efficiency. 
 
Early work at WMG, part of the University of Warwick, has defined a first iteration of a RA 
for the collective12. The high-level architecture schematic is shown in Figure 4 below. The 
RA must be designed to provide adequate information to quickly convey the overall 
operation of the collective. However, it does not provide the detail necessary to describe 
how the individual subsystems operate internally. That would be the domain of the subject 
matter experts. What it does provide is the ability to extract operational viewpoints on 
different aspects of the ecosystem. 
 
11 Robert Cloutier et al. (2010) ‘The Concept of Reference Architectures’, Systems Engineering 13.1, pp. 14–
27. doi: 10.1002/sys.20129 
12 Maple, C., Bradbury, M., Le, A.T., and Ghirardello, K. (2019) ‘A Connected and Autonomous Vehicle 
Reference Architecture for Attack Surface Analysis’, Applied Sciences, 23, doi: 10.3390/app9235101 
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Figure 4. A reference architecture for CAV systems, their communications and environment 
4.2.3. Views, Viewpoints and Perspectives 
There will be multiple stakeholders in a system, each interested in a system function based 
upon their domain expertise. An engineer will require a different view of the architecture 
than a business manager. The former may use it to drill down into technical details, the 
latter may use it to understand costs. The two viewpoints are valid for their requirements. 
 
A wide variety of views can be derived from a RA to meet different needs. An engineer may 
have more than one view of a system depending upon the area of system functionality in 
which they are interested. SysML uses the term Viewpoint to define the elements of the 
model that make up a View, with multiple views collectively forming a Perspective. Views 
can aid the decomposition of an architecture into its subsystems and components to allow 
focus on a set of functionalities. The system’s architectural framework may define rules for 
viewpoints to ensure that views remain consistent and are complete models of extracted 
functionality. The use of views on the architecture in Figure 4 aid the subdividing of the 
system into functional and communication viewpoints, required for targeted threat 
modelling. 
4.2.4. A CAV Ecosystem View 
A security specialist performing a threat analysis on an aspect of the CAV ecosystem can 
develop an appropriate RA viewpoint as a starting point. The viewpoint allows a functional 
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use case to be extracted from the RA as a view to be used during a Threat Analysis and 
Risk Assessment (TARA) process when performing threat modelling (see Section 4.3). 
Figure 5 shows a cloud services view extracted from the RA. For the TARA process, this 
view allows focus on the particular use case under consideration. In this use case, the 
cloud services are used by vehicle occupants, or the vehicles themselves, to provide 
information-based services. For example, a vehicle occupant can receive details about a 
booked work job they are attending, or the vehicle can provide its perceived traffic 
information. The view provides the boundaries of the threat analysis. The communication 
links between the view entities, and the entities themselves, can be iterated to extract ToEs 
and begin the TARA process. 
 
 
Figure 5. A cloud services view from the CAV ecosystem reference architecture 
4.2.5. Tooling for Reference Architectures 
The RA is not just a schematic of a system. It is a process designed to capture the key 
elements of a complex system. The high-level overview is supported by a documentation 
store to help the system’s stakeholders obtain the required knowledge to understand the 
system operation. Tooling support is required to ensure that the RA is useful and not 
onerous. SysML, MBSE and other design tools can be used to aid the development, day-to-
day use, and management of a RA. They should be sharp tools9, they should not just be a 
diagramming package but contain features that aid the RA building process. For example, 
include rules that aid for consistency checks. A user should be able to define their own 
rules. For example, a Bluetooth communications path could only be established between 
entities that support the Bluetooth protocol. Other useful features will support the defining of 
viewpoints and extracting views. 
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4.2.6. Investing in a CAV Security Framework Reference Architecture 
All connected devices need serious consideration of cyber security implications. CAVs are 
regarded as part of the Internet of Things (IoT) with their connectivity providing an attack 
point from threat agents. However, the CAV ecosystem is a complex system-of-systems 
with many stakeholders. It requires a systematic method to aid efficient analysis, risk 
management, and mitigation of cyber threats. This will be achieved by a security framework 
that has buy-in from all stakeholders. 
 
The RA is the foundation of the security analysis, providing the stakeholders a common 
view from which the threat analysis work can be systematically derived. WMG’s research 
into RAs is still at an early stage. The use of RAs for security analysis needs additional 
research to leverage the potential gains in efficiency in handling complex system-of-
systems. Further investment in RA research will address several areas: 
 
● The current RA needs further expert input to refine its design and ensure it matches 
the CAV ecosystem technology and communications. 
● The notation used for the current schematic design should be translated into a 
machine compatible format. A notation such as SysML is a likely candidate. 
However, other notations may be desirable, though translations to other notations 
from SysML are possible. 
● Tooling for RA defining and management, the tooling must allow for the defining of 
views for cyber security threat analysis. This tooling is required for CAV industry 
stakeholders. Investigations into the suitability of existing tooling, or the design of 
new tooling, is required. 
● The reference architecture is not static. The technology and applications of the 
collective will change and evolve as society progresses. Thus, the reference 
architecture will need to change to maintain relevance, incorporating changes in 
technology and communications techniques. How this is best achieved amongst 
stakeholders will need consideration. 
 
CAV ecosystem modelling can aid the development and deployment of the emerging new 
industry. The targeting of suitable investment provides the UK with an opportunity to be a 
leader in the design and application of a Security Framework within the industry. 
4.3. Threat Modelling 
As a part of a threat detection program, and to optimise a threat analysis and risk reduction 
operation for any system, it is recommended to use threat modelling for efficiency. This section 
reviews some approaches in threat modelling, in terms of both the overall threat analysis of a 
system to determine the possible threats, and the ranking of those threats via a risk 
assessment method. After looking at different TARA methods, their application to threat 
modelling within the automotive field is examined. It gives recommendations for selecting the 
most suitable techniques. 
4.3.1. Introduction to Threat Modelling 
Threat modelling can be used to qualitatively and quantitatively highlight the potential 
security risks to CAVs, the environment they operate within, the ITS systems with which 
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they interact, and the supporting communications infrastructure. Threat modelling defines 
security goals, identifies vulnerabilities, outlines defence plans and remediates security 
threats. It should be employed early in the system design process and development cycle 
to lead to proactive architectural decisions, providing the motivation and evidence to 
support those decisions13. 
 
System and vehicle development timescales place a finite limit on the time available for 
security testing for potential threats and existing known threats. Threat modelling can 
highlight where mitigation can be deployed to cover the most critical threats. Furthermore, 
the modelling will capture the security state of the system at a point in time, allowing 
comparison with a revised system once mitigation measures have been applied. This 
allows reports to be generated on the security improvements made.  
 
A thorough threat modelling and risk assessment must be conducted to identify those 
critical threats. The modelling reduces the likelihood of threats taking advantage of potential 
system vulnerabilities. The CAV ecosystem has a variety of intertwined software 
technologies and physical infrastructures, involving a variety of stakeholders. Threat 
modelling can reduce the potential costs of rearchitecting, fixing and retrofitting a complex 
CPSs or communications system, by reducing the risk from an in-field security incident.  
Threat modelling is an analysis process, which uses abstractions to categorise threats and 
aid in evaluating the risks14. The abstraction can learn from analogies and similarities to the 
known security issues reported from other types of systems; thereby help identify new 
threats which are difficult to detect by automated tools, e.g. static code analysis. 
A reference architecture can aid threat modelling in eliciting and validating the attack paths 
required to achieve the attacker’s goals12. The attack paths, or surface, and attack goals 
will be needed to assess the likelihood of a successful attack. There are several structured 
threat modelling techniques proposed in the literature, designed with specific objectives. 
The following sections provide an overview of some of the techniques. 
4.3.2. STRIDE 
STRIDE is a mature modelling approach to target threats in software development. 
Microsoft adopted this model in 2002 and has improved it to cover changes in the threat 
landscape. It is usable in various domains to evaluate the system design in detail by 
applying a set of well-known threats including Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege, hence the name. 
These are the classifications of different techniques that threat agents can use to attack a 
system. STRIDE builds data-flow diagrams (DFDs) to identify system entities, events, and 
the boundaries of the system13 15. Table 1 explains STRIDE’s definitions and required 
security goals. 
 
 
13 Shevchenko, N. (2018) Threat Modeling: 12 Available Methods. Retrieved from Software Engineering 
Institute, Carengie Mellon University: https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2018/12/threat-modeling-12-
available-methods.html 
14 Shostack, A. (2014) ‘Threat Modelling: Designing for Security’, John Wiley & Sons 
15 Bodeau, D., McCollum, C., & Fox, D. (2018) Cyber Threat Modeling: Survey, Assessment, and 
Representative Framework. The MITRE Corporation, McLean, VA. 
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Table 1. STRIDE Threat Modelling 
 
4.3.3. DREAD 
DREAD is as qualitative risk assessment method once used, and created, by Microsoft. It 
provides an evaluation scheme to assess, score and prioritise threats that are identified by 
STRIDE, or other methods. DREAD enables the threat modelling to cover risk 
assessment15. The mnemonic comes from the five risk factors which are used to provide a 
comparative score for different threats: 
 
DREAD Risk = (Damage + Reproducibility + Exploitability + Affected Users + 
Discoverability) / 5 
 
DREAD provides a scale conversion to numerically assess the likelihood of specific threats. 
The sum of all the factors are normalised to represent the overall likelihood rating. Each 
threat will be scored on the five elements from 1 to 10, to provide a calculated risk of the 
severity and impact that can be used to rank threats, see Table 2. 
 
  
Threat Property Violated 
(security requirement) 
Definition Example 
Spoofing Authentication Impersonating 
something or someone 
else. 
Pretending to be something or 
someone other than yourself. 
Tampering Integrity Modifying data or code. Modifying something on disk, 
memory, network, or 
elsewhere. 
Repudiation Non-repudiation Claiming to have not 
performed an action. 
Claiming that you didn’t do 
something or were not 
responsible; can be honest or 
dishonest. 
Information 
Disclosure 
Confidentiality Exposing information to 
someone not authorised 
to see it. 
Providing information to 
someone not authorised to 
access it. 
Denial of 
Service 
Availability Deny or degrade service 
to users. 
Exhausting resources needed 
to provide service. 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Authorization Gain capabilities without 
proper authorization. 
Allowing someone to do 
something they are not 
authorised to do. 
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Table 2. DREAD Risk Assessment Ratings 
Damage Potential - how much damage that the threat can create 
0 Nothing 
5 Information disclosure that could be used in combination with other vulnerabilities 
7.5 Individual non sensitive user data is compromised 
9 Administrative non sensitive data is compromised 
10 Complete system or data destruction 
10 Function unavailability 
Reproducible - level of difficulty in reproducing the threat 
0 Very hard or impossible, even for administrators of the application 
5 Complex steps are required 
7.5 Easy steps are required 
10 Easy with limited number of tools are required 
Exploitability - level of difficulty in launching the threat 
2.5 Advanced programming and networking knowledge, with custom or advanced attack tools 
5 Exploit exits in public, using available attack tools 
9 An Application and Proxy tool is available 
10 Very easy to exploit 
Affected Users - number of users who are affected by the threat 
0 None 
2.5 Individual user that is already compromised 
5 Some users of individual privileges, but not all 
7.5 Administrative users/systems 
10 All users 
Discoverability - level of difficulty in finding the vulnerability 
0 Very hard and requires source code, configuration or administrative access 
5 Can figure it out by monitoring and manipulating requests and services 
7.5 Details of faults like this can be easily discovered  
10 The information is visible on the user or network side 
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As with other qualitative scores, subjectivity may be an issue and experience will improve 
its application. However, when applying to complex security analysis, the guidance is still 
vague, inconsistent, or debatable, which requires significant time and expertise to reach a 
reliable judgment. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), described in see Section 
4.5, is more practical than DREAD when applied to the vehicle security domain. The 
widespread use of CVSS has provided plenty of experience in its application to rankings of 
known vulnerabilities. 
4.3.4. TARA from Intel 
Threat Agent Risk Assessment (TARA) was published by Intel Corporation in 2009. Intel’s 
TARA should not be confused with the common threat modelling TARA term (Threat 
Analysis and Risk Assessment), which applies to the whole threat modelling process and 
the methodology within the Security Framework. 
 
Intel’s TARA detects threat agents that may cause losses by evaluating greatest risks and 
likelihoods. This method is cross-referenced with existing vulnerabilities and controls to 
pinpoint the areas that are most exposed. The security strategy inherent in TARA then 
focuses on these areas to minimise efforts while maximizing effects. 
 
Intel provided a library of threat agents to be used as the starting point to characterise 
threat agents. The Threat Agent Library (TAL) defines 22 archetypes, using eight key 
attributes or parameters: Intent, access, outcome, limits, resources, skill, objective, and 
visibility. Intel subsequently modified its list of key parameters to include motivation. In 
addition, Intel identified 10 elements of the motivation parameter (ideology, coercion, 
notoriety, personal satisfaction, organisational gain, personal financial gain, disgruntlement, 
accidental, dominance, and unpredictable), and modified its model so that each agent can 
have multiple motivations (defining motivation, co-motivation, subordinate motivation, 
binding motivation, and personal motivation)15. 
4.3.5. PASTA 
Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis (PASTA) developed in 2012 to combine 
both business objectives and technical requirements. A strategic risk-centric threat model 
with seven stages and multiple activities. PASTA involves operations, governance, 
architecture, and development security requirements. It employs an attacker-centric 
perspective to produce an asset-centric output in the form of threat enumeration and 
scoring15. 
4.3.6. VAST Modelling 
Visual, Agile, and Simple Threat (VAST) modelling crates an application threat model that 
uses process-flow diagrams and an operational threat model, which is created from a data-
flow diagram. It produces actionable and reliable results by recognising differences in 
operations. It is based on an automated threat modelling platform named ThreatModeler16. 
It is mostly used in the DevOps lifecycle15.  
 
16 https://threatmodeler.com/ 
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4.3.7. Attack Trees 
Attack Trees describe attacks to a system in the form of a tree. The diagram starts from the 
tree root, which is the goal of the attack, followed by attack methods as the leaves. A 
complete system threat analysis creates several Attack Trees that demonstrate separated 
attack goals for each component of the system13. Attack Tree modelling is used for threat 
assessments of systems and CPSs. It can be applied in combination with other 
frameworks, including STRIDE and PASTA. Additional information on Attack Trees is in 
Section 4.6.4. 
4.3.8. NIST SP 800-154 Draft 
NIST has the draft the SP 800-15417, which focuses on identifying and prioritising threats 
against specific types of data within systems in order to inform and assess approaches for 
securing the data, it is a data-centric system for threat modelling. 
4.4. Threat Modelling in the Automotive Domain 
Many threat modelling techniques apply to systems in general, and not specifically to the 
automotive domain. In SAE J3061 - Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle 
Systems2, the first widely referenced vehicle security guideline, it suggests a threat analysis 
and risk assessment approach using frameworks such as: 
• EVITA – This came from the European E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected 
Applications project that ran from 2008 to 2011 and investigated protection of in-vehicle 
networks. It looked at security engineering, threats and security requirements18. The 
use of EVITA for risk assessment is further discussed in Section 4.6.1. 
• OCTAVE – This came from Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute in 1999, 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation, used for identifying 
and managing information security risks. It defines an evaluation method that allows an 
organisation to identify the information assets that are important to the mission of the 
organisation, the threats to those assets, and the vulnerabilities that may expose those 
assets to the threats19. 
• HEAVENS – This came from the Swedish HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software 
Security and Safety project that ran from 2013 to 2016. The goal was to identify security 
vulnerabilities in automotive systems. The resultant HEAVENS security model is a 
systematic approach (methods, processes and tool support) of deriving security 
requirements and to perform security testing and evaluation systems20. 
These frameworks are aimed at vehicular systems, and they contain four main functional 
processes: 
 
17 Souppaya, M., & Scarfone, K. (2016) ‘Guide to data-centric system threat modeling’, NIST Special 
Publication (SP) 800-154 (Draft). National Institute of Standards and Technology 
18 Ruddle, A., Ward, D., Weyl, B., Idrees, S., Roudier, Y., Friedewald, M., … Pedroza, G. (2009) ‘Security 
requirements for automotive on-board networks based on dark-side scenarios’, EVITA deliverable 2.3  
19 Alberts, C. J., Behrens, S. G., Pethia, R. D., & Wilson, W. R. (1999) ‘Operationally critical threat, asset, 
and vulnerability evaluation (OCTAVE) framework, Version 1.0’, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie-
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA  
20 HEAVENS, Retrieved from: http://www.vinnova.se/sv/Resultat/Projekt/Effekta/HEAVENS-HEAling-
Vulnerabilities-to-ENhance-Software-Security-and-Safety/ 
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• Asset analysis 
• Threat identification 
• Threat classification 
• Risk assessment 
A mapping consideration between the processes and the core functions are provided in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Main functions of common threat modelling methodology21 
There are several attempts to improve the TARA to match the context of autonomous driving 
such as follows: 
DAS-TARA21: TARA for Driving Automation System that considers the levels of automation 
when considering the risks and countermeasures applied in the driving functions. The method 
proposed to consider explicitly the Dynamic Driving Tasks, which are detailed in SAE J30162, 
rather than the general driving functions of the conventional cars. 
 
TARA+22: extends the impact assessments through incorporating the attack controllability by 
the automated driving system or by the driver. 
 
The practices of applying these approaches, combined with some of the methods from the 
previous Section 4.3,  for identifying the CAV security threats are summarised in Table 3. 
 
 
21 Cui, J., and Sabaliauskaite, G. (2017) ‘On the alignment of safety and security for autonomous vehicles’, 
IARIA CYBER, Barcelona, Spain 
22 Bolovinou, A., Atmaca, U., Sheik, A.T., Ur-Rehman, O., Wallraf, G., and Amditis, A. (2019) ‘TARA+: 
Controllability-aware Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for L3 Automated Driving Systems’ 
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Table 3. Commonly used threat modelling methods in vehicle security projects 
Model Description Applicable 
CIA A classical model to consider security in the 
aspects of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability 
Medium 
STRIDE Microsoft threat model to categorise attacks by 
purposes 
High (used in several vehicle 
security projects) 
DREAD Microsoft model to rank the risk of threats Medium 
OCTAVE Consider threats on three aspects: security 
practices, technology, and operational risk. 
Medium (it is too complex to 
apply in the context of vehicles) 
EVITA Qualitatively assesses the impact of threats and 
provides a ranking to risks. 
High (often cited in automotive 
security research) 
HEAVENS A system to identify risk to automotive system. High (coordinated by Volvo) 
TVRA ETSI threat model to analyse the emerging 
Intelligent Transport System architecture 
High 
 
For addressing the potential threats toward CAVs, under a proposed Security Frame (see Figure 
2) within a cyber security centre, the following steps can be applied: 
1. Identifying the CAV communication components and assets via a reference architecture. 
2. Applying STRIDE to analyse the potential threats to the components and assets. 
3. Desktop research (review the knowledge base and known literature) to find evidence of 
the potential threats and their relevant risks. 
4. Check the vulnerability databases to see more detailed assessments of the threats. 
A CAV’s complex operation is controlled by interconnected computers, or Electronic Control 
Units (ECUs). Several in-vehicle networks (IVNs) allow ECUs to operate in functional domains 
to exchange data23, see Figure 7. A gateway ECU allows data to flow between functional areas, 
for example when engine revolutions are displayed on an interior tachometer. The number of 
ECUs, IVNs and their functionality will vary between vehicles. 
Different ECUs may deliver wireless communications to a connected vehicle, they include a 
Telematics Box (T-Box) or Telematics Control Unit (TCU), In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) system, 
separate Radio or Bluetooth receivers, systems Telematics Service Provider such as fleet 
management systems, mobile applications, as well as other types of ECUs, such as insurance 
monitoring. 
 
23 Robert Bosch Gmbh, ed. (2014) Bosch Automotive Electrics and Automotive Electronics - Systems and 
Components, Networking and Hybrid Drive. 5th ed. Plochingen: Springer Vieweg, doi: 10.1007/978-3- 
658-01784-2 
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Figure 7. In-vehicle networks interconnect various vehicle ECUs 
How ECUs and IVNs are design will vary by manufacturer. Some may combine different 
functions into one unit to reduce component cost, for example combine a gateway ECU with a 
T-Box and even incorporating an IVI. Once the communications components are identified 
(step 1) the threats towards the system can be identified and reviewed. Here providing 
examples under a high-level STRIDE analysis. In these examples not every STRIDE category 
applies. 
4.4.1. Telematics Box 
The T-Box is responsible for the remote communications between the vehicle and the cloud 
platform communications networks. T-Box devices can be electronic units which integrate 
communication chip functions required for access to communications networks. This 
includes the 3G/4G, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi wireless module, microcontroller (MCU) or System on 
a Chip (SoC), the GNSS receivers and other functionality. Commands from telematics 
service providers or smartphone apps can be transferred through T-Box devices to remote 
control the CAV to open the doors, stop the engine, or other physical functions24. Some of 
the T-Boxes allow the vehicle to be tracked in real-time using satellite constellations to 
deliver functions such as planning the optimal route or anti-theft24. 
 
Applying STRIDE for Telematics Box: 
• Spoofing: Malicious firmware can be installed if the attacker can enter the uboot 
universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART) debug interface in the T-Box 
hardware layer28. Attackers can also use wireless access to connect to the vehicle, as 
was the case in the famous Jeep attack25. 
• Tampering: Researchers26 used a side-channel attack which tampers the embedded 
block random access memories (BRAMs) which store the Advanced Encryption 
 
24 Li, Y., Luo, Q., Liu, J., Guo, H., and Kato, N. (2019) ‘TSP Security in Intelligent and Connected Vehicles: 
Challenges and Solutions’, IEEE Wireless Communications, 2019, 26, (3), pp. 125-131 
25 Miller, C., and Valasek, C. (2015) ‘Remote exploitation of an unaltered passenger vehicle’, Black Hat USA 
26 Aldaya, A.C., Sarmiento, A.J.C., and Sánchez-Solano, S. (2016) ‘AES T-Box tampering attack’, Journal of 
Cryptographic Engineering 
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Standard (AES) keys of the T-Boxes. Others27 showed techniques to reverse-
engineering the T-Box firmware to recover the Next Generation Telematics Patterns 
(NGTP) protocol and the encryption/signature algorithms. Consequently, they can send 
NGTP messages via SMS to trigger the Remote Service. They can then send remote 
code execution to provision an update and send messages onto the CAN Bus. 
• Information disclosure: The attackers can eavesdrop the communication through T-
BOX by using techniques such as pseudo base stations and DNS hijacking28. The real-
time tracking function once compromised can expose users’ privacy24. 
• Denial of Service: attackers can overwhelm the T-Box to disrupt remote connections 
which rely on it. 
• Elevation of Privilege: XSS attack can be used when the users access the malicious 
websites which contain malicious scripts that can control their browsers. The 
compromised scripts can allow attackers to bypass authentications, therefore have 
rights to access private information or manipulate users’ data24. Authentication maybe 
simplified for the high mobility and short transmission distance of the connected cars. 
This makes other techniques to bypass T-Box authentication possible, including brute 
force and authentication spoofing. 
Suggestions for testing T-Box29: 
● penetration tests to test the security services such as debugging and data output 
interface, start-up verification, secret key management, operating system security, OTA 
upgrade. 
● using vulnerability scanner, source code analysis, firmware reverse scanning to scan the 
relevant information of security issues regarding the tested T-Box. 
● using network simulations to study the potential impacts when attacks happen. 
4.4.2. In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI)  
The IVI delivers the multimedia, application and navigation services to the passengers via 
the car’s information system via different interfaces such as voice command, touchscreen 
input, or physical controls. Users’ smartphone can also be connected to the IVI30. The IVI 
system can use communication protocols such as 3G, 4G, RF (Radio Frequency) antennas 
to connect to the servers, normally via the T-Box. 
 
Threats in IVI 
• Spoofing attack: Attackers can mislead the driver’s destination by spoofing the 
surrounding GPS signals31. Malicious signals can be injected into the vehicle via the 
mobile network and lead to acquiring the control of vehicle brakes and other critical 
 
27 Cai, Z., Wang, A., Zhang, W., Gruffke, M., and Schweppe, H. (2019) ‘0-days & Mitigations: Roadways to 
Exploit and Secure Connected BMW Cars’, Black Hat USA 
28 Wang, Z., Wang, Y., Zhang, Y., Liu, Y., Ma, C., and Wang, H. (2019) ‘A Brief Survey on Cyber Security 
Attack Entrances and Protection Strategies of Intelligent Connected Vehicle’, Springer International 
Publishing  
29 Shao, X., Dong, C., and Dong, L. (2019) ‘Research on Detection and Evaluation Technology of 
Cybersecurity in Intelligent and Connected Vehicle’, pp. 413-416 
30 Zhang, Y., Han, S., Zhong, S., Shi, P., and Shao, X. (2019) ‘Research on Information Security Test 
Evaluation Method Based on Intelligent Connected Vehicle’, Springer International Publishing 
31 Parkinson, S., Ward, P., Wilson, K., and Miller, J. (2017) ‘Cyber Threats Facing Autonomous and 
Connected Vehicles: Future Challenges’, IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 
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systems25. The Tyre Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) uses the 315 MHz or 433 
MHz band frequency which are vulnerable from jamming and falsification attacks. When 
such attacks happen, the TPMS system can trigger false warning messages on the IVI 
which can disrupt the driver31. 
• Information Disclosure: Attackers can eavesdrop users’ private information such as 
GPS; data from the in-cabin microphone which is used for hand-free calling; or other 
data that connected through the IRC channel32. 
• Denial of Service: Jamming attacks can be used to disrupt the IVI functions31, for 
example preventing in-vehicle apps from communication to cloud services. 
• Elevation of Privilege: There is a known vulnerability of the MirrorLink protocol for 
integrating a smartphone to an automotive infotainment system33. In detail, attackers 
can control the driver’s smartphone and send malicious messages into the in-vehicle 
network through the IVI system. Besides that, researchers34 show a method to 
compromise the IVI system via a fake WiFi connection to redirect the traffic to a 
malicious domain for installing compromised firmware. The compromised firmware later 
allows the attackers to control the vehicle remotely. Researchers35 have demonstrated 
injection of malicious code into a genuine Android app to provide a backdoor, which 
allows the attacker to access the infotainment remotely to record sounds inside the 
vehicle and collect information circulating on the CAN bus.   
4.4.3. Radio 
The radio surface refers to the communications through radio waves, including mobile, Wi-
Fi and Bluetooth communications, TPMS, or Remote Keyless Entry System (RKMS) that 
leverage radio communications. 
• Spoofing: Attackers can send spoofing signals to the vehicle claiming that they are a 
serving edge node36. If the vehicle connects to the rogue edge node, there will be high 
risk of privacy leakage and other consequence attacks such as man-in-the-middle or 
DoS. 
• DoS: Researchers37 show that a compromised vehicle can send malicious messages, 
which spoof its trajectory data (speed and location), to the Intelligent Traffic Signal 
System to malfunction its congestion control. 
• Elevation of Privilege: according to the Armis security lab38, an attack called 
BlueBorne which exploits the vulnerability of Bluetooth can take complete control over 
 
32 Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., Savage, S., Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., 
Roesner, F., and Kohno, T. (2011) ‘Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces’  
33 Mazloom, S., Rezaeirad, M., Hunter, A., and McCoy, D. (2016) ‘A security analysis of an in-vehicle 
infotainment and app platform’  
34 Nie, S., Liu, L., and Du, Y. (2017) ‘Free-fall: Hacking tesla from wireless to CAN bus’, Briefing, Black Hat 
USA 
35 Costantino, G., Marra, A.L., Martinelli, F., and Matteucci, I.: ‘CANDY: A Social Engineering Attack to Leak 
Information from Infotainment System’, 2018 
36 Lu, X., Wan, X., Xiao, L., Tang, Y., and Zhuang, W. (2018) ‘Learning-Based Rogue Edge Detection in 
VANETs with Ambient Radio Signals’ 
37 Chen, Q.A., Yin, Y., Feng, Y., Mao, Z.M., and Liu, H.X. (2018) ‘Exposing Congestion Attack on Emerging 
Connected Vehicle based Traffic Signal Control’  
38 The Attack Vector ‘BlueBorne’ Exposes Almost Every Connected Device, 
https://www.armis.com/blueborne/ 
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targeted devices without requiring the targeted device to be paired, or even to be set on 
discoverable mode. 
4.4.4. Telematics Service Provider (TSP) 
• Elevation of Privilege: Researchers39 found that the CVE 2014-4113 vulnerability 
regarding the Session Example servlet, which used by TSP Cloud Platform, can be 
exploited by the attacker to gain the administrator right in a session. 
4.4.5. Electronic Control Unit (ECU)  
• Elevation of Privilege: Researchers39 showed that malicious code can be injected into 
Bluetooth cable devices to manipulate the in-vehicle systems. 
4.4.6. Mobile Application (Mobile App) 
• Denial of Service: In a car sharing app it was possible to upload an unlimited number of 
pictures, flooding a server39. 
• Elevation of Privilege: In car sharing apps and a car manufacturer’s diagnostic app 
researchers39 found it was possible to modify the app code to leak user account 
information. 
4.5. CVSS Scoring of Vulnerabilities 
When, as part of a security assessment, vulnerabilities are identified, it is useful to score them. 
This enables the vulnerabilities to be directly compared to each other, as well as ranked for 
purposes such as remediation. 
 
CVSS, the Common Vulnerability Scoring System, is a security industry de-facto standard way 
of quantitatively grading vulnerabilities or security issues. At a high level, each vulnerability 
ends up with a score between zero and ten, with ten being the most severe. This final value is 
calculated by assessing various attributes or properties of the vulnerability, including (in version 
3): 
 
● The attack vector (local or remote) 
● The attack complexity (low to high) 
● The privileges required to perform the attack 
● Whether the attack requires a user to interact with the system 
● Whether the attack grants the attacker additional scope for further exploitation 
● How the attack affects the confidentiality of the system 
● How the attack affects the integrity of the system 
● How the attack affects the availability of the system 
 
These individual metrics are then tallied to result in the final 0 to 10 score. It should be noted 
that CVSS does not make a provision for safety as a factor, however with CVSS v3.1 
extensions framework40 would permit safety to be added as a factor if this was deemed 
necessary. 
 
39 Yan, W. (2015) ‘A two-year survey on security challenges in automotive threat landscape’ 
40 FIRST, ‘CVSS User Guide’ https://www.first.org/cvss/user-guide 
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4.5.1. Worked Example 
For the given use case of V2C telematics, let us consider that an attacker can unplug an 
exposed connector inside a vehicle, disconnecting the antenna used to transmit and 
receive mobile data. This means that the vehicle cannot send or receive telematics data. 
 
This attack (whilst simple) could be useful in several real-world scenarios. For example, a 
car thief may disconnect this antenna in order to prevent telematics from reporting a stolen 
vehicle’s location. This could also be a boon to privacy, allowing a legitimate end user to 
physically prevent their vehicle from ‘phoning home’ with data about the user’s behaviour. 
 
Qualitatively, the attack requires physical access to the vehicle, but no technical expertise 
or skill, with no privileged access to any systems. It results in a denial of service for any 
vehicle functionality which relies on mobile data (including telemetry). 
 
The CVSS v3 score is obtained as: 
 
AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H 
 
This is shown in the CVSS calculator Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. NVD’s CVSSv3 calculator 
 
This results in an overall CVSSv3 score of 4.6. The full workings for this final score can be 
tried on a CVSS calculator41. 
4.6. Assessing and Managing Cyber Security Risks 
Risk assessment is the process of evaluating the risks to rank or categorise the threats. The 
main approaches in risk assessment include quantitative, qualitative, or hybrid (combination 
between quantitative and qualitative). For the vehicle security domain, the qualitative approach 
is suggested in several standards, best practices, and guidelines, for example J30612 and 
ISO/SAE 2143442. The quantitative approaches may be industry specific and difficult to 
implement for embedded systems, as with OCTAVE; therefore, they have been used less 
within the automotive field. 
 
 
41 NIST, CVSS Calculator, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator 
42 ISO and SAE (2020) Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering (ISO SAE DIS 21434). Geneva 
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Risk assessment consists of two separate parts: assessing threat likelihood and assessing 
threat impacts. The overall risk evaluation of a threat will be obtained only after understanding 
the probability that this threat will happen (likelihood) and how much damage it can create to 
the system. Details of these two processes are presented in the following sections. 
4.6.1. Threat Likelihood 
Threat likelihood assessments consider how easy it is to attack a system. Firstly, the 
requirements that need to be met in order to launch an attack successfully need to be 
considered. The threat becomes feasible only when the attackers have acquired the 
capability to launch it. Therefore, the requirements to launch the attack is also called 
‘attacker capability’. Secondly, the assessment process needs to understand the defender’s 
capability, which is the available mitigations inside the system to defend against the attack. 
The final evaluation of threat likelihood will be obtained after comparing between the 
attacker and defender capabilities. 
Common threat likelihood assessment rankings use EVITA (see Section 4.4), DREAD (see 
Section 4.3), CVSS (see Section 4.5), each of which decompose the attacker capability into 
different factors for easier evaluation. 
In the EVITA framework the attacker capability can be assessed through the following five 
factors: 
• Elapsed Time: the total amount of time taken by an attacker to identify that a 
potential vulnerability may exist, to develop an attack method and to sustain the 
effort required mounting the attack. 
• Specialist Expertise: This refers to the required level of knowledge of the 
underlying principles, product types or attack methods. 
• Knowledge of the system under investigation: This refers to specific expertise in 
relation to the system under investigation. 
• Window of opportunity: This has a relationship to the Elapsed Time factor. 
Identification and exploitation of vulnerability may require considerable amounts of 
access to a system that may increase the likelihood of detection of the attack. Some 
attack methods may require considerable preparation, and only brief access to the 
target to exploit. Access may also need to be continuous or over a number of 
sessions. 
• IT hardware/software or other equipment: This refers to the equipment required 
to identify and exploit the vulnerability. 
A detailed evaluation for enumerating the attacker capabilities is given in Table 4. The 
overall numerical value is calculated by summing the values of all the five factors. The 
threat likelihood can be accessed by converting the attacker capabilities through a 
conversion table, which is given in Table 4. 
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Table 4. EVITA enumeration of attacker capabilities 
Factor Level Comments Value 
Elapsed time < 1 day   0 
1 day – 1 week   1 
1 week – 1 month   4 
1 month – 3 months   10 
3 – 6 months   19 
Unidentified The attack is not exploitable within a 
timescale that would be useful for the 
attackers 
∞ 
Expertise Layman No special security knowledge 0 
Proficiency Familiar with security 3 
Expert Mastering security in one or a few 
relevant fields 
6 
Many experts Collaboration of experts from 
multidisciplinary 
8 
Knowledge Public Easy to access 0 
Restricted Confident within a company 3 
Sensitive Known between a developing team 7 
Critical Known between few individuals 11 
Opportunities Unnecessary Do not need windows of opportunities 0 
Easy (<1 day) & (number of assets < 10) 1 
Moderate (1 day to 1 month) or (number of 
assets is between 10 and 100) 
4 
Difficult (More than 1 month) or (number of 
assets > 100) 
10 
None Window of opportunities is negligible ∞ 
Equipment Standard Already available for the attackers 0 
Specialised Not available but easy to get 4 
Bespoke Expensive and not available 7 
Multi-bespoke Different types of bespoke are needed 9 
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4.6.2. Threat Impacts 
The impacts of a threat represent the harm that this threat can create to the targeted system. 
Threat impacts can be considered in the four following EVITA perspectives: 
 
• Safety: the safety harm (e.g. injuries) that a threat causes to the human involved in the 
transportation system. 
• Privacy: the attack can cause leakage of sensitive information, which can be information 
about the operations of a vehicle, information from the passengers’ data, or the data from 
accessing (online) services. 
• Financial: the attack can cause financial losses to the vehicle itself and to other relevant 
on-road properties. 
• Operational: the attack can cause interference to the vehicle operations or downgrade 
its performance. 
 
Table 5 presents a numerical assessment of threat impacts regarding these four 
perspectives. This table has been cited heavily in vehicle cyber security risk assessment 
work, for example when assessing OBD security issues43. The impacts are related not only 
on the threats, but also to the operational scenarios. Therefore, when assessing the 
impacts of threats towards a targeted vehicle or component, it is important to clarify the 
working scenarios for these entities (which may include how the entities work, what are the 
relevant assets, what is in the surrounding environment, and other factors).  
 
  
 
43 Klinedinst, D., & King, C. (2016) On Board Diagnostics: Risks and Vulnerabilities of the Connected 
Vehicle. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=453871 
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Table 5. EVITA severity classification 
Impact 
Level 
Safety Privacy Financial Operational 
0 No injuries Undisclosed or non-
linkable data 
No loss No impact on 
vehicle 
performance 
1 Single light to 
moderate injury 
One identified vehicle Low-level loss (< £10) One small impact 
on a vehicle 
2 Single severe injury 
or multiple moderate 
injuries 
One vehicle tracking or 
identification of multiple 
vehicles 
Moderate loss for a 
single vehicle 
(between £10 and 
£100; or 
Low losses for multiple 
vehicles 
One big impact or 
many small 
impacts 
3 A single life-
threatening injury or 
multiple severe 
injuries 
Multiple vehicle 
tracking 
Heavy loss (≈ £1000); 
or 
moderate losses for 
multiple vehicles 
Big impact on 
many vehicles 
4 Life threatening or 
fatal injuries for 
multiple vehicles 
Driver or vehicle 
tracking for multiple 
vehicles 
Heavy losses for 
multiple vehicles 
Significant impact 
for multiple 
vehicles 
 
4.6.3. Risk Assessment Rating 
The risk rating can be considered as a function of the threat likelihood and its impact. For 
qualitative approaches, the risk rating can be obtained through a lookup table. This allows a 
statement of the subjectivity of the impact to be turned into a numerical value. Furthermore, 
when assessing the impact of a threat, it could adversely affect the safe use of a CPS. The 
CAV security literature differentiates the impacts of safety from the privacy, operational and 
financial factors (see Table 5) because safety may endanger human life. Therefore, safety 
is of higher criticality in comparison with other factors. As a result, the impact of safety is 
often considered to be more severe than those of the other perspectives. Table 6 and Table 
7 give examples of a lookup that can be used to derive the risk assessment ranking from 
the threat likelihood (ranked 1 to 5), and the safety or non-safety impact (ranked 1 to 4). 
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Table 6. Conversion to risk rating given the non-safety threat impact and likelihood 
Non-safety impact level Threat likelihood 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 0 1 2 3 
2 0 1 2 3 4 
3 1 2 3 4 5 
4 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Table 7. Conversion to risk rating given the safety threat impact and likelihood 
Safety impact level Threat likelihood 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 7+ 
4 5 6 7 7+ 7+ 
 
4.6.4. Risk Management 
Analysis of the threats to a system, vehicle or communication channel may identify many 
feasible attacks. Testing on all the known threats does not necessarily reveal the complete 
security posture of the tested system. For example, out of 100 test cases, system A passes 
90, while system B only passes 80 threats. If A fails on some of the threat tests that B 
passes, it is difficult to conclude that system A is more secure than B. Therefore, what is 
more important is to understand the risks behind the threats. It is also important to 
emphasise that rather than show that the system is free from certain threats, the purpose of 
testing is to justify: 
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• the risks that have been eliminated (via a re-engineering); 
• the risks that have been mitigated (reducing the risk’s rating); 
• the risks that are remaining. 
 
An effective method to manage the relations between threats and risks is via the use of 
Attack Trees13, see Section 4.3.7. They aim to address all possible elements that an attack 
needs in order to be launched successfully. The analysis focuses on drawing a logical ’tree’ 
for each attack. Each tree has a root node which represents the final goal of the attack. The 
leaves of the tree are the logical steps that attackers need to achieve before reaching the 
root. The parent node and child node of a tree can relate to each other by either ’OR’ or 
’AND’ conditions. In an ’OR’ relationship, the parent node is true if any of the child nodes is 
true. On the other hand, in an ’AND’ relationship, all the child nodes need to be achieved in 
order for the parent to be successful. Other system fault analysis such as ETA (event tree 
analysis), FTA (fault tree analysis), and FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis) have similar 
structure and can be easily converted to Attack Trees. Both quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment techniques can be applied in Attack Tree analysis. Much research has applied 
Attack Tree methodologies to assessing vehicle security risk, for example in the EVITA 
project18.  
 
The key idea of using an Attack Tree to manage the threats is to structure the attack 
surface by the potential threat agents and their goals to compromise the system. Based on 
the attackers’ goals, the defenders will need to investigate the attack surface to find all the 
possibilities of manipulations to achieve the goal. The attack surface is restructured as 
multiple Attack Trees, each tree includes one goal as the tree root and multiple tree leaves, 
which are sub-goal and activities that are essential to reach the main goal. Instead of a 
bottom-up strategy which tries to test every possible threat to assess the security posture, 
the defenders now use a top-down approach which focuses on the most relevant risks 
(justified from the threat agent analysis) to derive the tests which are necessary. The top-
down approach can create a list of tests which are more relevant and more understandable 
in terms of justifying the risks.  
 
Another advantage of Attack Tree as a method is the capability of reusing the analysis work. 
For example, when considering a new risk, the defenders can break it into multiple sub-goals, 
some of which may already be analysed in other Attack Trees. In such cases, the tree can 
be built more quickly by retaking the previous analysis for the known branches. 
 
Attack Trees can be employed to synthesise, manage, and control the attack surface. The 
process to perform the Attack Tree analysis is illustrated in Figure 9. The tree starts with the 
attack goals, which can be derived from attackers’ motivations and stakeholders’ security 
requirements. It then goes to the child nodes which represent the attacked functions or sub-
goals that need to satisfy the attack goal. The attack surfaces and detailed knowledge of the 
attacks (i.e. STRIDE modelling) will be structured based on the attacked functions.      
 
Evaluation of threat agents appears on both ends of the Attack Tree. In one end, threat 
agents influence the attack goals. It is assumed that threat agents will consider only goals 
that suit their needs. For example, a thief will be motivated by stealing the physical assets 
more than creating damage, while a hacktivist is more likely to find ways to manipulate the 
system rather than to inflict harm to it. On the other hand, each threat will require a certain 
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technique, skills, knowledge, equipment etc. to be implemented. Therefore, at the other end 
of the tree, the capability of threat agents needs to be evaluated to see whether the goal is 
feasible. 
 
Figure 9. A threat management strategy based on Attack Trees 
4.7. Mitigation 
Mitigation for cyber attacks can be categorised under two main types, authentication across 
boundary domains (including encryption of data) as the first line of defence to prevent 
unauthorised access, and secondly intrusion detection as the second line of defence to monitor 
abnormal behaviours once the attackers get in the system. However, mitigation applying for 
each attack and risk can be varied as they can affect the operation of the assets which need to 
be protected. For example, encryption algorithms applied in the CAN network should be light 
weight with low delay given the limited memory and computing power of the ECUs; while 
encryptions in other networks could be more sophisticated to strengthen the defence. As a 
result, it is important to keep up to date with the reported mitigation towards specific attacks 
and risks. There are also attacks which aim at breaking certain mitigation, for example, the 
side-channel attacks such as power analysis aiming at exposing the encryption key. If this kind 
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of attack is successful, the targeted mitigation can become invalid. Therefore, it is essential to 
update the strength and weakness of each mitigation when applying to the security system. 
Table 8 synthesises the common security controls for mitigating the attacks in the vehicle ’s 
communication44 45 46. These controls are categorised based on the targeted components, 
while the ‘x’ marks their effectiveness to STRIDE threats. This table can be used to find 
suitable mitigation for threats or risks targeting components. 
 
Table 8. Countermeasures applied in vehicle communication, derived from multiple sources 
Components Countermeasures S T R I D E 
Telematics 
gateway, a.k.a. T-
Box 
Detection of fake mobile networks x x x x x   
Secure boot process   x         
Debug port authentication x x         
Over the air software updates    x   x x   
Memory randomisation to protect buffer overflow   x       x 
IDS and IPS x x x x x x 
Data encryption to secure client-server communications 
from the T-Box to the cloud services  
      x     
Trust anchor for external communications x x x x     
SMS authentication x           
Hardening hardware security x x x x x x 
Mobile network 
operator 
SMS firewall   x   x x x 
Secure SIM data x x x x     
Telematics service 
provider 
Encrypted communication    x   x     
Adherence to security standards (ISO 27001) x x x x x x 
Mutual authentication for all client communications x           
ECUs/CAN 
bus/OBD 
OBD hardware covering x         x 
CAN bus firewall x x     x x 
 
44 Oyler, A., and Saiedian, H. (2016) ‘Security in automotive telematics: a survey of threats and risk 
mitigation strategies to counter the existing and emerging attack vectors’, Security and Communication 
Networks, 9, (17), pp. 4330-4340 
45 Graubart, R.D., McQuaid, R., and Woodill, J. (2019) ‘Cyber Resiliency Metrics and Scoring in Practice’ 
46 ENISA (2019) ‘ENISA good practices for security of Smart Cars’ 
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Message authentication codes x x         
ECU key management x x x x x x 
CAN bus anomaly detection network monitor  x x x x x x 
Validate source of messages and suppress invalid 
messages 
x   x   x x 
Attestation functions for ECUs x x x x x x 
Digital signing for ECU updates: require OEM 
digital signature for updating ECU firmware 
x x x x x x 
OBD lock either physical or logical to prevent 
unauthenticated CAN bus access via OBD 
x x x x   x 
Centralised authentication  x x         
In-vehicle 
infotainment/ 
Radio 
Digital signatures for applications x x x       
Embedded virtualization x x   x x x 
Wi-Fi password policy x x   x     
Wi-Fi security compliance with NIST guidelines x x   x x x 
Bluetooth security compliance with NIST guidelines x x   x x x 
USB security compliance with best practices    x       x 
Recovery by design           x 
Bug bounties x x x x x x 
Periodic refresh of the Infotainment system     x x   x 
Validate infotainment system x x x x   x 
Multi-Factor Authentication to strengthen the 
authentication of door lock, e.g. PIN entry on the IVI 
to counter key fob relay attacks 
  x       x 
It is important to consider how much security of the system is improved after applying mitigation, 
and how to choose the mitigation effectively given the limited security resource that a system 
has. Attack Trees can be used to tackle these issues. The main idea is to build an Attack Tree 
for each of the potential risks and assess whether the root of the tree can still be reached with 
the available mitigation. For example, mitigation which can prevent any leaf of an ‘AND’ Attack 
Tree is enough to eliminate the risk corresponds to this tree, while the ’OR’ Attack Tree will 
require mitigation for all the leaves in the tree. The effectiveness of a mitigation should be 
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considered given all the Attack Trees within the security scope of the system rather than for just 
a single threat. There are also automation tools (e.g. isograph47) for Attack Trees which can 
speed up the analysis for selecting the effective mitigation. 
Besides specific mitigation, there are other general mitigation strategies which employ system 
design to reduce the impacts of the attacks. The testing procedure also needs to revise the 
design of the target systems following these strategies for recommendations. The potential 
strategies include (but not limited to): 
● Applying the principle of least privilege: the principle is about limiting the (access) rights of 
every program or application programming interface to only what is needed to complete the 
work or action48. This strategy is to prevent attackers from exploiting the vulnerability of one 
attack surface to escalate the access right to other components. This principle can be applied 
to many assets and services in vehicle communication. For example, messages from the 
telematics gateway should not be able to invoke access to the CAN bus; or SMS service 
provider should be whitelisting to prevent unauthorised remote operation services. 
● Separating the safety-critical network segments from the external interfaces: if there exists 
any interface that connects a safety-critical network an external path, attackers can exploit 
an interface to manipulate the safety related functions, which can lead to safety issues. 
● Planning different operation modes to react when the system is under attack: attacks can be 
unavoidable in some circumstances despite all the defence efforts (e.g. due to unknown 
attack, zero-day vulnerability). Therefore, it is important to prepare for several scenarios such 
as “Safe Mode”49 in which all the non-essential communication functions of the vehicle are 
turn-off; or “Go Dark”49 mode where all the wireless interfaces are disabled to eliminate the 
remote attacks. 
4.8. Reviewing Security Testing Techniques 
For vehicle manufacturers and their suppliers, guidelines and standards, and proposed 
standards, require the implementation of practical security testing. This is the next stage in the 
security assessment of a system once the TARA process has progressed. Security testing is 
an additional overhead in the development process for new vehicle models. Such testing must 
include the links beyond the boundary of the vehicle because vehicle connectivity has made it 
part of a wider cyber ecosystem. This means security testing extends to the communications 
infrastructure and ITS. Fortunately for manufacturers, their existing investments and expertise 
in functional testing can be leveraged for the challenges of cyber security testing, and, as the 
J3061 guidelines indicate, testing processes should not need to change a great deal. 
Furthermore, if cyber security testing is performed early enough it can allow for feedback into 
designs prior to production, as it should do to ensure security is baked into systems. 
 
When engineers design a system, they can specify functional security mechanisms, for 
example, authentication of a user via a logging-in facility, e.g. entering a Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) when syncing a smartphone to a vehicle. Any designed-in security mechanisms 
are to protect the security (CIA) properties of the system. The functional security mechanisms 
 
47 https://www.isograph.com/software/attacktree/mitigating-against-attacks/ 
48 Oyler, A., and Saiedian, H. (2016) ‘Security in automotive telematics: a survey of threats and risk mitigation strategies 
to counter the existing and emerging attack vectors’, Security and Communication Networks 
49 Graubart, R.D., McQuaid, R., and Woodill, J. (2018) ‘Cyber Resiliency Metrics and Scoring in Practice’ 
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will be defined in the system specifications. The test plans for the system will check that such 
defined security mechanisms function as intended50. 
 
What is often exploited by malicious agents is hidden, and unwanted, functionality51, caused by 
engineering issues. In a system that uses software for much of its functionality, it is bugs that 
cause engineering issues. These bugs can take the form of: 
 
• Logical errors in code (or models used to generate code) resulting in run-time bugs. 
• Weaknesses in system design, for example, if no consideration has been given to data 
encryption or a lack of strong checks to ensure that input can only be received in the 
expected manner (or format). 
• Functional bugs due to a mismatch between what the system specification states and 
how the system has been implemented, and these not being caught by the functional 
testing. 
• Additional and undocumented features provided by third party components and 
software libraries. Examples include test functions or features that were developed for 
another use case (e.g. another customer) that remain present within the system. 
 
Not all bugs can be exploited to reveal weaknesses, however, for exploitable bugs, three types 
of testing can be performed to reveal them10 11. Indeed, Section 8.4.7 of J3061 describes them 
as “critical tools in evaluating the Cybersecurity performance of a system”: 
 
• vulnerability testing - performing tests for security weaknesses and exploits using 
scanning tools and a corpus of known attacks; 
• fuzz testing - dynamically sending the system large amounts of random and malformed 
data to see how it responds, in an effort to reveal a vulnerability; 
• penetration testing - using intelligence and tools to attack a system based on how 
adversaries would attempt to overcome security mechanisms. 
 
As researchers11 point out, these three classes of security tests are relatively new to 
automotive software and test engineers, and mobile network and communications engineers. 
Furthermore, they add to the existing systems functional testing workload. Integrating security 
tests systematically and rigorously into the systems testing regimes will take some effort, 
particularly considering the complexity and number of interfaces that can now be found with the 
ecosystem. The proliferation of advanced features, supported through cloud-based services 
which can be probed for weaknesses at the client (vehicle or device) or server (service 
provider) ends, adds to the attack surface. Whilst mobile networks carry out extensive cyber 
security checks on a regularly basis, the incorporation of mobile communications into the CAV 
ecosystem extends the attack footprint. 
The work required to implement the three types of security tests into CAV testing regimes has 
begun52, and researchers at Chalmers University of Technology have used the three security 
tests as part of a proposed Start - Predict - Mitigate - Test (SPMT) process to systematically 
 
50 S. Bayer, T. Enderle, D.-K. Oka, and M. Wolf (2016) ‘Automotive Security Testing-The Digital Crash Test’, 
in Energy Consumption and Autonomous Driving Proceedings of the 3rd CESA Automotive Electronics 
Congress, Paris, 2014, J. Langheim, Ed., Paris: Springer 
51 H. H. Thompson (2003) ‘Why security testing is hard’, IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 83–86, 
ISSN: 15407993. doi: 10.1109/MSECP.2003.1219078 
52 P. Wooderson and D. Ward (2017) ‘Cybersecurity Testing and Validation’ in SAE Technical Paper, SAE 
International, doi: 10.4271/2017-01-1655 
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analyse vehicular cyber security53. The SPMT process, which has the high-level steps 
illustrated in Figure 4, is complicated by vehicle complexity and the nature of the possible 
threats, however, here is a brief summary of the four phases: 
 
• Start - Perform an analysis of the vehicle systems to determine what needs protecting. 
This is the TARA in the Security Framework. 
• Predict - Perform a threat assessment to quantify and rank risks. This would be the 
application of attack tracks from the Security Framework. 
• Mitigate - Apply countermeasures to the ranked risks. Economic considerations 
influence the application of countermeasures. Mitigation is based upon the outputs of 
the previous two phases. 
• Test - Apply the three security testing regimes (vulnerability, fuzz, penetration) to 
ensure that designs are resilient to attack, and that applied countermeasures are 
effective. Use test automation, where possible, for efficiency. Any revealed security 
issues must be reviewed. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The SPMT process for security testing proposed by Chalmers University 
 
J3061 suggests that vulnerability and penetration testing is performed by parties independent 
of the systems engineering development. Indeed, BMW proved the benefit of having vehicles 
tested by independent automotive security specialists54. Having an unbiased and independent 
analysis of a system by security experts can reveal unconsidered exploitation paths and 
system weaknesses.  
 
53 Strandberg, K., Olovsson, T., & Jonsson, E. (2018) ‘Securing the Connected Car: A Security-
Enhancement Methodology’, IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, 13(1), 56–65, doi: 
10.1109/MVT.2017.2758179 
54 Tencent Keen Security Lab (2018) ‘Experimental Security Assessment of BMW Cars: A Summary Report’ 
Tech. rep. Keen Security Lab 
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Vulnerability and penetration testing can be performed by manufacturers, but there may be a 
bias in the results. Fuzz testing is a beneficial security test for manufacturers to perform 
themselves. However, a lack of available fuzz testing resources, and information to implement 
fuzz testing, is likely to restrict adoption. This is one area which would benefit from additional 
investment into research.  
 
In this section, the major types of security testing have been discussed. Security tests are the 
practical engineering that occurs to ensure that a level of security, as specified in requirements 
and designed into a system, is present, and that any mitigation designs have been addressed. 
The tests form part of the Security Framework, following on from the derivation of the attack 
surfaces from a reference architecture, the TARA process, and the Attack Tree rankings.  
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5. Possible Cyber Security Vulnerabilities in 
Telecommunications C-V2X 
The following Sections, 5 to 11 inclusive, will focus on technology and the potential cyber security 
vulnerabilities within the telecommunications system of the CAV ecosystem. This part of the report 
focuses primarily on the mobile network architecture, the built-in security features within mobile 
networks, and the associated and known vulnerabilities within the system. The CAV network 
architecture will be introduced, the security vulnerabilities specific to CAV will be addressed. Threat 
Modelling see Section 4.3, within communications is covered, including risk ratings. 
 
Some case studies relevant to mobile network security in general, as well as specific CAV 
examples, are discussed. These case studies demonstrate the importance and urgency of having 
effective cyber security controls and the risk mitigation frameworks that are explored in subsequent 
sections. 
5.1. Introductory Overview to Mobile Networks 
Mobile networks (also called cellular networks), primarily consist of a distribution of radio 
communication nodes that are organized in a cellular structure, with each node responsible for 
providing radio coverage in a specific geographic area through a radio transceiver known as a 
radio base station. Each radio base station provides radio coverage through a dedicated set of 
radio channels or frequencies carefully planned to propagate only a given coverage area. 
When grouped together, these cells form a network infrastructure that provides radio coverage 
and ensures connectivity and continuity of communication as users move through a larger 
geographic area.  
 
Connectivity to the network infrastructure can be achieved with portable or handheld User 
Equipment (UE) such as mobile phones, personal computers and vehicular communications 
systems. Continuity of communication is achieved through a process called ‘handover’, in 
which an ongoing voice or data call is transferred from one radio base station to another as the 
UE moves about the coverage area. 
 
Mobile networks have evolved since the introduction of the analogue First Generation (1G) 
networks, the development of the voice centric Second-Generation (2G) Global System for 
Mobile (GSM) networks and the upgrade to the higher data rate Third Generation (3G) 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks about 19 years ago. However, 
3G came of age 10 years ago when High Speed Packet Access was launched. Current Fourth 
Generation LTE (4G) mobile networks were designed as packet networks, allowing them to 
support higher data rates than 3G networks. The Fifth Generation NR (5G) mobile networks 
are currently being developed, standardised and deployed with the expectation that they will 
provide much higher capacity and data rates, through additional spectrum, larger channels and 
ability to aggregate more carrier, faster network response times and provide new service 
capabilities for a wide range of industry verticals enabled by; MEC, Private Networks and 
Network of networks. To be clear, to realise the full potential of 5G significant amounts of new 
spectrum will be required. 
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5.2. General Mobile Network Architecture 
Mobile networks have a structure that typically starts at the Base Transceiver Station (BTS), 
assuming a 2G mobile network as an example. The BTS provides radio coverage through its 
antenna systems and enables direct connectivity and communications with mobile devices. All 
base stations are connected back to one or more base station Controllers (BSC) by copper, 
microwave, fibre and even satellite backhaul links. 
 
The BSC (or RNC in 3G) has overall control functions of the base stations such as radio 
channel setup and handovers, ensures effective utilisation of the Radio Resources and serve 
as the interface between the BTS (in 2G), NodeB (in 3G) or eNodeB (in 4G) and the core 
network. This is referred to as Evolved Packet Core (EPC) in a multi-radio access technology 
system. 
 
The MSC is the gateway responsible for interfacing with other network operators and external 
networks such as the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The MSC also handles 
user authentication and the handover process to other BSCs. The MSC contains the VLR 
(Visitor Location Register) and HLR (Home Location Register) which holds the information of 
the mobile network subscribers. 
 
Figure 11 provides a high-level system architecture of a 2G, 3G and 4G mobile data network 
with the associated functional elements and interfaces. This architecture is derived from the 
3GPP reference architecture for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-
UTRAN) access55. 
 
 
Figure 11: General mobile data network architecture 
5.3. Functional Elements of a Mobile Network 
Mobile networks consist of several functional elements or sub-networks that connect and 
interface with each other to form the overall network architecture. Each of these functional 
 
55 3GPP TS 23.401, 
https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=849 
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elements or sub-networks have certain logical or physical interfaces that allows the various 
interactions between them to occur.  
 
The interactions between these functional elements, however, means that there are certain 
security implications that must be considered in order to provide guaranteed end-to-end 
security for the network. 
 
The radio access, core, and backhaul networks are the key functional elements considered in 
this work. The key security vulnerabilities that have been identified in each sub-network or 
network interface are provided. The security threats and attacks that have been demonstrated 
in each sub-network are highlighted. As a way of mitigating against the highlighted threats, the 
built-in security features and capabilities in each of these sub-networks are also discussed in 
the subsequent sections of this report. 
5.3.1. Radio Access Network (RAN)  
The Radio Access Network (RAN), in most cases, forms the largest component of the 
overall mobile network. It typically comprises of the Base Transceiver Station and the 
associated BSCs. The RAN is used to implement the radio access technology, using radio 
signals to connect subscribers (i.e., the mobile devices) to the Core Network.  
 
UEs, the mobile devices, primarily connect to the RAN through the BTS, which means that 
the interface between the RAN and the BTS, starting from the Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM) card that is embedded in the mobile devices, forms part of the RAN from a mobile 
security perspective. 
 
RAN technology has evolved over the years since the first generations of mobile networks 
from GSM. RAN uses a mixture of General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) and Enhanced 
Data rates for Global Evolution (EDGE), and data networks as well as circuit-switched 
voice. 3G improved data speeds with UMTS, with Circuit Switched Voice and High-Speed 
Downlink Packet Access (HSPDA) technology. 4G/LTE and recently upgraded to LTE-A 
(LTE Advanced) which is truly packet based and offers high data rates and low latency, as 
well as voice service though Voice Over LTE (VOLTE), supported by an Internet Protocol 
(IP) Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) platform in the core, this allows us to support Wi-Fi calling 
for an authenticated device. 
 
Each generation has also brought in better security measures and capabilities to mitigate 
the known security vulnerabilities of the preceding generation. For example, in earlier 1G 
mobile networks, it was possible to capture the radio signals using a transceiver, due to the 
lack of security against eavesdropping between the mobile devices and base station. It was 
also possible to use ‘cloning', either of the mobile subscriber to use services without paying, 
or of the base stations, in order to deceive the UE into connecting to a false base station 
and gain unauthorised access to user information. These security threats have been 
reduced in second generation networks onwards; for example, with the introduction of 
better security features and capabilities such as encryption and mutual authentication 
techniques. 
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5.3.2. Core Network (CN), the EPC 
The core network (CN), i.e. the EPC, forms the central part of the mobile network, providing 
access to the required services for users connected through the RAN. It comprises of 
entities such as the Mobile Switching Centre (MSC), the Home and Visitor Location 
Registers (HLR and VLR), known collectively as the HSS, the Equipment Identity Register 
(EIR), the Authentication Centre (AuC), the Serving Gateway (SGW) and the Packet 
Gateway (PGW) that interfaces with external data networks and the internet. 
 
The core network provides the circuit-switched and packet-switched functionalities required 
for mobile users to access mobile voice, SMS and data services as well as directing calls 
over the PSTN. To ensure that only the mobile users entitled to a service can have access 
and are accurately billed for it, the core network provides the authentication and charging 
capabilities of the network. It is also responsible for mobility management functions such as 
providing handover assistance between the mobile devices and BTS as well as managing 
paging, access, handover, and the location update process. 
 
Earlier generations of mobile networks such as 2G and 3G, used a set of protocols, namely 
the Signalling System number 7 (SS7), which were designed many years ago for the 
communication between networks and the coordination of activities such as authentication, 
voice and data switching and location updates. SS7 has an identified possible design flaw 
that, if not correctly managed, might introduce security threats by allowing messages to be 
altered, deleted or injected into the networks, leading to possible compromising data 
integrity and security of the network. This was mostly mitigated by the introduction and use 
of a newer and improved signalling system called ‘Diameter’ in 4G mobile technology. 
5.3.3. Transport Network (Backhaul) 
The backhaul of a mobile network connects the core network with the other subnetworks. It 
is typically used to transport data from the base station to the central elements of the core 
network such as the Serving Gateway (S-GW) and Mobility Management Entity (MME) in 
an LTE network for example. 
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Figure 12: 4G Network Architecture showing backhaul subnetwork elements 
The backhaul network usually comprises of three nodes: Access or last mile, 
preaggregation and aggregation nodes. The access and preaggregation networks can both 
be implemented through wireless media such as microwave technology or wired networking 
with the use of copper or fibre optic cables. The aggregation network requires a very high 
capacity and is therefore usually implemented using fibre technology. The access network 
links the edge of the mobile network (i.e. base station) to the preaggregation nodes. The 
aggregation node groups the data from all preaggregation nodes and is then responsible 
for aggregating all traffic and forwarding it to the core network.  
 
Earlier generations of mobile networks implemented backhaul technologies using standards 
such as Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM). These 
protocols were less understood by hackers and were therefore less attacked. However, 
current 4G backhaul technology is based on a flat All-Internet Protocol (All-IP) architecture 
that is well understood by many and therefore presents a larger surface area for attacks 
including traditional Internet security threats such as malware-based trojan attacks, 
jamming-based Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, IP Spoofing attacks (masquerading), 
eavesdropping and Man in the Middle (MitM) attacks. 
 
Some of the security threats and vulnerabilities in the backhaul network can be mitigated by 
using security gateways, Layer 3 IPsec tunnels and implementation of certificate 
authorities. The threats, vulnerabilities and capabilities of all the mobile network 
components introduced in this section are discussed in detail in the subsequent sections of 
this report, particularly as relate to CAV security. 
 
While the Internet is not a security issue per se for the mobile network, its connection to the 
mobile network may introduce large scale security threats, with a lot of Internet-based 
attacks occurring from this entry point. It should be noted that the modelling of any security 
threat outside the mobile network, such as external networks like the Internet or PSTN is 
outside the scope of this report. 
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5.4. Connectivity Infrastructure for CAV 
Connectivity is a key enabler upon which the benefits of CAV technology will be realized. It 
refers to the communication infrastructure that allows data to be transferred from and between 
the different elements that make up the CAV ecosystem. In CAV, V2X is the umbrella term that 
denotes the communication framework in which data from a variety of sources including vehicle 
sensors, vehicle telematic systems, roadside infrastructure, pedestrians and communication 
networks are transferred across the system.  
 
DSRC is based on the IEEE 802.11p-based wireless standard and supports secure 
communication between vehicles and the surrounding infrastructure without the involvement of 
the mobile communications infrastructure. 
 
As introduced in Section 3, C-V2X is a 3GPP standard, for vehicle wireless communication 
technology that is implemented using the mobile 4G or 5G technology. The early specifications 
and service requirements were defined and implemented in 3GPP Release 14 and significant 
enhancements, especially higher demands on security and reliability, provided in 3GPP 
Releases 15 and 16. 
 
As an example of C-V2X, this report primarily focuses on vehicle to mobile network technology 
(C-V2N). This uses the mobile network to provide services such as  fleet management, logistics 
and infotainment as well as enabling improved driving safety and road traffic efficiency through 
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) and Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADAS). DSRC is an alternative V2X technology. 
 
For example, C-V2N connectivity enables the distribution of real-time road traffic signals and 
traffic situations to drivers in the form of GeoCasted messages (messages that are 
disseminated with information regarding a target geographic area) from the LTE network to the 
SIM card placed in the modem of the vehicle’s communications system.  
 
Connected and autonomous vehicle technology enable a range of services and societal 
benefits as highlighted earlier. However, with these benefits come significant risks that must be 
mitigated against. For example, despite the elimination of driver error as a positive outcome, 
risks may exist from a myriad of factors, such as system errors, cyber attacks on safety 
systems, and the behavioural improprieties of both passengers and pedestrians. 
 
In addition, sophisticated data processing and storage abilities of CAV systems also raise data 
privacy concerns, examples include tracking of user location from location data stored in 
vehicles, and unauthorised use of personal data synced from personal devices. Connection to 
external networks such as the mobile network and cloud infrastructures, which may be 
necessary for vehicle cooperation on the roads, increases privacy risks as data can be 
accessed by attackers and retrieved if network vulnerabilities are successfully exploited56. 
 
The privacy and cyber security risks introduced by utilizing LTE C-V2N as a connectivity 
technology in CAV technology is also introduced. The cyber security threat modelling and risk 
analysis, scoring and mitigation frameworks beginning with the dataflows from the SIM card 
 
56 Hazel Si Min Lim, A. T. (2018) ‘Autonomous Vehicles for Smart and Sustainable Cities: An In-Depth 
Exploration of Privacy and Cybersecurity Implications’ Retrieved from MDPI: https://www.mdpi.com/1996-
1073/11/5/1062 
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interface inside the connected vehicle to the mobile LTE RAN and Core networks are 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
Figure 13: V2X communication systems architecture57 
In Figure 13 above, the general architecture of a heterogenous V2X system uses DSRC, C-
V2X and Wi-Fi technologies to enable communications between devices with a wide range of 
motion patterns including Vehicle-to-Vehicle, Vehicle-to-Pedestrian and Vehicle-to-Cloud. In 
this architecture, the LTE network provides vital connectivity to the cloud Application Server.  
 
Figure 14: End-to-end reference architecture of LTE V2C communications (Cisco) 
 
Figure 14 provides an end-to-end high-level reference architecture of a Vehicle to Cloud 
communications systems enabled by the LTE mobile infrastructure. The high-level system 
components, from the vehicle to the cloud, their connectivity interfaces and the interaction 
layers are shown.  
 
 
57 Marojevic, V. (2018) C-V2X Security Requirements and Procedures: Survey and Research Directions 
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Figure 15 then describes the high-level framework for data and message transfers from a C-
V2X Application Client, which may be resident in a vehicle, roadside infrastructure unit or 
personal communications device, to a cloud based V2X Application Server through an LTE 
mobile infrastructure58. 
 
Figure 15: Architecture for delivering C-ITS messages over mobile networks 
The above implementation of C-V2X primarily consists of the mobile network layer, V2X 
Application Server, the V2X Application Client and the Inter-change Server that ensures 
interoperability across different V2X Application Servers and backend systems.  
 
The V2X Application Client has both a transmit and receive module and can be hosted inside 
the vehicle communications unit, on personal communication devices, or road-side units which 
are all provisioned with the required mobile connectivity, enabling the transmission of uplink 
unicast messages to the V2X Application Server. 
 
The V2X Application Server is located at the backend or edge servers that are accessible by 
V2X Application Clients via mobile networks and uses downlink unicast, multicast or broadcast 
transmission to transfer data to the Application Clients58. 
 
  
 
58 Essaili, A. E., Lomar, T., Nylander, T., & Zang, Y. (2019, October 25). Ericsson Blog. Retrieved from 
Ericsson Web site: https://www.ericsson.com/en/blog/2019/10/cellular-v2x-the-road-ahead-c-its-adas 
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6. Challenges in Vehicular Communications 
6.1. Introduction 
There are four groups of vulnerabilities for vehicular communication59 60: 
 
• Limited connectivity: It is still a challenge to perform updates of a vehicle’s software 
and firmware to protect it against emerging cyber attacks.  
• Limited computational performance: Vehicles are more vulnerable to security threats 
and a security solution implementation is restricted due to the limited computational 
performance. 
• Unpredictable attack scenarios and threats: It is difficult to rearchitect a vehicle 
system including databases, communication system and vehicular parts to cover new 
cyber security challenges. An unsecure OEM element of this system might lead to a 
security breach.  
• Critical risk for drivers or passengers’ lives: A vehicle could be at a high risk even if 
only a limited number of sensors malfunction, if there is a lack of communication, or if 
illegitimate messages are delivered61. 
A CAV is at risk from attackers who maliciously interfere with the vehicular communication 
layer and might compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability. Moreover, the privacy, 
repudiation, flexibility and real-time constraints are targets of attacks. 
 
Confidentiality is defined as “preserving authorised restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information” by 
NIST62. Integrity means that the delivered message is not corrupted or altered by any intruder. 
It is necessary to provide the verification ability to make the receiver node sure that the 
message is legitimate. 
 
NIST defines availability as “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information”562. 
Non-Repudiation is crucial in case of an accident. It is necessary to rightly identify all elements 
during an investigation and to make sure all messages are transmitted reliably. Privacy means 
anonymity is protected and no unauthorised user can access the vehicle’s or driver’s private 
data63. It is crucial to prevent outdated information by providing online and reliable data 
transmission. This is guaranteed by real-time constraints that avoid transmission delays.  
 
The need for a flexible means of communication within a security architecture is significant in a 
dynamic environment. The dynamic nature of security attacks makes it challenging to provide 
flexible in vehicular communication. 
 
 
59 Onishi, H. (2013) Guidelines for vehicle cybersecurity. Retrieved from https://docplayer.net /7458872-For-
vehicle-cyber-security.html 
60 Onishi, H. (2012) Paradigm change of vehicle cyber security. 4th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict, pp.381–391 
61 El-Rewini, Z., Sadatsharan, K., Selvaraj, D. F., Plathottam, S. J., & Ranganathan, P. (2019) Cybersecurity 
challenges in vehicular communications. Vehicular Communications, 2214-2096 
62 Guttman, B., & Roback, E. (1995). An Introduction to Computer Security: The NIST Handbook. DIANE. 
63 Zhang, L. (2010) Research on Security and Privacy in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks. Retrieved from 
www.tesisenxarxa.net 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 61 of 150 
A mature cyber security program has several components that improve the threat detection 
program and effectiveness as follows64: 
 
• Secure design: The development process requires an appropriate solution to identify and 
prevent security vulnerabilities. Design analysis and security testing should be applied to 
stages of the development lifecycle to ensure flaws and vulnerabilities are covered. 
Constant penetration tests after development provide the ability to plan attack mitigations 
and appropriate updates to address new threats. 
• Threat intelligence: A proper threat detection program needs an up-to-date threat and 
vulnerability database, including public and proprietary threat information. 
• Asset identification: It is crucial to identify and document a list of assets including third-
party assets related to the environment to conduct proper threat analysis. In the lack of 
appropriate asset identification, vulnerable assets might be unknown to security team inside 
the ecosystem. 
• Mitigation capabilities: This refers to a security team’s ability to detect and resolve attacks 
as they emerge. Effective security planning requires the identification of applicable 
mitigation capabilities and security controls to provide the security team with the ability to 
take proper actions against security threats using existing resources.  
• Risk Assessment: It is important to evaluate, score and rank security risks of various 
components of a system by conducting a risk assessment process. The output is a list of 
security risks which are ordered based on their significance.  
• Mapping and modelling: Modelling methods build visual workflows and security 
operations plans based on multi-angle approaches. The modelling goal is to resolve 
existing issues and plan for future threats. It is crucial to cover and measure all components 
because a lack of planning might leave assets vulnerable. A mature threat model improves 
the threat mitigation process by simplifying threat detection and analysis. 
 
  
 
64 Walker, A. (2019) What Is Threat Modeling? Retrieved from https://learn.g2.com/author/aaron-walker 
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6.2. Threat Detection, Monitoring and Analysis 
To reduce the risk of cyber threats against CAV, it is necessary to define an organisational 
process to detect, monitor and analyse cyber security threats. Auto-ISAC has provided the 
Threat Detection, Monitoring And Analysis, Best Practice Guide, a framework containing five 
steps65, see Figure 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. A threat detection program 
Step 1 - Understand the CAV communication threats ecosystem to create the program basis 
including past research and reviews, and the history of security breaches; and how this relates 
to the vehicle communication components, software applications and connected services 
should be considered in the customer environment. Insider threats and operational 
technologies are included in the enterprise environment. The third-party environment also 
covers any devices or services which are supplied by vendors65. 
 
Step 2 - Threat intelligence requirements and monitoring targets should be identified to provide 
adequate information of interested assets and relevant threats. This helps to understand the 
threat landscape to define breach indicators, tactics and unusual incidents. 
 
Step 3 - It is required to create a risk profile of threats and applicable vulnerabilities. This helps 
to form a knowledge base risk profile that leads to threat identification and appropriate 
monitoring techniques. 
 
 
65 AUTO-ISAC. (2019) Threat Detection, Monitoring and Analysis, Best Practice Guide, Version 1.3. 
Retrieved from https://www.automotiveisac.com/best-practices/ 
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An effective monitoring process requires to determine crucial security risks and concentrate on 
monitoring the related threats. The constantly evolving vehicle technologies makes the CAV 
security risks a dynamic model and consequently, it is necessary to employ a flexible process 
to monitor the source of threats.  
 
Step 4 - An accurate threat analysis provides adequate information to develop a risk mitigation 
plan and comprehensive security control design. 
 
Threat analysis is the process of threat identification, validation and verification. It is necessary 
to detect threat events for each validated threat and respond appropriate strategy. 
 
Step 5 - Information from threat analysis and impacts makes this possible to identify 
appropriate controls and develop security architecture. These come together to develop a risk 
mitigation plan which defines required actions to reduce risk. The action plans should be 
design to provide, engineering and security teams with corrective actions and mitigations. 
 
Reactive approaches do not have the capacity to predict and respond to the dynamically 
changing nature of the risks. An effective CAV cyber security risk classification should be 
flexible, adaptive and evolving to cover new threats as they arise. 
6.3. CAV Threat Environment 
The threat environment is defined by threat actors and attack vectors. A cyber security threat 
will be executed by a person or entity (threat actor) that uses various methods on an attack 
surface (threat vectors) used to exploit a vulnerability of the ecosystem. To identify a threat in 
the CAV ecosystem, it is necessary to consider its impacts and consequences to the security 
properties. It is also required to understand threat actors’ capabilities and motivations by 
employing risk assessment and incident response processes65. 
 
The following threat actors are identified by Auto-ISAC that might affect the vehicle 
ecosystem66: 
 
• Terrorist organisations 
• Malicious insiders 
• Nefarious individuals 
• Cyber criminals 
• Organized crime groups 
• State sponsored attackers and intelligence agencies 
• Vandals/pranksters/hacktivists 
 
  
 
66 AUTO-ISAC (2019) Risk Assessment and Management, Best Practice Guide, Version 2.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.automotiveisac.com/best-practices/ 
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Auto-ISAC has also identified several attack vectors that increase the security risks on the 
vehicular ecosystem: 
 
• Distance from vehicle: 
o Near: 
▪ Bluetooth. 
▪ Wi-Fi. 
▪ Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS). 
o Far: 
▪ Via back-office channels. 
▪ Via remote capabilities. 
• Internal to vehicle: 
o Standard user interface. 
o Infotainment. 
o USB. 
o Standard programming/data interface. 
o Non-standard interface. 
▪ Accessing and modifying vehicle electrical systems. 
 
According to the above attack actors and attack vectors, the following threats might be possible 
through compromising the vehicular communication layer: 
 
• Theft or exposure of data: 
o Theft or exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) or other sensitive data,  
o Theft or exposure of vehicle-related data or software. 
• Physical theft or compromise: 
o Unauthorised physical access to the interior or breaking door locks, 
o Theft of the entire vehicle. 
• Manipulating vehicle controls: 
o Illegal manipulation of components and functions, 
o Unauthorised activation or deactivation of functionality, 
o Co-opting vehicle systems, 
o Loss of vehicle control. 
• Threats to availability: 
o “Bricking” vehicle systems, 
o Denial of service attacks, 
o Ransomware attacks. 
6.4. Threat Types 
The CAV ecosystem follows current mobile computing and Internet communication security 
requirements. From this perspective, cyber security threats to CAV communication layer are 
divided into passive and active attacks67.  
 
Passive attacks eavesdrop or monitor the transmissions between nodes, where the attackers 
cannot modify or change the content in the transmission and would not interact with the data 
 
67 He, Q., Meng, X., & Qu, R. (2017) Survey on cyber security of CAV. 2017 Forum on Cooperative 
Positioning and Service (CPGPS), 351-354 
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transmitted68. These attacks can be hard to identify because there is no modification to 
messages. Passive attacks that are most likely to be faced by CAV include the following: 
 
• Eavesdropping and Release of the Information: Without appropriate encryption 
mechanisms, an attacker could eavesdrop in on the vehicle’s communication messages 
sent using the C-V2X communication channels. 
• Traffic Analysis: Attackers could use traffic analysis method to obtain the length and 
time of messages, and with such information, could gather further information such as 
the time the car is used, and thus the user’s working time and time of their daily 
activities. 
 
Attackers are more likely to take actions to modify or damage the messages and the data 
transmitted in active attacks68. These can cause much more damage than passive attacks, 
especially in the CAV environment, and might result in injuries or death to drivers and 
passengers. In CAV, active attacks can be divided into four categories as follows: 
 
• Spoofing: A spoofing attack is conducted by faking identities or data. This happens 
when an unauthorised attacker pretends to be an authorised user. 
• Replay Attack: Attackers can intercept the message with authentication from sender to 
receiver and resend the message to the receiver to obtain the authenticated access to 
the service. Attackers do not need to know the content inside the message, so the 
encryption of data is useless in this attack. 
• Modification: In this kind of attack, attackers can modify the message such as GPS 
information between the communication channels. 
• Denial of Service (DoS): DoS attacks will block the access to the target server by 
making use of flaws in the system or protocol to send huge amount of data, or request 
to interfere with the receiver’s network69. This attack may cause delay and breakdown 
of the receiver’s response. In some contexts, the delays caused by this might be an 
inconvenience. However, in CAV safety systems, for example, C-V2X messaging, low 
latency is importance and timing delays might reduce capabilities. 
 
Compared with passive attacks, active attacks are much more difficult to defend against but 
much easier to detect. It is crucial that CAV designers and car manufacturers always carefully 
consider all the possible flaws in CAV systems and protocols. 
 
  
 
68 Gagandeep, A., & Kumar, P. (2012) Analysis of different security attacks in MANETs on protocol stack A-
review. International Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology (IJEAT), 269-275 
69 Hasbullah, H., & Soomro, I. A. (2010) Denial of service (DOS) attack and its possible solutions in VANET. 
International Journal of Electrical, Computer, Energetic, Electronic and Communication Engineering, 813-
817 
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7. Communication resilience 
Communication networks are facing a large group of challenges, especially for vehicular 
communication networks. It is essential to recognise, which is crucial for network design and 
planning. The difficulties for communication networks are large-scale disasters, Socio-Political and 
Economic Challenges, dependent failures, human errors, malicious attacks, unusual traffic, and 
environmental challenges70 . 
7.1. Introduction of Communication Resilience 
7.1.1. Challenges of Communications Networks 
Large-Scale Disasters are usually caused by natural disasters, including earthquakes or 
hurricanes, and pandemics. They significantly disrupt communication networks. Typically, 
they are communication hardware facilities failures. Another source of large-scale disasters 
is human activity. 
 
Socio-Political and Economic Challenges include voluntary activities (also acts of terrorism) 
aimed at disrupting the regular network operation, e.g. as a response to political decisions 
or to achieve advantage on economic markets. 
 
Dependent Failures refer to challenges that may result in a cascade of failures, for 
instance, after a failure of a system (or its part) offering service to another network. 
Examples include power grids providing power supply for the Internet. 
 
• Non-malicious human activities imply human Errors. They include, e.g., 
misconfiguration errors being a result of incompetence. Consequently, 
communication networks may even encounter catastrophic failures. 
• Malicious Attacks is another group of challenges referring to deliberate actions 
designed to cause as much disruption as possible, commonly by being targeted at 
an essential software/hardware element of the network infrastructure. 
• Unusual Traffic can be a problem if its volume exceeds the upper design limit of the 
network.  If such additional traffic can be inserted into the network, e.g., after the 
occurrence of a catastrophic event not necessarily disrupting the network 
infrastructure itself, but, resulting in a significant increase of several simultaneous 
requests to get information. This can result in significant issues for Network Service 
restoration. 
• Environmental Challenges are in turn dependent on communication environment 
characteristics. They are related, e.g., to mobility aspects in ad-hoc wireless 
networks (and in particular to time-dependent characteristics of wireless links). 
 
Based on the research71, network challenges can be categorised based on detailed criteria 
including: 
 
70 Cetinkaya, E.K., Sterbenz, J.P.G. (2013) A taxonomy of network challenges. In: Proc. 9th International 
Conference on Design of Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN’13), pp. 322–330 
71 Avizienis, A., Laprie, J.-C., Randell, B. (2014) Dependability and its threats: a taxonomy. In: Jacquart, R. 
(ed.) Building the information society, vol. 156, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, pp. 
91–120. Springer, New York 
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• cause - natural, human-made, or challenge-dependent; 
• boundaries - internal, or external; 
• target - direct, or collateral; 
• objective - non-malicious, selfish, or malicious; 
• intent - non-deliberate, or deliberate; 
• capability - accidental, or incompetence; 
• dimension - hardware, software, protocols, or traffic; 
• domain - medium, mobility, delay, or energy; 
• scope - nodes, links, or area; 
• significance - minor, major, or catastrophic; 
• persistence - short-lived, long-lived, or transient; 
• repetition - single, multiple, or adaptive. 
7.1.2. Disciplines of Communications Resilience 
It is difficult to identify real-time communication network challenges. A multi-stage approach 
is used to recognise those challenges72, Figure 17. It includes detection of challenge 
symptoms (i.e., that may lead to recognition of a challenge onset), identification of the root 
cause of a challenge, and determination of a potential impact on the system. Challenge 
detection mechanisms, typically invoked in a distributed manner, should be as lightweight 
as possible in order not to use resources unnecessarily (which is an essential requirement 
for resource-limited networks), and not to disturb the system's regular operation. 
 
Figure 17. Aspects of challenge identification 
For any challenge, apart from evaluating its impact on communication network 
performance, it is crucial to identify the probability of a challenge occurrence (𝑃𝑐 ), as well 
as the probability of a particular challenge which results in a fault (𝑃𝑓 ). The two measures 
combined with information on the challenge impact 𝐼can be used to derive the ratio of 
network resources exposure 𝐸 to disruptions. 
𝐸 = (𝑃𝑐 ×𝑃𝑓) × 𝐼 
 
72 Fry, M., Fischer, M., Karaliopoulos, M., Smith, P., Hutchison, D. (2010) Challenge identification for network 
resilience. In: Proc. 6th EURO-NF Conference on Next Generation Internet (NGI’10), pp. 1–8 
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A fault, if not adequately dealt with, can next cause an error, defined as a deviation 
between the observed value/state and its specified (correct) value/state. If the error 
propagates, it may result in a service failure. 
 
Figure 18. Resilience disciplines 
Network resilience is the ability of a network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of 
service in the face of various faults and challenges to regular operation of the network. 
Since faults and challenges are inevitable, network resilience should be viewed as one of 
the most important characteristics of a communication networks design. 
Mobile network operators typically offer a service level agreement of between 96% to 97% 
availability translating to around 2-hour a week of network downtime. It should be noted that 
these are not global network outages that affects all customers of the network but are 
mainly an aggregation of clusters of downtime that are localised, affecting subsets of 
customers. Some of the network outages are planned outages that may be communicated 
to customers in advanced and are required in order to conduct essential maintenance 
works such as software upgrades, feature integration, optimisation and fault resolution. 
These are usually done at times when the network usage is predicted to be at its lowest 
peak, for example in the early hours of the morning. The effect of these planned outages is 
therefore not acutely experienced by the mobile network subscribers. 
A typical classification of resilience disciplines73 is shown in Figure 18. Resilience 
disciplines can be classified into two main categories: challenge tolerance focusing on 
network design and approaches to provide service continuity in the presence of challenges, 
and trustworthiness describing measurable characteristics of analysed communication 
systems. The relation between challenge tolerance and trustworthiness is the indicator of 
the performance of a network under perturbative conditions. 
 
73 Sterbenz, J.P.G., Hutchison, D., Cetinkaya, E.K., Jabbar, A., Rohrer, J.P., Sch€oller, M., Smith, P. (2010) 
Resilience and survivability in communication networks: strategies, principles, and survey of disciplines. 
Comput. Netw. 54(8), 1245–1265 
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Survivability is the ability of a network to recover the affected traffic in failure environments 
and to provide different services continuously74. It refers to the ability of automatically 
reacting to both physical and software faults by redirecting the traffic from the affected 
routes to ones which are operating correctly75 . 
The scope of survivability is broader than fault tolerance and comprises issues of correlated 
failures for unbounded networks76, e.g., failures due to malicious human activities (attacks) 
or failures of large parts of a communication network infrastructure77.  
Fault Tolerance is the ability of a network which tolerates faults but does not result in 
service failures78. It is relying on network redundancy to compensate for unexpected and 
uncorrelated failures of system components. However, fault tolerance is not sufficient to 
provide recovery after multiple correlated failures, and therefore, it is considered as a 
subset of survivability. 
Another significant type of challenge that is unique to communication networks is to 
maintain stable end-to-end connections between users. 
Disruption Tolerance is the ability of a system to tolerate disruptions in connectivity among 
its components79 . This connectivity is measured in terms of communication channel 
characteristics, and may be affected due to environmental challenges including, e.g., weak 
and episodic channel connectivity, node mobility, unpredictably long delay, and signalling 
power challenges80. 
Traffic Tolerance is the ability of the network system to tolerate the unexpected 
communication traffic load79. High traffic volume is a big challenge of wireless 
communication because of the resource-constrained environments. If the communicating 
demand amount rises far beyond the network design assumptions for the normal 
operational state, the network services will possibly fail. Examples of this scenario include 
either legitimate activities such as flash crowd following natural disasters like earthquakes 
implying the need to get the relevant information or e.g., malicious actions like DDoS 
attacks81. 
 
74 Haider, A., Harris, R. (2004) Recovery techniques in Next Generation Networks. IEEE Commun. Surv. 
Tutorials 9(3), 2–17 
75 Chołda, P., Jajszczyk, A. (2010) Recovery and its quality in multilayer networks. IEEE/OSA J. Lightwave 
Technol. 28(4), 372–389 
76 Mukherjee, B., Habib, M.F., Dikbiyik, F. (2014) Network adaptability from disaster disruptions and 
cascading failures. IEEE Commun. Mag. 52(5), 230–238 
77 Neumayer, S., Zussman, G., Cohen, R., Modiano, E. (2011) Assessing the vulnerability of the fiber 
infrastructure to disasters. IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking 19(6), 1610–1623 
78 T1A1.2 Working Group (2004) Reliability-related metrics and terminology for network elements in evolving 
communication networks. American National Standard for Telecommunications T1. R1.524-2004, Alliance 
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions – ATIS 
79 Sterbenz, J.P.G., Hutchison, D., Cetinkaya, E.K., Jabbar, A., Rohrer, J.P., Sch€oller, M., Smith, P. (2010) 
Resilience and survivability in communication networks: strategies, principles, and survey of disciplines. 
Comput. Netw. 54(8), 1245–1265 
80 Khabbaz, M.J., Assi, C.M., Fawaz, W.F. (2004) Disruption-tolerant networking: a comprehensive survey 
on recent developments and persisting challenges. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials 14(2), 607–640 (2012) 
81 Ho, P.-H.: State of the art progress in developing survivable routing schemes in mesh WDM networks. 
IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials 6(4), 2–16 
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Trustworthiness is the ability of a network to assure the system will perform as the purpose 
of design. The trustworthiness disciplines measure the service delivery of a network, which 
includes (1) dependability, (2) security, and (3) performability. 
Table 9 presents the selected sets of resilience characteristics defined by ITU-T and IETF 
for communication networks. From the client perspective, the essential resilience 
characteristics are related to the perceived service quality (QoS), referred to as the Quality 
of Resilience (QoR) features, being the QoS characteristics related to resilience observed 
by the end-users82. 
 
  
 
82 Chołda, P., Mykkeltveit, A., Helvik, B.E., Wittner, O.J., Jajszczyk, A. (2007) A survey of resilience 
differentiation frameworks in communication networks. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials 9(4), 32–55  
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Table 9. Measurable metrics for resilience quantification83 
Recommendations of International Telecommunication Union – Telecommunication 
Standardisation Sector (ITU-T) 
ID Area Metric 
E.800 
E.802 
E.820 
E.850 
E.855 
E.860 
E.862 
E.880 
General (e.g., Internet 
access), ISDN 
telephone 
network 
• Retainability 
• (Mean) time between interruptions (MTBI) 
• Down time (MDT), up time (MUT) 
• Instantaneous (un)availability, steady-state/asymptotic 
(un)availability (U/A) 
• Reliability function (R(t)) 
• Time to failure (MTTF) 
• Time between failures (MTBF) 
• Time to recovery (MTTR) 
• p-fractile repair time 
• Failure/repair rate 
• Probability of fault coverage 
G.911 Fibre optic systems • Median life – a value on a lognormal probability plot of 
time to failure at which 50 % of the devices fail earlier and 
50 % of the devices fail later 
• Standard deviation – a value of a standard deviation 
concerning the natural logarithms of the time to failure 
• FIT: number of failures per billion device hours 
Y.1540 
Y.1541 
Y.1542 
 
 
IP • IPLR: “ratio of total lost IP packet outcomes to total 
transmitted IP packets in a population of interest” 
• Service availability: “classifies the total scheduled service 
time for an IP service into available and unavailable 
periods,” using the threshold on IPLR 
• PIU/PIA: “percentage of total scheduled IP service time 
categorised as (un)available using the IP service 
availability function” 
P.10 General telephone 
network 
 
• MOS is a subjective measurement of the quality. It is 
used in a survey-based studies when a service is tested 
by users 
• QoE: “overall acceptability of an application or service, 
as perceived subjectively by the end user” 
3386 Multilayer networks • Protection switch time: “time interval from the occurrence 
of a network fault until the completion of the protection-
switching operations” 
• Restoration time: “time interval from the occurrence of a 
network fault to the instant when the affected traffic is 
either completely restored, or until spare resources are 
exhausted, or no more extra traffic exists” 
• Definitions show the difference in the approaches of ITU-
T and IETF, where the former is more general, and the 
latter more focused on particular methods 
 
 
83 12. Chołda, P., Tapolcai, J., Cinkler, T., Wajda, K., Jajszczyk, A. (2007) Quality of Resilience as a network 
reliability characterization tool. IEEE Netw. 23(2), 11–19 (2009) 
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7.1.3. Existing Approaches of Communication Resilience 
To recover communication services continuity after failures, communication capacity 
redundancy (mostly related to link bandwidth) is a commonly reserved method in a network. 
It provides the possibility of an alternate communication path with the primary 
communication link failing84. In general, the higher the capacity to be protected, then the 
more significant the task to protect the network from failures. 
 
After a failure occurs, the recovery process starts with the detection of a failure. Which is 
followed by fault localisation and, or, isolation (i.e. determination of the faulty node/link), 
which is necessary to stop further transmission of information via the affected element that 
should be repaired85. Before the recovery actions, a failure notification message is sent to 
network nodes. Two processes are taking place at this stage: 
 
1. The repair process, which is related to the repair of the faulty element. 
2. The recovery process is to identify the affected traffic, localize the failure, and 
determine the alternate path for the communication data redelivery. 
 
Ideally, the recovery time, which is defined as the time needed to switch the traffic to 
backup paths, should not be longer than 50ms. Because shorter than 50ms it would be 
treated as a transmission error by the higher network layers. Any confusion longer than 
50ms results at least in packet losses, or unavailability of service86. A detailed classification 
of time outages is given in Table 1087. 
 
  
 
84 Ho, P.-H. (2004) State of the art progress in developing survivable routing schemes in mesh WDM 
networks. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials 6(4), 2–16  
85 10. Chołda, P., Jajszczyk, A. (2010) Recovery and its quality in multilayer networks. IEEE/OSA J. 
Lightwave Technol. 28(4), 372–389 
86 60. Ramamurthy, B., Sahasrabuddhe, L., Mukherjee, B. (2003) Survivable WDM mesh networks. IEEE/ 
OSA J. Lightwave Technol. 21(4), 870–883  
87 22. Grover, W.D. (2004) Mesh-based Survivable Networks. Options and Strategies for Optical, MPLS, 
SONET, and ATM Networks. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River 
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Table 10. Impacts of outage time 
Target range Duration Main effects 
Protection 
switching 
t≤50 ms No outage logged; recovery of Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) after one errored frame; no TCP fallback; 
no impact at all for most TCP sessions. 
1st type 
outage 
50ms≤t<0.2s <5 % voiceband disconnects; signalling system 
switchovers. 
2nd type 
outage 
0.2s<t<2s Common upper bound on distributed mesh restoration 
time: TCP/IP protocol back-off. 
3rd type 
outage 
2<t<10s Disconnections of all switched circuit services; 
disconnections of private lines; TCP sessions time-outs; 
Hello protocol affection; web page “not available” errors. 
4th type 
outage 
 
10<t<5 m All calls and data sessions terminated; timeouts of TCP/IP 
application layer programs; users making attempts of 
mass redials; link state advertisements (LSAs) sent by 
routers referring to failed links; updates of topology and 
resynchronisation network wide. 
Undesirable 
outage 
5m<t<30m Massive reattempts causing heavy load of switches; 
noticeable Internet “brownout”; minor societal/business 
effects. 
Unacceptable 
outage 
t>30m Major societal impacts (societal risks: travel booking, 
impact on all markets); headline news; regulatory reporting 
often required; lawsuits; SLA clauses triggered. 
 
Based on the structure of communication networks, the existing approaches to 
communication resilience can be classified as ring-based and mesh-based. The ring-based 
methods refer to architectures introduced, e.g. Synchronous Optical Networks Synchronous 
Digital Hierarchy (SONET/ SDH)88 and the early architectures of ring Dense Wavelength 
Division Multiplexing (DWDM) networks89. Based on flow direction, ring networks may be 
classified as unidirectional, or bidirectional, accordingly. As shown in Figure 19, both 
working and backup routes in ring networks are organized in rings. 
 
88 Siller, C.A., Shafi, M. (1996) Synchronous Networking. IEEE Press, IEEE Communications Society, New 
York  
89 Mukherjee, B. (2006) Optical WDM Networks. Springer, New York 
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Figure 19. Example of Unidirectional Path-Switched Ring (UPSR) and Bi-directional Line Switched 
Ring (BLSR) with Add-Drop Multiplexers (ADMs) 
7.2. Public Road Communications Resilience 
 
Figure 20. Vehicular communication networks with multiple paths of V2I and V2C 
Vehicular communication networks provide for a wide range of applications designed to 
solve several problems related to: 
 Public Safety. Road safety can be improved by messages exchanged by vehicles, e.g., in 
the case of accidents/collisions, bad weather conditions (ice/water on the road) unexpected 
events (e.g., low bridges, oil on the road), or to assist the drivers in lane change/overtaking 
operations. 
Traffic Information. V2X and C-V2X can be utilised to provide traffic monitoring/ shaping 
(including traffic light management), i.e., aimed at adjusting the scheduling of traffic lights to 
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help the drivers move in the green phase, thus also contributing to the reduction of 
environmental pollution. 
 Infotainment. Providing travellers with on-board information and entertainment services 
such as Internet access or music download. 
So, vehicle communication can be divided into Public Road Safety Communications 
Resilience and ad-hoc vehicular communications Resilience. 
Vehicular networks provide communications for a wide range of applications, as shown in 
Figure 20, public road communication includes V2N, V2I and C-V2X.  
7.2.1. Understand Public Communications Resiliency 
Communications resilience is that networks can recover from damage, accident or attack, 
hereby minimising the possibility of the service outage. There are three key elements of 
communications resilience90: 
1. Route Diversity. Route diversity is defined as routing communications between two 
vehicles over more than one physical path (RF communication channels). As shown in 
Figure.6.4 vehicles can upload and download data to the cloud via V2N and V2I. 
Meanwhile, vehicles can act as a relay to communicate with infrastructure by V2V. 
2. Redundancy. Redundancy means that additional or duplicate communications assets 
share the load or provide back-up to the primary asset. In the purpose of resilience, 
network redundancy means dedicated resource blocks (RB) for the recovery or 
emergency communication use only. 
3. Protective/Restorative Measures. Protective measures decline the probability that a 
threat will affect the network, while therapeutic measures enable rapid restoration if 
commercial services are lost or congested. 
7.2.2. Network Failure Management 
Network failure management includes: Fault detection, Fault localization, and Fault 
notification91. 
 
1. Fault Detection. Parameters and counters can be used to detect the communication 
network failure at different network layers. 
• Physical layer: signal loss, modulation loss and synchronous clock loss. 
• Signal strength: the signal deterioration at the receiver side during the specified 
period; it can be detected from Signal-to-Interference Plus Noise Ratio (SINR), 
channel BER, the dispersion level, the crosstalk, or the attenuation level. 
• Service Quality: Package loss ratio, channel throughput or package delays, etc. 
2. Fault Localisation. During fault localisation, where the failure occurred is determined, 
i.e., a faulty item is recognised. 
 
90https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/blog/2018/02/07/public-safety-communications-resiliency-ten-keys-obtaining-
resilient-local 
91 D. Papadimitriou and E. Mannie, Eds. (2006) ‘Analysis of Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching 
(GMPLS)-based Recovery Mechanism (including Protection and Restoration)’, IETF RFC 4428 
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3. Fault Notification.  Fault notification is used to inform the control centre that there 
was a failure in the network. This triggers the appropriate procedures to resolve the 
fault quickly and try to prevent it happening in the future, if possible.  
7.2.3. Cost of Resilience 
The cost of a recovery is very important for the operator and should be taken into 
consideration as an important factor to determine the different resilience methods based on 
several parameters. 
 
Generally, the most direct way is to base it on the network redundancy for resilience, such 
as the extra network resource usage for supporting the specific recovery method. Normally, 
it is the dedicated resource blocks (RB). There are some other elements to measure the 
cost of communication resilience, e.g., additional software, the increased Operational 
Expenditures (OPEX) related to the new staff or higher expenses on device operation92. 
7.2.4. Ad-hoc Vehicular Communications Resilience 
Vehicular communications can be provided either without or with the support of a roadside 
infrastructure, also referred to as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
wireless networking. Based on data travel via vehicles the V2V communication can be 
classified as either: (1) single hop (sender to receiver directly), or (2) multi-hop V2V 
(between sender to receiver there are vehicles acting as relays.) 
The advanced applications of intelligent transportation systems require both reliable and 
low-latency communication. An example is road safety warning (e.g. related to collision 
warning or traffic coordination issues). If the information delay is high, it may increase risk 
to human life or injury. 
7.2.5. Reliability Requirements of V2V Communication 
The V2V communication can be considered as self-organising, self-optimizing, and with a 
short transmission range. 
 
• Dynamic network topology: with frequent topology changes resulting in common 
path unavailability, or even causing network disconnections/partitioning. 
• A relatively sufficient resource of energy and data storage. Compared with other 
mobile communication devices (mobile phone, pads), vehicles have higher energy 
and data storage. 
• Geographic-based message distribution provides fast dissemination of time-critical 
information to other vehicles. 
• Strict data delay requirement, because of the safety applications.  
 
The categories of safety applications are identified by the Vehicle Safety Communications 
Consortium (VSCC)93. Safety applications require low delay communications because the 
 
92 H. Lønsethagen, A. Solem, and B. Olsen (2005) ‘Feasibility of Bandwidth on Demand. Case Study 
Approach, Models and Issues’ EU FP6 IP IST-NOBEL Project internal presentation, Sept. 19–21. 
93 Delgrossi, Luca, and Tao Zhang (2012) ‘Vehicle safety communications: protocols, security, and privacy’, 
Vol. 103 
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validity of information (e.g., post-crash warnings) expire very fast, and any such delayed 
information shortly may shortly become useless for surrounding vehicles. Therefore,100ms 
is the maximum latency of safety message delivery, while 10 Hz is the minimum frequency 
of message exchange. 
 
Safety-related notifications can be either event-driven or periodic. Event-driven messages 
are disseminated after identification of an event94. Safety applications data is normally a 
one-hop broadcasting communication. it should be to send out safety-related messages 
over 150m by one-hop broadcasting. In the case of multi-hop distribution of 
safety messages. The total coverage distance of safety applications is in the range between 
300 m and 20 km95.  The requirement of non-safety applications is shown in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 11.Classification of non-safety applications 
Categories Applications Frequency (Hz) Latency (ms) 
Traffic efficiency Enhanced route guidance and 
navigation 
10 <100 
Green light optimal speed 
advisory 
10 <100 
V2V merging assistance 10 <100 
Infotainment Internet access in vehicle 1 <500 
Point of interest notification 1 <500 
Remote diagnostics 1 <500 
 
7.2.6. Resilience of End-to-End V2V Communications 
The three elements of end to end V2V communication resilience are: (1) communications 
path stability, (2) multipath routing.  
 
Network Path Stability. The main factor for measuring the V2V network path stability is the 
path outage probability. An outage occurs if data from the source vehicle cannot reach the 
destination vehicle. Specifically, the transmission vehicle fails to find the destination vehicle 
within the vehicle’s maximum communication range.  The maximum communication range 
is defined as the range that both the receiver signal level and signal quality SINR is higher 
than a required Quality-of-Service (QoS) threshold. 
 
The approach of enhancing the network capacity is to decrease the network outage 
probability. For example, in a single-hop network, usually one can increase the 
 
94 Vijayakumar, Pandi, Victor Chang, L. Jegatha Deborah, Balamurugan Balusamy, and P. G. Shynu (2018) 
‘Computationally efficient privacy preserving anonymous mutual and batch authentication schemes for 
vehicular ad hoc networks’ Future generation computer systems 78, 943-955. 
95 ETSITR102638 (June 2019) Intelligent Transport System (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of 
Applications; Definition, ETSI Std. ETSI ITS, Specification TR 102 638  
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transmission power to increase the communication rang. However, this can increase the 
interference to other co-frequency users. 
 
Multipath Routing. It improves the reliability of end-to-end transmission, and multipath 
routing can transmit information via a multiple hop relay network. Additionally, multipath 
routing can also improve network throughput, load balancing, and packet delivery ratio. 
However, multipath can cause a data delay because of the longer transmission path and 
relay processing. The multipath routing is suitable for the delay-tolerant service. Such as 
V2V store-carry-forward (SCF) network96.  
 
In recent years store-carry-forward (SCF) relaying has received attention for its potential to 
deliver extra mobile capacity for delay-tolerant data delivery. The principle idea is to 
transmit data close to the intended destination by physically carrying the data packets 
across most of the original transmission distance. It has been shown that it can lead to 
higher energy efficiency for transmission. What has been lacking, however, is the design of 
route selection algorithms that are optimised and efficient for application in large scale 
urban simulations, using real vehicular traffic, to examine performance trade-offs. 
7.3. User Case Analysis for Communication Resilience 
One of the defining trends of our century is the rapid urbanisation in both developed and 
developing worlds.  Across the planet, more than 50% of the population is now living in cities, 
and this is set to rise rapidly over the next decade.  Modern cities are partly defined by a high 
population density and high mobile devices usage (includes mobile vehicles).  Therefore, there 
is an opportunity to achieve multi-hop communications between users. One of the critical 
challenges global cities face is security from terror attacks.  Terrorist attacks generally target 
dense urban areas to deliver the greatest casualty and a high impact. In the event of such an 
attack, such as the 9/11 attack in New York City and the 7/7 bombing in London, the mobile 
networks became overloaded due to the increase phone and date usage. This is typically 
managed by implementing a class access bar for emergency services, meaning that critical 
communication can still take place. 
 
96 Yuan, H., Maple, C. and Ghirardello, K. (2018) August. Dynamic route selection for vehicular store-carry-forward 
networks and misbehaviour vehicles analysis. In 2018 IEEE 88th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Fall) 
(pp. 1-5). IEEE. 
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Figure 21. A simulation of V2V emergency communication under terrorist attack 
7.3.1. Emergency V2V Communications Under Terrorist Attack 
In this section, the use case scenario is that the public access network is under attack, and 
we lose some access points such as RSU or BS. It should be stated that O2’s vision for C-
V2X, would not provide V2V communication via RSUs, but rather directly vehicle-to-vehicle, 
negating the need of the RSU. In this situation, the communication network is fully loaded 
with data traffic, and a large set of vehicles and users are seeking alternative ways to relay 
vital data. Peer assistance V2V communication is a way of allowing vehicles to act as 
relays for each other97. The RSUs of the C-V2X network are then not required for data-
bearing channels or to serve as a coordinator or facilitator to V2V channels. 
 
In Figure 21, it is a use case that shows the communication resilience of V2V 
communication in an urban environment under terrorist attack. In this case, two V2V routing 
algorithms are addressed, the shortest path routing (SPR), which is a greedy path selection 
algorithm. SPR seeks to minimise the total multi-hop distance or the number of hops in 
order to improve the multi-hop V2V transmission reliability. In SPR, each V2V knows its 
location and that of the destination user. Each UE that holds the message will first identify 
the UEs to which it can reliably transmit and then transmit to the one that is closest to the 
destination UE. 
 
The other routing algorithm is Interference Avoidance Routing. While algorithms such as 
SPR can yield reasonable performance and minimise the delay, it may not always yield the 
best reliability performance. This is because when cross-tier interference between 
conventional communication (CC) and V2V transmissions is considered, selecting the 
shortest path is not always the optimal strategy. 
 
 
97 Yuan, Hu, Weisi Guo, and Siyi Wang (2014) "Emergency route selection for D2D cellular communications 
during an urban terrorist attack." In 2014 IEEE International Conference on Communications Workshops 
(ICC), pp. 237-242. IEEE 
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Cross-tier interference is the lowest when the V2V transmissions occur at the RSU 
coverage boundary (cell edge). An edge routing path would reduce the V2V interference to 
CC transmissions in the uplink (UL) band and would reduce the CC interference to V2V 
transmissions using the downlink (DL) band. The interference avoidance routing (IAR) 
algorithm tends to migrate along the cell edge in order to trade off a longer route for 
reduced interference. 
7.3.2. V2V Resilience Performance under CC Constraint 
One of the key advantages of IAR routing over SPR routing is that it reduces the 
interference emitted to regular CC UEs.  By picking a routing path that travels 
predominantly along the traditional coverage edge, it maximises the distance to the majority 
of CC UEs.  The paper now expands the IAR routing to both consider uplink (UL) and 
downlink (DL) bands. 
 
 
Figure 22. V2V outage probability for various CC outage constraints 
Figure 22 shows the V2V outage probability for various CC outage constraints. The results 
show that there is an intuitive trade-off in outage probability between CC and V2V UEs. For 
a stringent CC outage constraint, V2V transmission is not permitted. As the CC constraint 
gets relaxed, the V2V routing method changes from IAR to SPR, and from the DL to the UL 
band.  More specifically, the results show that for: 
 
• CC outage constraint <5%: no V2V is permitted; 
• CC outage constraint <12%: V2V using IAR in DL can achieve the lowest outage 
probability of 20%; 
• CC outage constraint <15%: V2V using IAR in UL can achieve the lowest outage 
probability of 8%; 
• CC outage constraint <40%: V2V using SPR in UL can achieve the lowest outage 
probability of 3%; 
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There is an intuitive trade-off in outage probability between CC and V2V, what has been 
improved is that by dynamically selecting the V2V routing method and transmission band, 
the V2V outage can be minimised.  The V2V transmit band that causes the least 
interference to CC is the DL band, but the V2V outage is reasonably high.  As the outage 
constraint is relaxed in CC, there is a shift from interference aware transmit band and 
routing paths, to the shortest path in UL band. 
8. Introduction to Mobile Network Security 
8.1. Introduction 
1st and 2nd generation of mobile communications systems and their networks were not 
designed and implemented with security considerations as a major focus. Although today 2G, 
with improvements from later releases over time, is now considered to be extremely robust. 
This approach was mainly based on the “security through obscurity” paradigm wherein it was 
believed that if the algorithms used in the implementation of the mobile network technologies 
were kept secret, then the security of the system was assured as no one outside of the 
implementation group will have the requisite technical know-how to break the system. Of 
course, this assumption was flawed as evidenced by the recorded number of successful 
attacks on the TACs system. 
 
The job to ensure that future mobile networks evolved to have better security measures, that 
user communications remained private, and the ability to compromise the system and disrupt 
services was limited, would fall to the standards body 3GPP and its members. Designing this 
type of security into the fabric of the network from the ground up was better known as “Carrier 
Grade” security. 
8.2. Evolution of Mobile Network Security 
The standardisation consortium responsible for implementing GSM (one of the 2G technical 
options) was the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). However, the initial 
standards did not produce strong enough security capabilities. It became obvious that 
additional security measures were needed. The standardisation framework specified the 
following features that had to be supported by both the mobile devices and base stations, as a 
standard requirement in any public GSM mobile network: 
 
• Confidentiality and authentication of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), i.e. 
the subscribers. 
• Data confidentiality along physical connections (i.e. secured and encrypted). 
• Data confidentiality for connectionless users. 
• Data confidentiality for signalling (i.e. signal integrity) 
 
When 3G was introduced, it provided improved security features as well as high data rates, 
while also providing much higher network capacities. 3G mobile networks were the first to 
implement “Carrier Grade security” and this differentiated them from the previous generation. 
 
Before improvement, some of the known GSM security vulnerabilities at that time included: 
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• Fake base station set up by attackers for eavesdropping. 
• Unsecured International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). 
• Lack of built-in flexibility in the system to upgrade security and functionality easily. 
 
The new standard for 3G “Carrier Grade” security was set out with the following objectives: 
 
• All user information must be protected against 3rd party access, misuse or theft. 
• Networks and home environments must have their resources protected against misuse or 
theft. 
• Security must be standardised and compatible worldwide, as well as allowing roaming and 
interoperability within these security standards. 
• There should be a mechanism to allow for security to be improved in a flexible manner as 
new threats arise. 
 
As mobile networks were becoming more IP oriented, a whole new group of threats to the new 
generations of mobile such as 4G and 5G were introduced. This was addressed by developing 
security from the ground up and would be known as Carrier Grade security. Figure 7 provides 
an overview of a generic mobile network security interactions and interfaces from the SIM 
inside a UE to the Mobile Core Network and beyond for current day 2G, 3G, 4G & 5G 
networks. 
 
 
Figure 23. Generalised mobile network security interfaces 
8.3. Overview of 3GPP 5G Security Features 
3GPP 5G security is principally defined in 3GPP TS 33.501 and takes a very-much enhanced 
view of the need for security mitigation and mechanisms through its bottom-up consideration in 
standards. The high-level architecture for 5G security is depicted in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24. 3GPP security architecture, where ME=Mobile Equipment, USIM=Universal Subscriber 
Identity Module, AN=Access Node, SN=Serving Network 
The domains and features highlighted in Figure 8, as taken from 3GPP TS 33.501, are outlined in 
detail below: 
 
• Network access security (I): The set of security features that enable a UE to authenticate 
and access services via the network securely, including the 3GPP access and non-3GPP 
access, and in particularly, to protect against attacks on the (radio) interfaces.  In addition, it 
includes the security context delivery from the Serving Network (SN) to the Access Network 
(AN) for the access security. 
• Network domain security (II): The set of security features that enable network nodes to 
securely exchange signalling data and user plane data. 
• User domain security (III): The set of security features that secure the user access to 
mobile equipment. 
• Application domain security (IV): The set of security features that enable applications in 
the user domain and in the provider domain to exchange messages securely. 
• Service-Based Architecture (SBA) domain security (V): The set of security features that 
enables network functions of the SBA architecture to securely communicate within the 
serving network domain and with other network domains. Such features include network 
function registration, discovery, and authorisation security aspects, as well as the protection 
for the service-based interfaces. SBA domain security is a new security feature compared 
to 3GPP TS 33.401 which is the technical security specification for the preceding LTE, 3G 
and GSM generations standardized by 3GPP. 
• Visibility and configurability of security (VI): The set of features that enable the user to 
be informed whether a security feature is in operation or not. 
8.4. Security in the Context of CAVs 
Cars are continually incorporating more software and becoming more connected. This opens 
them up to increased risks of cyber security attacks. At present, cars have more than 100 types 
of Engine Control Units (ECUs) and more than 100 million lines of code which provides a 
massive attack surface for hackers. 
 
Hackers can exploit and gain access to any vulnerabilities in the system such as any 
exploitable vulnerabilities in the Bluetooth interface for example, to take control of critical core 
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ECUs which controls brakes or engine functionality. Attackers can then pose very serious 
security threats such as the ability to disable a vehicle's brakes or steering functions, shut down 
the vehicle’s engine, or manipulate other on-board systems through DoS and other forms of 
attacks. However, this is may be mitigated using two data buses; one for information and 
connection to outside world, and another for critical control systems such as brakes and 
steering with no connection to the outside world without a direct cable connection. Access to 
this system is gained via a secure gateway or similar device. 
 
The addition of any connected component to support vehicle infotainment systems, 
maintenance monitoring, and other systems increases cyber security vulnerabilities. In 
connected and autonomous vehicle systems, the elements or interfaces that may be exploited 
include: 
 
• Sensors. 
• Vehicle Communications Networks. 
• Hardware components (e.g., control units). 
• Software systems. 
 
Sensors can be exploited by jamming or giving them incorrect signals. For example, with the 
Light Detection and Ranging System (LiDAR), a laser tuned to the correct wavelength directed 
at the vehicle will jam the LiDAR and cause it to stop. With Global Positioning Systems (GPS), 
a simple software defined radio can be used to project incorrect location information causing 
the vehicle to take a completely different path compared to its intended or actual path. 
 
Vehicle communications networks can be used to enable communications between vehicles 
using Wi-Fi or DSRC networks, as well as other personal devices using the mobile network.  
This means that the vulnerabilities in the smartphone connectivity interface and data flows, 
such as certain elements in the LTE protocol, can be exploited to monitor the communications 
and information about the vehicle, or to intercept this information and inject incorrect 
information within the system. 
 
The control units within connected vehicles can be exploited if accessed in a way in which the 
data they send for diagnostics and feedback can be tampered with. In this situation, a vehicle 
can then be fed incorrect information that may interfere with its control systems and decision 
making. This type of vulnerability includes rogue firmware updates delivered to a vehicle to 
then enable receipt of further compromised updates. 
9. Mobile Network Vulnerabilities 
9.1. Radio Access Network Security Vulnerabilities 
9.1.1. Denial of Service (Registration)  
One of the RAN security issues is its susceptibility to DoS attacks98, which can be used to 
saturate the resources of the RAN. This is done by sending very high volumes of 
registration requests to the MSC, which lacks the ability to distinguish between false and 
 
98 Department of Homeland Security (2017) ‘Study on Mobile Device Security’ 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 85 of 150 
legitimate requests. As a result, for each request, the MSC will attempt to get an 
authentication challenge from the HLR, keeping it busy, which will cause genuine requests 
to be lost in the presence of such a DoS attack99. In most modern networks this has now 
been mitigated. 
9.1.2. Denial of Service (Attach)  
Attach requests and rejects can be used to block mobile devices at the RAN99. This is done 
using a rogue eNodeB to send a false attach reject message, which tells a mobile device it 
cannot connect to a legitimate eNodeB, while pretending to be a legitimate eNodeB. This 
then convinces the mobile device that the nearby legitimate eNodeB has in fact rejected the 
attempt to connect to it. As a result, the mobile device will not attempt to connect to the 
legitimate eNodeB again and is therefore denied access to the legitimate services it desires 
from its mobile network service provider, at least for a certain amount of time100, or by 
moving location, or doing a power-off reset. 
9.1.3. Eavesdropping 
This is done via the SIB (System Information Block) and MIB (Master Information Block) 
packets. These packets are broadcasted periodically by the base station and contain useful 
system information such as the mobile operator of the cell, the identity of that cell as well as 
the power required to trigger handover to that cell. However, these information blocks, have 
no form of encryption on them, leaving them open to passive packet sniffing, where the 
attacker can simply listen in on the data passing through and intercept it without any real 
effort101. Using this information, it is also possible to construct a very convincing fake base 
station by impersonating a legitimate Mobile Network Operator and using a transmitted 
power value that will trigger mobile devices to initiate a handover to it. It is also possible to 
obtain the mapping of important control channels through this method, allowing for more 
accurate methods of executing a jamming attack, as the attacker now knows where the 
best locations to jam the mobile network are. However, this will be only a very localised 
attack, and does make the attacker vulnerable to detection by law enforcement. 
9.1.4. IMSI Catcher 
The IMSI of a mobile network user is usually kept private but must at some point be used in 
the communications process and data flow. It is usually transmitted before the encryption 
and authentication process in the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) functional layer, where the 
attach process occurs. The NAS is a set of protocols that are used to enable the transfer of 
non-radio signalling messages between a UE and the Core Network. The vulnerabilities in 
the protocol stack can be exploited to obtain the IMSI information during the network attach 
process. The IMSI catcher commonly impersonates a GSM base station so that a mobile 
device is forced to use low level security which can be used to monitor communications102, 
 
99 RadWare. (2013) Mobile Networks Security Research Paper 
100 Altaf Shaik, R. B.-P. (2017) Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Communication 
Systems 
101 Jover, R. P. (2016) LTE Security, protocol exploits and location tracking experimentation with low-cost 
software radio 
102 Timo Gendrullis, M. N. (2008) A Real-World Attack Breaking A5/1 within Hours 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 86 of 150 
see Figure 25103. A method to mitigate this vulnerability is by minimising the transmission of 
IMSI, which is accomplished by using a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI). This 
identifier is shorter than the IMSI number and hence it is more efficient to transmit. 
However, to be clear, the purpose of using TMSI in place of IMSI is to provide a significant 
improvement to security to the mobile subscriber, as IMSI does not need to be transmitted 
continuously. 
 
 
Figure 25: IMSI catcher illustration 
9.1.5. Downgrade Attack 
The ‘Attach Reject’ and TAU (Tracking Area Update) reject messages can be used in a 
similar way to the denial of service attacks, again with a rogue eNodeB sending the reject 
messages to an unsuspecting UE that will then be convinced that it is not permitted to 
connect to a legitimate eNodeB100. Instead of a simple reject message to prevent an attach 
or connection, the rogue eNodeB will now additionally specify that the user is not allowed to 
connect to 3G and 4G services, which will leave only 2G which is more vulnerable in terms 
of security. The UE will then exclusively attempt to connect to a 2G network layer, exposing 
it to eavesdropping due to the possibly weaker encryption of 2G102. 
9.1.6. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)  
Using a false base station or rogue eNodeB, it is possible to simply impersonate a 
legitimate provider’s base station, using some of the prior vulnerabilities such as 
eavesdropping to obtain subscriber information and illegally intercept communications. In 
this scenario, mobile network users initially connect to the false base station, meaning that 
information will pass through the false node before being routed to its desired destination, 
allowing the attacker to simply monitor all communications without discovery100. 
9.1.7. Tracking 
It is possible to use prior methods such as MitM attacks to obtain information allowing the 
location of the mobile network user to be determined, however there is a newer method 
which allows for this to be achieved. On the physical layer, there is a 16-bit identifier known 
as the Cell Random Network Temporary Identifier (C-RNTI), which is unique to each device 
in a cell. The C-RNTI is included in the header of the physical layer packets, meaning that 
this information is not encrypted. From this unique identifier, it is then possible to use the 
 
103 Patel, M. (2020, February) Retrieved from Paladion High Speed Cyber Defense: 
https://www.paladion.net/blogs/how-to-build-an-imsi-catcher-to-intercept-gsm-traffic 
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packets with the C-RNTI in the header to map the traffic of the user quite easily, allowing an 
eavesdropper to know approximately how long a user stays at a certain location. While the 
C-RNTI is considered temporary, it is not refreshed very often, giving a long enough period 
for it to be used for tracking101, see Table 12 and Figure 26, though none of the contents of 
the data packets are exposed. 
 
Table 12: Mobile network user identity mapping flow 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Mapping user identity for tracking 
9.2. Core Network Security Vulnerabilities 
9.2.1. Unsecured SS7 
The SS7 protocol outside of the Mobile Application Part (MAP) protocol component is 
essentially security-free, meaning that an attack on the SS7 protocol would be met with no 
direct opposition104. As a result, the signalling protocol stack connected to the core network 
can potentially be exploited to access the ports of the core network, allowing for a range of 
attack vectors due to the number of services supported by the core network105. But this is 
 
104 GSM Association. (2019) Mobile Telecommunications Security Threat Landscape. 
105 Vacca, J. (2014) In Network and System Security - Second Edition (pp. 319-350) 
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generally well managed, within the mobile network core network buildings, with managed 
access, i.e. no access to general public or staff. 
9.3. Backhaul Network Security Vulnerabilities 
9.3.1. Optional Implementation of IPsec 
4G transmissions have a security vulnerability as backhaul traffic from the eNodeB to the IP 
core network is unencrypted98 on a VLAN.  Most of the tier 1 operators have implemented 
IPsec to address this issue. IPsec is a real necessity for operators due to the added layer of 
security it provides and the fact that LTE is an all-IP mobile system. The IPsec protocols 
were defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to provide end-to-end security 
that can protect IP networks and protect higher-layer applications105. 
9.3.2. Unsecure CPRI protocol 
CPRI (Common Radio Interface Protocol) is a digital interface standard to transport 
antenna samples between a radio equipment and a radio equipment control unit that 
performs the digital processing of these signals. In other words, it is an opensource protocol 
between Baseband and Radio Unit in base stations. 
 
CPRI defines how the radio signal data is exchanged and not the data itself. 
CPRI uses network security protocols such as IPsec and MACsec. However, the 
implementation and usage of IPsec or MACsec is vendor specific and are both optional 
solutions to provide transmission security in both the user plane and management plane. 
For the synchronisation plane, there is no defined security recommendations. If any vendor 
uses an unencrypted part of CPRI then all communications between baseband and radio 
unit are deemed to be unsecured. 
9.4. Summary of Mobile Network Vulnerabilities and Defences 
In Table 13, some possible defences are proposed for the current mobile network 
vulnerabilities. These are quite general with the aim of dealing with where the attack occurs, 
including the signalling protocols of mobile networks. 
 
Table 13: Mobile network vulnerabilities and proposed defences 
Vulnerability Proposed Defence 
DoS (Registration) 
Make the Core Network capable of determining non-legitimate 
requests so that they can be dropped before resources are 
saturated. 
DoS (Attach) 
Develop a unique session ID or form of distinguishing different 
eNodeBs, as well as changing the reject system so that a 
phone does not stop attach requests after a single eNodeB 
has issued a reject. 
Eavesdropping, Tracking 
Improve security and encryption on data packets containing 
sensitive information which could lead to security breaches. 
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IMSI Catcher, Man-in-the-
Middle 
Stronger authentication methods to avoid the presence of false 
base stations. Partially mitigated using TMSI. 
Downgrade Attack 
Changes required for backward compatibility to avoid 
downgrades beyond a certain level of security if possible. 
SS7, IPsec, CPRI 
Use of higher-level encryptions with standardized 
requirements for more flexible protocols where encryption 
must be used where possible, especially when going into 
unsecured networks. 
 
In Table 14, network security methods more specific to CAVs are proposed, with the aim of 
mostly ensuring that nodes and information in the CAV network are secured in a way to 
limit the effect of mobile attacks on the CAVs57. 
 
Table 14: Mobile network security defences 
Defence Benefits 
Use physical layer channels to assign 
signatures and other features that allow 
legitimate UEs to be determined. 
Detection of fake UE which could be used to 
compromise data and give false information. 
Communication between layers to alert 
systems of threats on different levels. 
More robust security awareness as a threat 
detected can be communicated to different 
system layers. 
Use of cloud and edge networks to detect a 
false transmitter. 
Detection of false transmissions leading to 
potential interception or modification of 
messages and information. 
Periodic notification of users so that they are 
aware which UEs in the network are 
legitimate. 
Prevents false nodes from hiding in a 
legitimate network by constantly indicating 
the legitimate nodes. 
Local station is provided with the information 
from the sensors of CAVs to check for 
inconsistency. 
Prevention of false information used to 
manipulate sensors in potentially dangerous 
ways. 
Use machine learning to learn and become 
aware of normal behavior of CAVs. 
Dangerous sensor manipulation much 
harder, as the machine learning would 
indicate it as unusual behavior and detect 
the threat. 
Store prior information exchanges between 
UEs. 
Can be used to identify anomalies in data 
exchange, indicating a possible attempt to 
exploit data transfer. 
Validate messages using multiple types of 
sensor information. 
Determines legitimacy of message as well 
as finding possible threats from the 
messages. 
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9.5. Categorisation of Attacks and their Aims 
In this section, the mobile network vulnerabilities and attack vectors are summarised. The 
exploits are categorised based on the aims of an attacker. This is then mapped to which 
interfaces or network elements are compromised in a successful attack and the mobile network 
technology it can impact. Some attacks are targeted specifically at the service provider’s 
network, while others affect the network users. Mobile network attacks can be categorised into 
the following four main elements that can be impacted from a successful exploit: 
 
• Service 
• Secrecy 
• Privacy 
• Integrity 
 
Attackers can use either passive or active methods to target the RAN layer, but this is localised 
at a cell level. Furthermore, other types of attacks have wider consequences or footprints and 
can impact at a network-wide or global scale. 
 
There are different types of mobile network attacks106, see Table 15, and their causes and root 
causes are provided in Table 16106. 
Table 15: Attack categorisation and aims 
 
 
106 David Rupprecht, A. D. (2018) ‘On Security Research Towards Future Mobile Network Generations’, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.08932.pdf 
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Table 16: Root causes of some mobile network attacks 
 
9.6. Mobile Network Vulnerability Case Studies 
It is important to understand why mobile network vulnerabilities and their possible implications may 
impact the CAV ecosystem. The case studies presented in this section demonstrate the 
importance and urgency of having effective cyber security controls and the risk mitigation 
frameworks that are explored further in the report. 
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9.6.1. ComSec – IMSI Catcher 
A biotech company in San Francisco found that secrets had been exposed to the 
competition regarding expansion of its product line, which was unknown to anyone outside 
of a confidentially bound group of people within the company. Looking further into this with 
the help of ComSec, it was found that an IMSI catcher was acting as a rogue cell tower for 
mobile phones, monitoring all communications and taking a copy of all the details before 
forwarding them along the regular route, meaning that a man in the middle attack was 
being perpetrated the entire time107. 
 
In the case of the IMSI catcher at ComSec, it is possible to have access to a victims’ 
communications, which could result in a wide range of data breaches well beyond 
production line secrets, as phones now have a wider range of uses than before. For 
example, this attack could be used to monitor the IP based communications on the user 
end as well as gain access to more sensitive data which can include passwords stored on 
the phone or bank details. However, this vulnerability is mostly mitigated by the use of 
TMSI, adopted by all modern networks, but is an example of attacker thinking. 
9.6.2. Jeep Cherokee Hijacking 
In 2015, serious weaknesses were shown in self driving personal light vehicles, particularly 
highlighted by the hijack of in a Jeep Cherokee by two scientists. The hijacking occurred 
while the vehicle was still in motion. Initially, the climate control system was hijacked, 
allowing for adjusting of the fan and temperature within the car, followed by the activation of 
the radio. An added result of taking control of the car was that these features could not be 
manually overridden by the person in the car. The digital display was taken control of to 
display unauthorised images, followed by a much more serious issue of cutting the 
transmission. This basically stopped the accelerator of the car and resulted in the car 
coming to a stop in the middle of the road, which meant that this self-driving car could be 
stopped at any time, resulting in a potential crash108. This exploit was due to the software, 
uConnect, which is used to connect to the Internet, allowing for the driver to have an 
Internet hotspot, navigate and make phone calls, meaning that this could be exploited to 
take control of the car provided that the IP address of the vehicle was known25. 
 
In this scenario, the stopping of the car was only one of the dangers. In fact, a full software 
control could allow for all types of spoofed data to be exploited such that a vehicle could be 
deceived regarding its surroundings, the detection of obstacles could return the wrong 
values, or the speed of a vehicle would not be detected. This could cause serious 
accidents, especially if all the other vehicles are also autonomous and therefore dependent 
on the same kind of systems. 
9.6.3. SS7 Signalling Interception 
SS7 can be used to track phones as well as intercept the messages being sent to and from 
them because it is a core network signalling protocol, giving rise to a range of possible 
 
107 ComSec (n.d.) ComSec: IMSI Catcher Case Study. Retrieved from ComSec: 
http://comsecllc.com/comsec-imsi-catcher-case-study/ 
108 WIRED (2015) Retrieved from Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway: 
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-keep-highway/ 
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attacks. One of these attacks was when two-factor authentication messages to phones for 
Metro Bank UK banking in 2019 were intercepted. This meant that the attacker could obtain 
the verification codes needed to gain access to the online banking system showing an 
extremely serious issue in banking using mobile networks that use SS7 signalling 
protocols109 (VICE, 2019). In a CAV scenario, this type of attack could lead to loss of 
privacy and integrity. Again, all modern networks protect against this form of attack.  
Attackers would need access to the core network, which is very unlikely, as these are 
secure managed access areas. 
9.7. Vulnerabilities of OEM In-Vehicle Applications 
Vehicle Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications such as Land-rover Jaguar’s 
InControl Apps, FordPass Connect and Tesla App are some examples of the platforms that 
enable connectivity in modern connected cars. 
 
These applications provide two broad functionalities and services in a CAV environment:  
 
• A platform for services such as weather and live-traffic data, infotainment as well as 
personal and social media messaging. 
• Driving-related functions that provide safety and convenience for drivers and vehicle 
occupants such as navigation data, information about charging points for electric 
vehicles, climate control and parking-related assistance. 
Software applications, however, are never hundred per cent secure from possible exploits and 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in connected car applications exposes these vehicles to huge 
security threats as they become attractive targets for attackers. Vehicle manufacturers are 
cognizant of these critical vulnerabilities and routinely issue warnings to investors and 
consumers that despite their best efforts in designing and implementing security measures to 
protect against unauthorised access to their systems, they cannot guarantee that vulnerabilities 
will not be exploited before being identified or that their mitigation strategies are effective. 
 
It is very common to find connected vehicle models with the capability to establish 
communication links between the in-vehicle applications and other external devices. Although, 
In-vehicle applications provide essential connectivity functions for drivers, they also increase 
the cyber security risk profiles of connected vehicles due to their connection to the internet 
amplifying the potential of being hacked. 
 
One of the most important focus for in-vehicle security is the infotainment system which is 
designed to interact and connect to mobile networks such as 4G and 5G, as well as the 
capability to connect to smart home systems using technologies such as Zigbee, Bluetooth or 
Wi-Fi. 
 
The main security considerations raised by researchers stem from a potential design flaw in 
most connected vehicles where the infotainment system is connected to external networks 
such as the Internet, through a mobile connection, as well as to the control unit of the vehicles 
that serve critical and safety-related functions such as the engine control and the braking 
 
109 VICE (2019) 'Criminals are Tapping into the Phone Network Backbone to Empty Accounts' 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbzvxv/criminals-hackers-ss7-uk-banks-metro-bank 
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systems. This therefore provides an attack surface for hackers to commandeer a vehicle from a 
remote location through the internet. 
 
The most recent cyber-attacks on connected vehicles were conducted via in-vehicle application 
exploits. Applications that allow for remote access often use a web service hosted by the 
service provider or through direct connections to the devices. The web service then connects to 
the vehicle through the mobile network. Like any mobile application, in-vehicle applications are 
exposed to a multitude of cyber security threats and vulnerabilities. The list below provides a 
summary: 
 
• Non-standard testing and analysis: Auto manufacturers have not yet defined 
industry-wide standards for fundamental activities during the design process. Tools like 
fuzz testing and static code analysis should be standardized across manufacturers.  
 
• Malware Attack: Any digital application is exposed to the threat of malware attacks. In 
addition, poorly designed or maintained software provides an entry pathway for 
attackers wishing to exploit security vulnerabilities especially with applications that are 
designed and implemented using open source platforms. This risk is further amplified 
when third-party applications are allowed in the vehicle application ecosystem. 
 
• Front Door Attack: Commandeering or over-riding the access mechanism of the OEM 
such as access to the Engine Control Unit (ECU), Engine Control Module (ECM), 
Transmission Control Module (TCM), BCM (Brake Control Module) etc. through bugs or 
security lapses in in-vehicle software systems. 
 
• Lack of Binary Protections: This vulnerability is presented when the source code of 
an in-vehicle application is easy to decompile, read and reverse-engineer as a result of 
being written in clear-text. 
 
• Privacy risks: Despite the inherent privacy implications, most consumers opt in to have 
their usage and interaction data with in-vehicle applications collected and sent to 
remote OEM servers. This means that consumers are susceptible to being tracked and 
have no control in stopping their data being sold to third parties or for what purposes 
their data is used.  In addition, if the data that sits on these applications is not wiped 
when the vehicle is transferred to a new owner it may be exposed and exploited with 
severe consequences on privacy. 
 
• Data Leakage: When the in-vehicle application shares services with other third-party 
applications and provides permissions to transfer or share any consumer data then data 
leakage may occur, leading to breaches of confidentiality and privacy. 
 
• Client-Side Injection Attack: This Vulnerability targets application clients or users 
rather than assets or server resources. Through this attack, the application is used to 
execute a malicious code on the client side. Malicious code running in an application 
can have serious security and privacy implications for consumers and OEMs. 
 
• Weak Encryption: This vulnerability can be exploited when outdated or weak 
algorithms are used to protect data and data transmissions. 
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• Private Key Exposure: When the attacker obtains a private key, then offline cracking 
is possible. 
 
• Over-the-Air (OTA) Software Updates: Enabling OTA updates for in-vehicle software 
applications attracts serious security risks. If a vehicle’s systems can be updated 
remotely then these systems can also be accessed remotely by an attacker, given 
enough time and resources to identify holes in the security systems relied on by the 
OEMs. It was reported in (Consumer Watchdog, 2019)110 that in August 2015, security 
experts found six vulnerabilities that exposed the Tesla software to hacking. Those 
vulnerabilities were eventually patched OTA. 
 
The remote unlocking of BMW, Mini, and Rolls-Royce vehicles has been widely publicised. 
This specific vulnerability was addressed by upgrading the communication encryption 
mechanisms between the vehicles and BMW’s server, requiring the patching of at least 2.2 
million vehicles.  
 
The vehicle application vulnerabilities summarised above indicate a greater need for OEMs to 
improve their cyber security capabilities and put in place robust mitigation strategies to quickly 
address and fix vulnerabilities as soon as they are discovered. Software testing and patching 
can reduce the vulnerabilities, but more importantly security by design must be embraced by all 
vehicle manufacturers.  
10. Mobile Network Security Capabilities 
10.1. Introduction 
In mobile networks, different sections of the network have different abilities to defend against 
attack. This includes encryption and methods of authorization to make sure that information is 
not read by a third party, as well as ensuring that UEs and base stations are authenticated and 
encrypted before beginning any communication. These capabilities can limit the effect of 
existing vulnerabilities to reduce the effect of an attacker on the network. 
10.2. Radio Access Network Security Capabilities 
10.2.1. Ciphering 
As it is not desirable for others to have easy access to communications, mobile networks 
employ forms of encryption based on ciphering. This is where the communications, either in 
voice or text form, are encoded using a predetermined system such as AES which prevents 
them being easily intercepted, meaning only the end users may successfully read them 
without having to break the cipher, preventing eavesdropping between the mobile device 
and base station105.  
 
110 Consumer Watchdog. (2019, July) Kill Switch: Why connected cars can be killing machines and how to turn 
them off. USA 
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10.2.2. Non-Repeating Random Values 
 Another form of protection for the RAN is non-repeating random values, which essentially 
generates a sequence of random numbers that will not have any repeats in them, so that a 
unique session ID is generated for each communication. This prevents replay attacks, 
which fraudulently repeat or delay valid data transmissions. This is usually done by an 
attacker who intercepts the data and retransmits it, essentially performing a type of MitM 
attack105. 
10.2.3. Signalling Integrity 
This uses integrity keys to ensure that the data transmitted is not modified or deleted in any 
way, so that there is no interfering with communications between the base station and the 
mobile device. This consists of an algorithm agreement stage, where the mobile device and 
base station can securely negotiate the algorithm they will use, followed by integrity key 
agreement, which allows them to agree on a chosen integrity key, which also provides 
authentication between the mobile device and the base station (mutual authentication). This 
authentication also prevents the use of cloned mobile devices and base stations by an 
attacker105. 
10.2.4. Mutual Authentication 
The mobile device and the base station must verify their identities to one another at the 
same time before agreeing on security measures. As a result, a fake base station will have 
much greater difficulty impersonating an existing station as it must verify itself to the mobile 
device in the same instant101. The 11 digit cell global identity (CGI) is a way of insuring a 
unique identifier for every cell in the network, it is made up of a country code (CC), a mobile 
network code (MNC), location area code (LAC) and cell identity (CI), therefore GCI = 
CC+MNC+LAC+CI. 
10.2.5. Privacy (TMSI and GUTI)  
The TMSI is assigned locally to mask the IMSI of the user as it is possible to track the 
mobile device based on this. Similarly, the use of the Globally Unique Temporary Identifier 
(GUTI) 100 is assigned to a mobile device on attachment. The GUTI, like the TMSI can be 
periodically changed, meaning that it is harder to follow the traffic of the phone to identify its 
location, as discussed earlier in this document. 
10.3. Core Network Security Capabilities 
10.3.1. End-to-End Encryption  
In the core network, the SS7 group of protocols is used, which provide a range of services 
including number translation, billing and Short Message Service (SMS), but are mainly 
used for setup and teardown of phone calls. Security is provided for a protocol known as 
Mobile Application Part (MAP) which is based on SS7, in the form of a security protocol 
known as MAPSec. MAP provides an application layer for nodes in GSM, as well as core 
networks in GPRS and UMTS, so that services can be provided to users by accessing key 
nodes in the core network. When MAP is used with the IP protocol, it becomes IPsec. Both 
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MAPSec and IPsec are used to protect MAP messages between links by providing service 
node authentication, as well as message encryption from end to end. This prevents 
eavesdropping, as well as corruption or fabrication of MAP messages. It must be noted that 
both MAPSec and IPsec are optional, but most, if not all network operators enables them, 
the other providers must also enable it to ensure end-to-end security105. 
10.4. Backhaul Network Security Capabilities 
10.4.1. IPsec and Certificate Handling 
3GPP has introduced security by addressing the scenarios with and without IPsec, 
protecting the user and control traffic where possible. Packets encrypted at the backhaul 
use Internet Key Exchange 2 (IKEv2) which is used to set up Security Association (SA) 
protocol of IPsec. The IKEv2 protocol is certified with the use of Certificate Management 
Protocol 2 (CMPv2) which is used to authenticate links using Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI). This form of IPsec was used to develop the 3GPP security standards for the LTE 
backhaul. 
 
The packets between eNodeB and the core network are controlled by IPsec, which uses an 
Authentication Header offering integrity and authentication of the data, with the option of 
anti-replay to avoid a replay attack. The Encapsulating Security Payload offers the same 
services with confidentiality. The purpose of the S1 interface outlined by 3GPP is to provide 
end to end encryption and decryption. If the S1 and X1 sections of the network are trusted, 
IPsec is not mandatory, otherwise it must be used when traversing non trusted networks. 
 
 
Figure 27: Backhaul security architecture111 
 
111 Backhaul Security Mechanisms. (2015) Retrieved from Long Term Evolved Security: 
https://longtermevolvedsecurity.wordpress.com/backhaul-security-mechanisms-in-lte/ 
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10.4.2. CPRI (Common Public Radio Interface) 
At the baseband unit of a network, signals will pass through the baseband unit which 
controls information and status inside the base station and will encrypt all digital information 
based on IPsec or MACsec according to the vendor-specific implementations. This means 
the data leaving the baseband unit is secured by encryption, if the optional security 
mechanisms are implemented. 
10.5. Summary of Mobile Network Security Capabilities 
A summary of the mobile network security capabilities is provided in Table 1757, and referenced 
to the appropriate network element where is implemented. 
 
Table 17. CAV security defences 
Capability Network 
Location 
Explanation 
Ciphering RAN Use of agreed system to encode the data to 
avoid others freely reading it. 
Non-repeating Random 
Values 
RAN Sequence of random numbers used for 
each session to avoid attackers interfering 
with sessions using replay attacks. 
Signalling Integrity RAN Integrity keys used to prevent the signal 
being tampered with and is used by both 
sides in mutual authentication. 
Mutual Authentication RAN Both ends of the communication must 
identify to each other before agreeing on 
security. 
Privacy RAN TMSI and GUTI used to mask the IMSI and 
are periodically changed to avoid using 
them for ID and tracking. 
End-to-End Encryption Core 
Network 
Information encrypted before going between 
end users to prevent reading of information. 
IPsec & Certificate 
Handling 
Backhaul IPsec used when transferring data along 
untrusted networks and certificate handling 
used to authenticate links before agreeing 
on public keys. 
CPRI (Common Packet 
Radio Interface) 
Fronthaul Data encrypted at the baseband unit before 
going to next point of network to allow 
privacy. 
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11. Threat Modelling of CAV Communication 
In this section an overview of the CAV communications assets and tiers is provided, see Figure 28. 
This is used to analyse potential threats that arise from the interactions of the various assets and 
asset boundaries within the Open System Interconnection (OSI) layers of the LTE protocol stack. 
The OSI model is a conceptual framework developed by ISO and is used in describing generic 
network communication data flows. In contrast to the TCP/IP model, which was developed 
specifically for internet and data-based communications over networks, the LTE protocol stack has 
similar characteristics and functionalities that can generally be mapped to the OSI model. The LTE 
functional assets are mapped to the OSI layers and listed in Table 18 through to Table 20. These 
assets are used for a high-level STRIDE analysis with mitigation using Center for Internet Security 
(CIS) Controls, which are described in Section 11.2. 
 
The Data Flow Diagram created for Figure 28 is from the reference end-to-end CAV network 
architecture used in this report. It models the data interactions between assets and asset 
boundaries, starting from the SIM card located in the vehicle modem to the PGW of the mobile 
core network, the internet and the application servers used to provide CAV-related services. 
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Figure 28. Data Flow Diagram for the CAV communication layer assets and their interactions 
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11.1. OSI Layer Assets 
Table 18. OSI Layer 2 Assets 
Asset Description Location 
C
o
n
fi
d
e
n
ti
a
li
ty
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ty
 
A
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b
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y
 
Modem A device that adds wireless 4G (LTE) 
connectivity to vehicle. 
Vehicle M H H 
SIM Subscriber Identification Module 
securely store the IMSI number and its 
related key to identify and authenticate 
the subscribers on network. 
Vehicle H H H 
eNodeB Evolved Node B communicates directly 
wirelessly with user equipment and 
controls radio communication between 
US and EPC. 
RAN M H M 
MME Handles the high-level operation by the 
signalling messages and HSS. 
EPS M H H 
HSS Holds all the information about all the 
network operator’s subscribers in a 
central database. 
EPS H H H 
SWG Performs mobility anchoring and 
forward data between PDN Gateway 
and Base Station. 
EPS M M H 
PCRF Accountable for controlling the flow-
based charging operations in the 
Policy Control Enforcement Function 
(PCEF) and policy control decision-
making. 
EPS H M H 
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Table 19. OSI Layer 3 Assets 
Asset Description Location 
C
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A
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
 
PDN_GW Communicates with PDN’s employing 
interfaces. It performs operations like 
IP address allocation and packet 
filtering. 
EPS H H H 
IP GW Connects the IP network to PDN-GW IP 
Network 
H M M 
 
Table 20. OSI Layer 7 Assets 
Asset Description Location 
C
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DHCP Automatically assigns an IP address and 
other information to each host on the 
network. 
EPS L M H 
DNS A hierarchical and decentralised naming 
system for resources connected to the 
Internet or the internal network. 
EPS H H M 
3GPP AAA Provides authentication, authorisation, 
policy control and routing information to 
packet gateways. 
EPS H H H 
Application 
Server 
Handles all application operations 
between users and the backend business 
applications or databases. 
EPS M M M 
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Figure 29. Simplified diagram, showing assets, threats and mitigations for each OSI layer 
11.2. CIS Controls 
CIS controls are developed by a global community of IT experts to provide a series of high 
priority security actions and mitigations that should be considered as a defence-in-depth best 
practice to reduce the risk of common attacks112. 
 
CIS controls are developed based on actual experienced attacks, which are defended 
effectively. The experts’ extensive knowledge is gathered from various ecosystems to develop 
 
112 Center for Internet Security (2019) CIS Controls, Version 7.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/ 
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a mature collection of controls that could be employed and adopted by different industries and 
teams. The security improvement ideas and actions are shared by individuals and enterprises 
and CIS acts as a catalyst to support this community and makes sure the controls are effective 
and up to date. 
 
The technical measures are specifically defined to provide the most effective controls to detect, 
prevent, respond to and mitigate breaches of the most common and enhanced security attacks. 
These might be used in combination with current formal risk management frameworks. CIS 
controls demonstrate critical factors of an effective defence system including: 
 
• Offense informs defence 
• Prioritisation 
• Measurements and Metrics 
• Continuous diagnostics and mitigation 
• Automation. 
 
All mitigation recommendations that provided in the STRIDE Threat modelling are based on 
CIS controls. 
11.2.1. Basic Controls 
CIS Control 1: 
Inventory and control of hardware assets 
 
Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all hardware devices on the network so that 
only authorised devices are given access, and unauthorised and unmanaged devices are 
found and prevented from gaining access. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
1.1 Utilise an Active Discovery Tool 
1.2 Use a Passive Asset Discovery Tool 
1.3 Use DHCP Logging to Update Asset Inventory 
1.4 Maintain Detailed Asset Inventory 
1.5 Maintain Asset Inventory Information 
1.6 Address Unauthorised Assets 
1.7 Deploy Port Level Access Control 
1.8 Utilise Client Certificates to Authenticate Hardware Assets 
 
CIS Control 2:  
Inventory and control of software assets 
 
Actively manage (inventory, track, and correct) all software on the network so that only 
authorised software is installed and can execute, and that all unauthorised and unmanaged 
software is found and prevented from installation or execution. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
2.1 Maintain Inventory of Authorised Software 
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2.2 Ensure Software is Supported by Vendor 
2.3 Utilise Software Inventory Tools 
2.4 Track Software Inventory Information 
2.5 Integrate Software and Hardware Asset Inventories 
2.6 Address unapproved software 
2.7 Utilise Application Whitelisting 
2.8 Implement Application Whitelisting of Libraries 
2.9 Implement Application Whitelisting of Scripts 
2.10 Physically or Logically Segregate High-Risk Applications 
 
CIS Control 3:  
Continuous vulnerability management  
 
Continuously acquire, assess, and act on new information in order to identify vulnerabilities, 
remediate, and minimise the window of opportunity for attackers. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
3.1 Run Automated Vulnerability Scanning Tools 
3.2 Perform Authenticated Vulnerability Scanning 
3.3 Protect Dedicated Assessment Accounts 
3.4 Deploy Automated Operating System Patch Management Tools 
3.5 Deploy Automated Software Patch Management Tools 
3.6 Compare Back-to-Back Vulnerability Scans 
3.7 Utilise a Risk-Rating Process 
 
CIS Control 4:  
Controlled use of administrative privileges 
 
The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the use, assignment, and 
configuration of administrative privileges on computers, networks, and applications. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
4.1 Maintain Inventory of Administrative Accounts 
4.2 Change Default Passwords 
4.3 Ensure the Use of Dedicated Administrative Accounts 
4.4 Use Unique Passwords 
4.5 Use Multi-Factor Authentication for All Administrative Access 
4.6 Use Dedicated Workstations for All Administrative Tasks 
4.7 Limit Access to Script Tools 
4.8 Log and Alert on Changes to Administrative Group Membership 
4.9 Log and Alert on Unsuccessful Administrative Account Login 
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CIS Control 5:  
Secure configuration for hardware and software on mobile devices, laptops, workstations 
and servers 
 
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security 
configuration of mobile devices, laptops, servers, and workstations using a rigorous 
configuration management and change control process in order to prevent attackers from 
exploiting vulnerable services and settings. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
5.1 Establish Secure Configurations 
5.2 Maintain Secure Images 
5.3 Securely Store Master Images 
5.4 Deploy System Configuration Management Tools 
5.5 Implement Automated Configuration Monitoring Systems 
 
CIS Control 6:  
Maintenance, monitoring and analysis of audit logs 
 
Collect, manage, and analyse audit logs of events that could help detect, understand, or 
recover from an attack. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
6.1 Utilise Three Synchronized Time Sources 
6.2 Activate Audit Logging 
6.3 Enable Detailed Logging 
6.4 Ensure Adequate Storage for Logs 
6.5 Central Log Management 
6.6 Deploy SIEM or Log Analytic Tools 
6.7 Regularly Review Logs 
6.8 Regularly Tune SIEM 
11.2.2. Foundational Controls 
CIS Control 7:  
Email and web browser protections  
 
Minimise the attack surface and the opportunities for attackers to manipulate human 
behaviour through their interaction with web browsers and email systems. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
7.1 Ensure Use of Only Fully Supported Browsers and Email Clients 
7.2 Disable Unnecessary or Unauthorised Browser or Email Client Plugins 
7.3 Limit Use of Scripting Languages in Web Browsers and Email Clients 
7.4 Maintain and Enforce Network-Based URL Filters 
7.5 Subscribe to URL-Categorisation Service 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 107 of 150 
7.6 Log All URL requester 
7.7 Use of DNS Filtering Services 
7.8 Implement DMARC and Enable Receiver-Side Verification 
7.9 Block Unnecessary File Types 
7.10 Sandbox All Email Attachments 
 
CIS Control 8:  
Malware defences  
 
Control the installation, spread, and execution of malicious code at multiple points in the 
enterprise, while optimising the use of automation to enable rapid updating of defence, data 
gathering, and corrective action. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
8.1 Utilise Centrally Managed Anti-Malware Software 
8.2 Ensure Anti-Malware Software and Signatures Are Updated 
8.3 
Enable Operating System Anti-Exploitation Features/Deploy Anti-Exploit 
Technologies 
8.4 Configure Anti-Malware Scanning of Removable Devices 
8.5 Configure Devices to Not Auto-Run Content 
8.6 Centralize Anti-Malware Logging 
8.7 Enable DNS Query Logging 
8.8 Enable Command-Line Audit Logging 
 
CIS Control 9:  
Limitation and control of network ports, protocols, and services  
 
Manage (track/control/correct) the ongoing operational use of ports, protocols, and services 
on networked devices in order to minimise windows of vulnerability available to attackers. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
9.1 Associate Active Ports, Services, and Protocols to Asset Inventory 
9.2 Ensure Only Approved Ports, Protocols, and Services Are Running 
9.3 Perform Regular Automated Port Scans 
9.4 Apply Host-Based Firewalls or Port-Filtering 
9.5 Implement Application Firewalls 
 
CIS Control 10:  
Data recovery capabilities  
 
The processes and tools used to properly back up critical information with a proven 
methodology for timely recovery of it. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
10.1 Ensure Regular Automated Backups 
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10.2 Perform Complete System Backups 
10.3 Test Data on Backup Media 
10.4 Protect Backups 
10.5 Ensure All Backups Have at Least One Offline Backup Destination 
 
CIS Control 11:  
Secure configuration for network devices, such as firewalls, routers, and switches  
 
Establish, implement, and actively manage (track, report on, correct) the security 
configuration of network infrastructure devices using a rigorous configuration management 
and change control process in order to prevent attackers from exploiting vulnerable 
services and settings. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
11.1 Maintain Standard Security Configurations for Network Devices 
11.2 Document Traffic Configuration Rules 
11.3 
Use Automated Tools to Verify Standard Device Configurations and 
Detect Changes 
11.4 
Install the Latest Stable Version of Any Security-Related Updates on All 
Network Devices 
11.5 
Manage Network Devices Using Multi-Factor Authentication and 
Encrypted Sessions 
11.6 Use Dedicated Machines for All Network Administrative Tasks 
11.7 Manage Network Infrastructure Through a Dedicated Network 
 
CIS Control 12:  
Boundary defence  
 
Detect/prevent/correct the flow of information transferring across networks of different trust 
levels with a focus on security-damaging data. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
12.1 Maintain an Inventory of Network Boundaries 
12.2 Scan for Unauthorised Connections Across Trusted Network Boundaries 
12.3 Deny Communications with Known Malicious IP Addresses 
12.4 Deny Communication Over Unauthorised Ports 
12.5 Configure Monitoring Systems to Record Network Packets 
12.6 Deploy Network-Based IDS Sensors 
12.7 Deploy Network-Based Intrusion Prevention Systems 
12.8 Deploy NetFlow Collection on Networking Boundary Devices 
12.9 Deploy Application Layer Filtering Proxy Server 
12.10 Decrypt Network Traffic at Proxy 
12.11 Require All Remote Login to Use Multi-Factor Authentication 
12.12 Manage All Devices Remotely Logging into Internal Network 
 
CIS Control 13:  
Data protection  
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The processes and tools used to prevent data exfiltration, mitigate the effects of exfiltrated 
data, and ensure the privacy and integrity of sensitive information. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
13.1 Maintain an Inventory of Sensitive Information 
13.2 
Remove Sensitive Data or Systems Not Regularly Accessed by 
Organisation 
13.3 Monitor and Block Unauthorised Network Traffic 
13.4 Only Allow Access to Authorised Cloud Storage or Email Providers 
13.5 Monitor and Detect Any Unauthorised Use of Encryption 
13.6 Encrypt Mobile Device Data 
13.7 Manage USB Devices 
13.8 Manage System's External Removable Media's Read/Write Configurations 
13.9 Encrypt Data on USB Storage Devices 
 
CIS Control 14:  
Controlled access based on the need to know  
 
The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct secure access to critical 
assets (e.g., information, resources, systems) according to the formal determination of 
which persons, computers, and applications have a need and right to access these critical 
assets based on an approved classification. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
14.1 Segment the Network Based on Sensitivity 
14.2 Enable Firewall Filtering Between VLANs 
14.3 Disable Workstation to Workstation Communication 
14.4 Encrypt All Sensitive Information in Transit 
14.5 Utilise an Active Discovery Tool to Identify Sensitive Data 
14.6 Protect Information Through Access Control Lists 
14.7 Enforce Access Control to Data Through Automated Tools 
14.8 Encrypt Sensitive Information at Rest 
14.9 Enforce Detail Logging for Access or Changes to Sensitive Data 
 
CIS Control 15:  
Wireless access control  
 
The processes and tools used to track/control/prevent/correct the secure use of wireless 
local area networks (WLANs), access points, and wireless client systems. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
15.1 Maintain an Inventory of Authorised Wireless Access Points 
15.2 Detect Wireless Access Points Connected to the Wired Network 
15.3 Use a Wireless Intrusion Detection System 
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15.4 Disable Wireless Access on Devices if Not Required 
15.5 Limit Wireless Access on Client Devices 
15.6 Disable Peer-to-Peer Wireless Network Capabilities on Wireless Clients 
15.7 
Leverage the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Encrypt Wireless 
Data 
15.8 
Use Wireless Authentication Protocols That Require Mutual, Multi-Factor 
Authentication 
15.9 Disable Wireless Peripheral Access of Devices 
15.10 Create Separate Wireless Network for Personal and Untrusted Devices 
 
CIS Control 16:  
Account monitoring and control  
 
Actively manage the life cycle of system and application accounts – their creation, use, 
dormancy, deletion – in order to minimise opportunities for attackers to leverage them 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
16.1 Maintain an Inventory of Authentication Systems 
16.2 Configure Centralized Point of Authentication 
16.3 Require Multi-Factor Authentication 
16.4 Encrypt or Hash all Authentication Credentials 
16.5 Encrypt Transmittal of Username and Authentication Credentials 
16.6 Maintain an Inventory of Accounts 
16.7 Establish Process for Revoking Access 
16.8 Disable Any Unassociated Accounts 
16.9 Disable Dormant Accounts 
16.10 Ensure All Accounts Have An Expiration Date 
16.11 Lock Workstation Sessions After Inactivity 
16.12 Monitor Attempts to Access Deactivated Accounts 
16.13 Alert on Account Login Behaviour Deviation 
11.2.3. Organisational Controls 
CIS Control 17:  
Implement a security awareness and training program 
 
For all functional roles in the organisation (prioritizing those mission-critical to the business 
and its security), identify the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to support 
defence of the enterprise; develop and execute an integrated plan to assess, identify gaps, 
and remediate through policy, organisational planning, training, and awareness programs. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
17.1 Perform a Skills Gap Analysis 
17.2 Deliver Training to Fill the Skills Gap 
17.3 Implement a Security Awareness Program 
17.4 Update Awareness Content Frequently 
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17.5 Train Workforce on Secure Authentication 
17.6 Train Workforce on Identifying Social Engineering Attacks 
17.7 Train Workforce on Sensitive Data Handling 
17.8 Train Workforce on Causes of Unintentional Data Exposure 
17.9 Train Workforce Members on Identifying and Reporting Incidents 
 
CIS Control 18:  
Application software security  
 
Manage the security life cycle of all in-house developed and acquired software in order to 
prevent, detect, and correct security weaknesses. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
18.1 Establish Secure Coding Practices 
18.2 
Ensure That Explicit Error Checking is Performed for All In-House 
Developed Software 
18.3 Verify That Acquired Software is Still Supported 
18.4 Only Use Up-to-Date and Trusted Third-Party Components 
18.5 Use Only Standardized and Extensively Reviewed Encryption Algorithms 
18.6 Ensure Software Development Personnel are Trained in Secure Coding 
18.7 Apply Static and Dynamic Code Analysis Tools 
18.8 
Establish a Process to Accept and Address Reports of Software 
Vulnerabilities 
18.9 Separate Production and Non-Production Systems 
18.10 Deploy Web Application Firewalls 
18.11 Use Standard Hardening Configuration Templates for Databases 
 
CIS Control 19:  
Incident response and management 
 
Protect the organisation’s information, as well as its reputation, by developing and 
implementing an incident response infrastructure (e.g., plans, defined roles, training, 
communications, management oversight) for quickly discovering an attack and then 
effectively containing the damage, eradicating the attacker’s presence, and restoring the 
integrity of the network and systems. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
19.1 Document Incident Response Procedures 
19.2 Assign Job Titles and Duties for Incident Response 
19.3 Designate Management Personnel to Support Incident Handling 
19.4 Devise Organisation-wide Standards for Reporting Incidents 
19.5 Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents 
19.6 
Publish Information Regarding Reporting Computer Anomalies and 
Incidents 
19.7 Conduct Periodic Incident Scenario Sessions for Personnel 
19.8 Create Incident Scoring and Prioritization Schema 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 112 of 150 
 
CIS Control 20:  
Penetration tests and red team exercises 
 
Test the overall strength of an organisation’s defence (the technology, the processes, and 
the people) by simulating the objectives and actions of an attacker. 
 
Sub-Controls 
 
20.1 Establish a Penetration Testing Program 
20.2 Conduct Regular External and Internal Penetration Tests 
20.3 Perform Periodic Red Team Exercises 
20.4 
Include Tests for Presence of Unprotected System Information and 
Artefacts 
20.5 Create Test Bed for Elements Not Typically Tested in Production 
20.6 Use Vulnerability Scanning and Penetration Testing Tools in Concert 
20.7 
Ensure Results from Penetration Test are Documented Using Open, 
Machine-readable Standards 
20.8 Control and Monitor Accounts Associated with Penetration Testing 
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11.3. STRIDE Threat Modelling 
This section identifies cyber security threats and vulnerabilities that increase the cyber security 
risks against assets. Appropriate security controls recommended for mitigation are provided 
based on the CIS Controls, see Section 11.2, to reduce the security risks. Reference is made 
to Figure 28, the CAV communications Data Flow Diagram. 
11.3.1. Vehicle Side (UE) 
 
 
Threat Physical Tampering 
Category Tampering 
Description Mobile connectivity interfaces such as SIM cards and modems can 
be physically accessed, tampered with and used as an entry point 
to stage a subsequent remote attack. Cloning of SIM cards is a 
possible threat in this scenario. 
Misuse of hardware components such as jailbreaking smart 
devices (hardware or firmware) compromises the manufacturer’s 
security settings, elevates the security risks, and makes it easier to 
gain unauthorised access to a CAV network infrastructure113. 
Tampering of hardware and software elements is a real risk, 
especially when conducted at the source during the manufacturing 
process. This includes the introduction of backdoor elements within 
the hardware or code that can be used as an access mechanism 
to spy or attack the CAV network infrastructure.  
Mitigation Using CIS controls and principles, it is recommended that 
Inventory and Control of Hardware assets be implemented to 
minimise the risk of tampering. Hardware tamper resistant, 
detection and security certification techniques should be 
implemented as major security precautions. 
A security awareness and training program is required to educate 
subscribers and provide adequate information on how to properly 
use these assets and keep them safe and secure. 
A tight control of the asset manufacturers’ employees should be 
instituted with careful vetting and risk assessments conducted prior 
to any OEM or component manufacturer being allowed in the 
supply chain. 
CIS 1 & 17 
 
113 Bhasker, D. (2013). 4G LTE security for mobile network operators. Cyber Secur. Inf. Sys. Inf. Anal. 
Cent.(CSIAC), pp.20-29. 
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Related 
Interactions/Assets 
Modem, SIM card, connectivity interfaces such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi 
and GPS. 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Risk of Data Loss and Unauthorised Data Access 
Category Information Disclosure 
Description With an ever-increasing storage capacity, electronic devices used 
in the today’s vehicle wireless architecture have larger memory 
and storage capacities than ever before, making them attractive 
targets for attackers. 
Confidential user data on these connectivity devices are vulnerable 
to hacking and attackers can gain unauthorised access to files and 
data leading to personal information being compromised, data loss 
or leakage and a violation of victims’ privacy113. 
Mitigation Data protection security controls such as data encryption at rest 
and password protected solutions to limit access to sensitive 
information on connected devices is highly recommended. Access 
control and data input and output procedures should be 
implemented for vehicle files and data. It may also be required to 
implement Malware defence and data recovery controls to reduce 
the risk of data disclosure and data loss.  
CIS 13, 8 & 10 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
Modem, UE 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Side-Channel Attack 
Category Tampering/ Information Disclosure 
Description These are attack actions undertaken on the Automotive Security 
Controllers (ASC). ASCs are micro-controllers used in security 
critical applications such as vehicle access, mobile 
communications (eSIM) and black box data logging. They provide 
security functions to protect against illegal access to data and 
security credentials including passwords, keys. 
Side-channel attacks are usually non-invasive and are carried out 
by monitoring the electromagnetic field emissions while a device is 
performing cryptographic operations. The measured patterns are 
then used to reverse engineer the process and retrieve the 
cryptographic keys. This vulnerability then exposes the security 
and authentication credentials and thereby threatening the 
confidentiality and integrity of the CAV system114. 
Mitigation ASCs such as the Integrated Controllers in eSIM cards should be 
hardened with additional hardware protection to protect against 
side-channel attacks. It is highly recommended to use session 
keys to limit vulnerability and exposure if cryptographic keys are 
compromised. 
 
114 Machold, M., Brunner, M., & Steurich, B. (2019) Future requirements for automotive hardware security. 
Post EVITA Semiconductor Security Quo Vadis? 
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Only ASCs with high levels of protection that can initiate an active 
counter-reaction in the event of an attack, such as an application 
termination or deletion of critical memory contents should be used 
in the CAV ecosystem114. 
CIS 1 & 5 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
Modems, SIM cards, Wireless connectivity interfaces 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
11.3.2. RAN 
 
 
Threat Physical Attacks 
Category Elevation of Privilege / Tampering 
Description eNodeB’s installation in public location are vulnerable to physical 
tampering113. 
External attackers may be presented with opportunities to gain 
access to critical functions of the mobile network through physical 
tampering of easily accessible devices in poorly secured eNodeB 
site locations and microcell base stations. 
Mitigation Inventory and control of hardware assets and strong incident 
response and management processes are recommended by CIS 
to reduce the risk of this threat. It is recommended to adopt strict 
control of the operational functions of the network and implement 
strong physical security mechanism to protect against any illegal 
and unauthorised access to any network node or interface that can 
be used to launch an attack. 
CIS 1 & 17 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
UE access to RAN 
Mitigation Status Mitigated 
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Threat Rogue eNodeB Attack 
Category Information Disclosure / Denial of Service 
Description In this type of attack, an attempt is made to introduce a rogue 
eNodeB element into the LTE network. Rogue eNodeB attacks 
allow for the duplication of the functionality of the base station by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the protocol stack such as IP and SS7. 
The rogue base station is then used to impersonate the operator’s 
node and enable interception of voice and data transmission 
across the network. The attacker can therefore passively 
eavesdrop, redirect user traffic to a different network and conduct 
packet modification or injection113. 
Mitigation Implementation of strong end-to-end security protocols including 
authentication and traffic protection mechanisms between the UE 
and core networks is strongly recommended. Use of strong 
encryption during the UE attach procedures as well as 
implementation of mutual authentication between eNodeB, MME 
and HSS will minimise rogue element attacks. 
Wireless Intrusion prevention and wireless intrusion detection 
system can also be used rogue eNodeB for detection and minimise 
such attacks. From an operations point of view, it is recommended 
that MNO’s continually monitor their access networks in real time 
for rogue access points and wireless attack tools to enable quick 
identification and elimination. 
CIS 11 & 6 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
UE access to RAN 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Eavesdropping, Identity tracking, Man in the Middle Attack (MitM) 
Category Information Disclosure 
Description Attackers can take advantage of a known weakness in the LTE 
protocol stack wherein the user identity transference occurs 
unencrypted, in clear text between the UE and the eNodeB, during 
the initial attach procedure. A MitM attack can be staged by 
capturing the IMSI which can then be used to impersonate and 
track a user. This allows a malicious node to create an 
independent connection between the UE and the network. It is 
then able to eavesdrop the communication, hijack ongoing 
sessions and inject or fabricate data thereby compromising the 
integrity and confidentiality of the CAV infrastructure113. 
Mitigation Use of public key infrastructure (PKI) with the public key of the 
MNO stored in the USIM enables encryption of privacy-related 
information such as the transmission of the IMSI to the eNodeB. It 
is also recommended to use robust authentication mechanisms 
and digital signature to prevent MitM attacks. 
CIS recommends to continually run and assess vulnerability 
management programs in order to identify new and zero-day 
attacks.  
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CIS 9, 3 & 15 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
UE access to RAN 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Paging Attack / Loss of Privacy 
Category Information Disclosure 
Description Attackers can take advantage of vulnerabilities in the LTE paging 
protocol to locate UEs by injecting paging requests multiple times 
and correlating the gathered TMSI of the phone with the paged 
permanent identity IMSI113. Unencrypted transmission of paging 
messages over the wireless channel is a vulnerability that can 
compromise a subscriber’s identity. Paging attacks can result in 
drastic consequences for victims, enabling an attacker to conduct 
targeted location tracking, obtain a victim’s IMSI, inject fabricated 
emergency alerts and perform paging channel hijacking. This can 
lead to a complete loss of confidentiality, privacy and integrity of 
the CAV system. 
Mitigation It is also strongly recommended to implement strong encryption 
mechanisms between the UE and the eNodeB to guard against 
attackers using IMSI paging and location tracking vulnerabilities 
and protect the privacy of subscribers and the confidentiality of the 
CAV infrastructure.  
CIS recommends the implementation, maintenance, monitoring 
and analysis of audit logs to monitor network traffic and ensure 
signalling integrity.  
CIS 6, 9 & 15 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
UE access to RAN 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Replay Attack / Loss of Privacy 
Category Information Disclosure / Tampering 
Description In replay attacks, an intruder can capture the authentication 
parameters sent by the MME and replay the intercepted 
authentication request to an unsuspecting UE. When the UE 
receives a replay of an intercepted authentication request it will 
send a synchronisation failure message, thus allowing the intruder 
to verify the presence of the subscriber through the received error 
message response. This attack has the potential to enable location 
tracking thus compromising privacy and security113. 
Mitigation It is strongly recommended to implement techniques for protecting 
against replay attacks, such as EPS-AKA mechanism, 
timestamping and use of a freshness value. 
CIS recommends the implementation, maintenance, monitoring 
and analysis of audit logs to monitor network traffic and ensure 
signalling integrity. 
CIS 6, 9 & 15 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 118 of 150 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
UE access to RAN 
Mitigation Status Not Mitigated  
 
Threat eNodeB/Femtocell/Microcell Compromise 
Category Tampering / Denial of Service 
Description eNodeB may use a virtualized Linux operating system instead of a 
custom OS that has been explicitly hardened and made secure 
during development. If a virtualized eNodeB is successfully 
attacked by exploiting a security flaw in the commercial hypervisor 
or operating system, it may fail or be used as a launch pad for 
attacks against the overall network infrastructure causing service 
disruptions.  
If an attacker can get into a trusted device like an eNodeB, the 
attacker can navigate to many other internal devices115. 
Mitigation CIS recommends basic controls including configuring the software 
and hardware securely and implementing continues vulnerability 
management programs.  
CIS 5 & 3 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
eNodeB 
eNodeB access to EPC 
Mitigation Status Mitigated 
 
Threat Botnet-Launched DDOS Attacks 
Category Denial of Service 
Description A botnet of infected UE could be used by attackers to synchronize 
the behaviours of a group of malicious users 
Botnet in 4G mobile networks can be used as platforms to launch 
DDoS attacks against the air interface. The core idea of this 
proposed attack scenario is botmasters activate all botnet nodes at 
the same time and let them start downloading a large file or send 
dummy data to create congestion on the downlink or the uplink116. 
Mitigation CIS recommends to security control the software assets and use 
appropriate security configurations. It is also necessary to monitor 
and analyse transmission channels to identify this kind of attacks.  
CIS 2, 5 & 6 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, eNodeB 
Mitigation Status Not Mitigated 
 
Threat Radio Frequency Jamming 
Category Denial of Service 
Description These are attack actions on the communications medium between 
the UE and the network. RF jamming attacks are therefore 
 
115 Macaulay, T. (2013) The 7 Deadly Threats to 4G. 4G LTE Security Roadmap and Reference Design, 
McAfee: Santa Clara, CA, USA 
116 Bassil, R., Chehab, A., Elhajj, I., & Kayssi, A. (2012) Signaling oriented denial of service on LTE 
networks. in Proc. ACM Int. Symp. Mobility Manage. Wireless Access, 153158. 
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interference attacks involving deliberate transmission of radio 
signals with the aim of disrupting communications by decreasing 
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the received signal to a point 
where there is a complete loss of service. 
In LTE, jamming attacks on the synchronisation signals containing 
Primary Synchronisation Signal (PSS) and the Secondary 
Synchronisation Signal (SSS) prevents the UE from selecting the 
cell leading to a DoS situation. 
Mitigation Jamming attacks on the control channels in LTE can be mitigated 
by transmitting the vulnerable control data in unused parts of the 
data channels.  
Other mitigation solutions include monitoring of abnormally high-
power levels in control channels, ensuring that control channels 
are randomised in time and frequency as well the use of shared 
keys to transmit location information to a UE. 
CIS 15, 9 & 6 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, eNodeB 
UE connection to eNodeB 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
11.3.3. EPC – OSI Layer 2 
 
 
Threat Remote De-Registration Attack 
Category Denial of Service 
Description In this scenario, an attacker can exploit implementation flaws in 
MMEs that causes them to de-register a legitimate UE attached to 
the network without notification, resulting in a DoS for the victim 
UE. 
The attacker establishes an RRC connection spoofed as the victim 
using the legitimate UE’s S-TMSI and then proceeds to send a 
NAS message such as an invalid security protected message or an 
initial plain request message to the MME serving the victim. The 
MME will then process the received NAS message from the 
attacker inappropriately and will consequently de-register the 
connection of the victim UE without any notification  
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This attack was demonstrated by researchers117 against a live 
operational LTE network and should be considered a major 
security threat for CAVs using LTE as a connectivity platform. 
Mitigation CIS controls recommend the implementation, management and 
correction of the configuration of network elements using rigorous 
configuration management and change management processes. 
De-registration attacks are mainly possible due to incorrect 
implementation of the MME and its functionalities in the EPC. 
Therefore, this attack is mitigated by implementing an MME that 
adheres fully with the 3GPP standards and requirements. 
CIS 12 & 11 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, eNodeB , MME 
Mitigation Status Mitigated 
 
Threat Authentication & Key Agreement (AKA) Bypass Attack 
Category Information Disclosure / Tampering 
Description The connection between the UE and MME is mutually 
authenticated after the initiation and completion of the 
Authentication and Key Agreement procedure. The procedure is 
completed when the UE sends the NAS authentication response to 
the MME. At this stage, all control plane messages that should be 
protected are encrypted and integrity protected using the agreed 
security algorithms. 
However, researchers117 demonstrated that an AKA bypass attack 
can be employed to bypass the existing encryption of user data 
between the UE and MME. 
An AKA bypass attack can be launched by using a rogue eNodeB 
and actively exploiting a known weakness to skip the key 
agreement procedure in the RRC layer. This then nullifies the 
security context of RRC and user data allowing for an attacker to 
spoof the RRC messages and intercept private information and 
communication of the victim’s UE. 
Mitigation Since the AKA bypass attack stems from lack adherence to the 
mandatory security procedures, it can be mitigated by making sure 
that the MME and UE do not continue with any control plane 
procedures prior to the successful completion of the mandatory 
security procedures.  
CIS recommends assessing and taking continuous action on new 
information in order to identify vulnerabilities, remediate, and 
minimise the window of opportunity for attackers. 
CIS 3, 15, 9 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, eNodeB, EPC, HSS, AuC 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
 
117 Kim, H., Lee, J., Lee, E., & Kim, Y. (2019). Touching the Untouchables: Dynamic Security Analysis of the 
LTE Control Plane. 
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Threat Signalling Storm Attack 
Category Denial of Service 
Description Signalling traffic can be maliciously generated by an attacker 
through repeated and simultaneous sending of multiple dedicated 
bearer or NAS requests with the expressed intention of disrupting 
the services provided by the EPC. If the maliciously generated 
signalling load exceeds the actual capacity of the MME, then 
services may be impacted. This is because the resources available 
at the core network is being diverted away from serving genuine 
and legitimate subscribers effectively leading to a DoS. 
Mitigation CIS recommends the continuous maintenance, monitoring and 
analysis of network audit logs. It is also recommended to control 
network traffic between network nodes by employing boundary 
defence solutions.  
Despite intrusion prevention systems and network and traffic 
monitoring mechanisms, signalling storm attacks cannot be entirely 
prevented.   
CIS 6 & 12 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, EPC, MME, HSS/AuC 
Mitigation Status Not Mitigated 
 
Threat Single Key Dependency 
Category Information Disclosure / Tampering 
Description Safeguarding the key used in the cryptographic algorithm such as 
EPS-AKA is a major security concern in LTE networks. If the 
source key (K) that is shared between the UE and the HSS and 
used to derive all the future keys is compromised, then the network 
becomes vulnerable and attackers can exploit this vulnerability and 
be easily authenticated by the LTE network, jeopardising the 
integrity and confidentiality of the network. 
The EPS-AKA protocol used currently in LTE is therefore rooted on 
the secrecy of the permanent key K. If K is compromised, 
especially given advances in quantum computing, then the security 
of the network cannot be guaranteed118. 
Mitigation CIS recommends management of the ongoing operational use of 
protocols, and services on networked devices in order to minimise 
windows of vulnerability available to attackers 
It is also recommended to implement robust key management 
mechanisms that provide a balance between computational 
complexity and the secure storage and use of cryptographic keys.  
CIS 9 & 16 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, EPC, MME, HSS/AuC 
Mitigation Status Not Mitigated 
 
 
118 Rajakumar , A., Raja, G., Almagrabi, A. O., Alkatheiri, M. S., Hussain, C. S., & Bashir, A. K. (2019) A 
Quantum-safe Key Hierarchy and Dynamic Security Association for LTE/SAE in 5G Scenario 
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11.3.4. EPC – OSI Layer 3 
 
 
Threat Billing Attacks 
Category Spoofing 
Description Overbilling and billing-escape attacks generally result in revenue 
losses for service providers but also are an indication of 
compromised systems or networks. This needs to be mitigated and 
addressed to protect the integrity and security of the network 
infrastructure and the confidentiality of the network subscribers. 
In these exploits, an attacker hijacks the IP address of a legitimate 
subscriber when the IP address in being returned to the IP pool and 
takes control of it. The attacker then utilises the services at the 
expense of the legitimate subscriber’s account119.  
Mitigation Limitation and control of network protocols and services is 
recommended by CIS. It is also necessary to monitor and control 
accounts. A proper continuous vulnerability management program is 
also useful.  
Deployment of security gateways, firewalls, IDS and IPS are 
recommended by many infrastructure vendors. The use of VLANs 
for network and traffic segregation as a security measure is 
suggested. 
CIS 9,16 & 3 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, PGW 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Interface Attacks Through External Networks 
Category Information Disclosure / Tampering 
Description LTE has an All-IP architecture that exposes it to attacks that are 
originated at the interfaces that connect the LTE core network to 
external networks such as roaming networks and external IP 
networks such as the internet. 
The SGi interface of the PGW interconnects multiple IP networks 
containing many untrusted devices. An attacker can employ these 
untrusted devices to launch an attack on the core network through 
various IP-based attack mechanisms that includes use of Malware, 
port scanning, Botnets etc. 
Similarly, the S5/S8 interface is used to interconnect the LTE core 
network to external operator network to support roaming customers. 
 
119 Mobarhan, M. A., Mobsrhsn, M. A., & Shahbahrami, A. (2012) Evaluation of Security Attacks on Different 
Mobile Communication Systems. Canadian Journal on Network and Information Security, vol. 3, no. 1 
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Attackers can use a device in the untrusted external network to 
launch attacks on the core network through the S8 interface120.  
Mitigation A security gateway (SEG) should be implemented as a firewall at the 
edge of the core network interfacing with external IP networks. The 
security gateway must be implemented with the capability to filter 
and drop malicious traffic at the entry point to the core network as 
well as DPI and IPS and internet noise filtering capabilities. 
It is recommended by CIS controls to securely configure servers and 
control access to network elements. Network protocols and services 
should be limited and controlled.  
CIS 4,9 & 14 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
PGW, Application Servers 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Network Snooping 
Category Information Disclosure / Tampering 
Description Breach of confidentiality can occur when an attacker intercepts an 
information flow between two nodes in a SIP session. Without 
adequate security mechanisms, attackers can use tools like 
Wireshark to capture SIP signalling data121. Session hijacking 
involves the attacker inserting malicious packets, substituting traffic 
and breaching integrity. Packet tampering, information leakage, 
network scanning, SIP flooding and resource exhaustion are all 
attack vectors that are rooted in LTE’s flat All-IP architecture. 
Mitigation It is recommended to implement encryption of SIP and other 
signalling data. 
CIS recommends securely configuring servers and implementing 
tight controls on access to network elements. Network protocols and 
services should be limited and controlled.  
CIS 4,9 & 14 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, PGW, Application Servers 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
 
120 Liyanage, M., Ylianttila, M., & Gurtov, A. (2013) A Case Study on Security Issues in LTE Backhaul and 
Core Networks. ResearchGate 
121 Slezak, D., & Gelogo, Y. (2011) Securing IP Multimedia Subsystem with the appropriate Security gateway 
and IPSec Tunnelling. Journal of security engineering 
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11.3.5. EPC – OSI Layers 4-7 
 
 
Threat GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) snooping attacks 
Category Spoofing / Denial of Service 
Description GTP is a Signalling and tunnelling protocol used to transfer user and 
control data between the UE, SGW and PGW. Compromised 
network elements can enable an attacker to snoop into GTP traffic 
and extract sensitive subscriber data such as APN credentials. 
In addition to eavesdropping, an attacker can generate malicious 
requests to cause DoS, gain unauthorised access to an APN or 
redirect an existing GTP tunnel to another PGW. 
Mitigation It is recommended to implement a GTP firewall that has the 
functionality to inspect GTP traffic. IPS and DoS prevention 
capabilities are also suggested. 
It is suggested to control network boundary and control access to 
network devices and services. Application software security 
implementation is also recommended by CIS. 
CIS 12, 9 & 18 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, SGW, PGW, Application Servers 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
Threat Service Abuse Attacks, Theft of Service 
Category Elevation of Privilege / Spoofing 
Description The IMS can be accessed by an attacker through a compromised 
UE. Theft of service is achieved by the UE not releasing the 
established media stream between a UE and IMS core after a “Bye 
request” message has been sent to the call session control function 
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(CSCF). This causes the CSCF to stop accounting for the session 
while the attacker continues to gain access to the services122. 
Mitigation Strong authentication functionality between the UE and IMS 
networks, as well as the implementation of security gateways (SEG) 
to ensure confidentiality of data between client and IMS network  
CIS recommends use of application software security controls and to 
implement necessary limitation on network protocol and services. 
Secure configuration of servers is also required.  
CIS 18, 9 & 5 
Related 
Interactions/Assets 
UE, Application Servers, PGW 
Mitigation Status Partially Mitigated 
 
  
 
122 Belmekki, E., Bouaouda, N., Raouyane, B., & Bellafkih, M. (2013) IP Multimedia Subsystem: Security 
Evaluation. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology, vol. 51, no. 1 
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12. Security Testing 
A primary outcome from investment in a CAV Security Framework, within a cyber security testing 
centre of excellence, is the ability to perform real cyber security tests against vehicles, products, 
systems and services. This section examines cyber security testing within the CAV ecosystem at 
the practical testing level. 
12.1. Introduction to Testing 
Prior to the advent of connectivity, testing a vehicle, or any system, many have been time 
consuming, but was essentially straightforward. It involved comparing the operation of a 
system function to its design specification. For complex systems this may mean many 
thousands, or tens of thousands, of individual tests. For each test, if the result differs from what 
the specification states, then that piece of system functionality is incorrect. 
 
Manufacturers and suppliers devote considerable resources to such functional testing. Test 
teams develop repeatable test sets and test oracles, which can be used against the products or 
systems being constructed. However, as the previous section discussed, communications and 
software-based technologies have made the testing process challenging, due to the need to 
discover vulnerabilities that may be present and pose a potential cyber risk. It causes a 
paradox, in that you need to test for vulnerabilities, but you do not know the technical details, 
i.e. the specification, of those vulnerabilities until they have been found. This requires some of 
the techniques described earlier in the report, i.e. running a TARA, quantifying risks and 
performing security testing techniques. 
 
Any testing process needs to be systematic, results orientated, and with reported outputs that 
are measurable. To achieve this a variety of metrics need to be established. Metrics allow test 
results to be meaningful. If results are meaningful, they can be compared with test results from 
other products or previous testing sessions. Unfortunately, establishment of meaningful metrics 
within cyber security testing has proven problematic in the past. The nature of computerised 
systems is part of the problem. Once a system receives a software update it is no longer the 
same system that was previously tested. However, useful metrics can be established, and it is 
the requirement of the framework to build up a bank of skills, experience, techniques, tools and 
practical tests. That bank of knowledge that can be called upon by the CAV industry 
stakeholders to perform the necessary cyber security testing of all the elements within the CAV 
ecosystem. 
12.2. Black Box to White Box Testing 
One aspect to consider with regards to performing testing at the cyber security testing centre, 
is how far along the black box to white box spectrum should be supported. At the outset the 
items to be tested will be considered a black box. Aside from operational information provided 
for the DUT or SUT, testing occurs with no knowledge of the detailed operation of the internals 
of an item under test. This is a natural state for two reasons. Firstly, the protection of IP. 
Manufacturers and tier component suppliers will protect their IP and not reveal details that may 
compromise IP. This means enough information is provided to use an item, but not reveal how 
the item operates internally. Secondly, this is the view that attackers have of a system, i.e. 
cyber security testing can proceed as if the tester is viewing the system as an attacker. 
 
   
 
BeARCAT D1 v1.03 127 of 150 
However, grey box testing and white box testing is not discounted. Grey box testing may be 
required when additional technical information is required in order to carry out or complete a 
specific test, or when a component, sub-assembly or individual part is being tested. 
 
White box testing, where full access to detailed technical design documents, including full 
access to software source code, is required, is likely to be done by the manufacturers and tier 
one suppliers themselves. This does not preclude the CAV cyber security test centre from 
performing white box testing, but there is unlikely to be a large demand. 
12.3. Effective Testing and Testing Metrics 
Measuring the results from the security testing is important in assessing the effectiveness of 
the testing process. For a cyber security testing centre the reporting of metrics demonstrates to 
the customers the work performed. However, it must be made clear that security testing 
metrics are difficult to use as a measure of cyber security improvement. As previously stated, 
comparing systems or iterations of systems is difficult due to the inherent differences between 
systems and system versions. However, what can be used to compare systems and iterations 
of systems is the reduction, or even increase, in the perceived cyber security risk to a system. 
Furthermore, completing security testing does not mean that a system is secure; there may still 
be unknown vulnerabilities waiting to be found. What systematic testing does achieve, when 
executed via a repeatable and reporting process, is demonstrate a best effort in security risk 
reduction. The testing ensures that: 
 
• Designed mitigation has been applied. 
• Assessed risks have reduced. 
• If any anticipated risks remain, then planned mitigation has not occurred. 
• Possible new vulnerabilities are discovered, in which case the risks will be noted as 
having increased. 
 
There are metrics that can be used in relation to the management (project and personnel) and 
economics of security testing, for example Return on Investment (ROI) (was the spending on 
security testing less than the potential loss from fixing an undiscovered vulnerability in the 
field). These are useful for the manufacturer's finances; however, metrics must be considered 
that are concerned with quantitative technical aspects of the testing, and not whether the cost 
of finding a defect outweighs the cost of a security breach. The technical aspects of the system 
security are the prime concern for a security testing centre, and therefore, the metrics that 
relate directly to security performance (risk reduction) must be considered. 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of security testing is an area of ongoing of research. The science 
is attempting to move it further from subjective results towards quantitative data. However, 
specific data points are highly dependent upon the DUT or SUT being tested and the types of 
testing being executed. For example, a penetration test on an in-vehicle network is different to 
a jamming test on a 4G signal. Furthermore, as implied above, results between two different 
iterations of systems may not be comparable. For example, a software update will change a 
system to a new state, i.e. the updated system is not identical to the previous version. 
 
This report is not going to list specific security metrics that could recorded within the Security 
Framework, as they are highly dependent upon the SUT and specific test being executed. 
Furthermore, security testing that is approached as a black box exercise is inherently less 
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precise than white box testing, where, for example, percentage of code coverage could be 
easily recorded. 
 
Once the test results have been obtained then various types of analytical reports and charts 
can be generated using the recorded metrics. The goal is to generate meaningful actionable 
reports. Reports have two major aims. Firstly, and most importantly, a report that addresses 
the ability of the DUT or SUT to reduce cyber security risk. Secondly, management reports that 
allow the operators of the testing centre to demonstrate execution of the testing process. 
 
Another outcome of reporting is to view testing over an extended time period. This has two 
strands, customers can view any trends over different testing sessions, and the testing centre 
can view any operational trends over an extended timeline. 
 
It will be a function of the Security Framework development to establish a list of technical 
metrics relevant to a test, and the metrics that can be recorded during testing. It will be 
important for the tooling used to support the framework (and the tooling within the testing 
centre) to enable measurements to be recorded as easily as possible, preferably automatically, 
for efficiency. Specifically, the results recording process must not get in the way of executing 
the security tests. 
12.4. Testing Phases within Product Development 
The forthcoming ISO/SAE 2143442 standard, Road vehicles - Cybersecurity engineering, 
addresses cyber security via different phases of a product’s development. These phases are 
covered by the different clauses of the proposed standard: 
 
● Overall cyber security management (governance and culture) 
● Project dependent cyber security management 
● Continuous cyber security activities (executed throughout a product's lifetime), includes: 
○ Cyber security monitoring (what is happening in the ecosystem) 
○ Cyber security event assessment (analysing incident impacts)  
○ Vulnerability analysis (determining security issues) 
○ Vulnerability management (correcting security issues) 
● Risk assessment (i.e. performing TARA) 
● Concept phase (new product proposal, assess cyber security goals) 
● Product development (new product engineering to include security considerations) 
● Cyber security validation (testing for issues) 
● Production (product build) 
● Operations and maintenance (incident management and updates) 
● Decommissioning (end-of-life management) 
● Distributed cyber security activities (suppliers and related services)  
 
Expertise within the cyber security testing centre may well cover all the above phases. In terms 
of physical test execution, that is likely to occur as part of the Continuous cyber security 
activities. It is also likely to occur in support of Cyber security validation, in which designed in 
security considerations are assessed, probably with specific intention to address any known 
common vulnerabilities, existing CVEs, and correct application of encryption. The validation 
phase: 
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● validates cyber security goals and claims; 
● determines if an item satisfies cyber security goals; 
● determines if residual risks are acceptable. 
 
To help with the validation the requirements are: 
 
● a validation specification;  
● penetration testing, with the extent controlled by risk considerations; 
● the resultant outputs being handled by the Vulnerability management process. 
 
As with all cyber security considerations, validation phase, and the testing overall, is not trying 
to eliminate risk, which is not possible, it allows for acceptable risks. 
12.5. Security Testing Considerations 
The ability to compromise communication, automotive and IoT systems has seen a growth in 
cyber security research and testing beyond the traditional IT domain. Across the globe, 
researchers and security engineers have demonstrated multiple security weaknesses within 
non-IT systems. Alongside the search for security weaknesses, solutions to protect and 
enhance security are being tried and implemented. Cyber security is concerned with both cyber 
attack and cyber defence. The security properties within a system that cyber security address 
are: 
 
● confidentiality - preventing the exposure of data, password, encryption keys, and personal 
information; 
● integrity - ensuring data and information is not changed, corrupted or deleted, and including 
associated mechanisms, for example data non-repudiation; 
● availability - disrupting data flows, system operation and access to systems. 
 
The methods used to attack confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) on system, i.e. the 
types of test to perform, include: 
 
● sniffing - covertly reading data to gain system and operational information, and to extract 
private data; 
● replay - capturing data and then re-transmitting the data onto a communications network, 
allows the attacker to send data as though it originated from within the system, the attacker 
may also benefit from delaying replayed data; 
● spoofing - generating data so that it appears to originate within the systems but is 
generated by the attacker; 
● denial-of-service (DoS) - flooding the system network with two much data can overload 
components and they are no longer able to correctly perform their functions; 
● man-in-the-middle (MITM) - data is diverted through the attacker, allowing the attacker to 
surreptitiously change data and monitor results; 
● malformation (e.g. fuzzing) - manipulating data formats or values to confuse the software in 
a component or system; 
● malware - changing the code on a component or within a system to affect the data and 
systems; 
● social engineering - manipulating humans or the human machine interface (HMI) to 
influence behaviour. 
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The above attack methods may need to be used in combination to achieve a successful attack. 
The outcome of a successful attack will vary, based upon: 
 
● the attacker’s motivations and aims; 
● the attacker’s technical knowledge and expertise; 
● how well the system is designed and engineered; 
● the presence of security mechanisms to counter attacks. 
 
The same factors above will affect the magnitude of the outcome from an attack: 
 
● no noticeable effect - an attack is taking place, but the impact is not observed by systems 
users, examples include system data sniffing or exfiltration of personal data, or the attack is 
having negligible effect on system performance; 
● minor degradation of performance - the system is functioning as intended but the 
performance is below normal levels of operation, for example a vehicle’s braking may not 
be as sharp as normal, for an Intelligent Transport System (ITS), this may mean that traffic 
signals will be commanded to change at a reduced rate; 
● major degradation of performance - the system performance is severely impacted, a vehicle 
may have switched into a limp mode, or some traffic signals have failed; 
● complete system failure - a vehicle has stopped functioning, all the signals in an area have 
failed, typically a full DoS attack has been successful. 
 
Finally, consideration of how attacks can be propagated will influence any risk mitigation 
actions: 
 
● direct attack - the attacker connects directly to the system, for example via a wireless 
interface; 
● indirect attack - a cloud-based system or third party device provides a proxy through which 
an attack is launched; 
● automated attack - an attack is setup on external systems to be launched against targets, 
for example, by using a botnet; 
● self-propagating attack - the attacker uses malware that is able to replicate across 
components, vehicles and infrastructure, for example, via a worm, trojan or virus. 
12.6. Security Testing Tooling and Supporting Systems 
Test execution will require supporting systems and tooling. For the entire end-to-end testing 
process, this will include data servers, workstations, networking, test equipment and software. 
Access to specialised test facilities may be required for some tests, for example testing over 
the air transmissions may require a vehicle sized Faraday cage. The broadcast of radio signals 
on most frequencies requires a valid license; therefore, it is illegal, even for testing purposes to 
broadcast radio signals without appropriate licenses. Thus, large Faraday cages, or other 
forms of isolated or remote facilities may be required. 
 
The size and complexity of testing the CAV ecosystem and the number of expected tests to 
execute requires the consideration of a high level of automation and simulation. The use of 
automation improves test coverage, test execution speed, repeatability, reproducibility and 
overall testing efficiency. Simulation, including digital twins, enables the support of a wider 
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range of testing cases for interactive systems. It allows for the simulation of large numbers of 
agents in test scenarios that may be prohibitively expensive, unrealistic, or not scalable if 
performed in a real environment. 
 
Much of the tooling will be in the form of software: 
 
● operating systems for servers and workstations; 
● software used to maintain the security framework and manage the cyber security testing 
centre; 
● software tools used to manage, setup and run tests, record, store and analyse the test 
results and generate report on the results, including the forensic analysis of data and 
visualisation of data, and test equipment operating software; 
● specialist software used for systems design and development can re-purposed for 
simulation and running digital twins, however, it is likely that high performance computing 
(HPC) systems for digital twins will be required for multi-agent simulations; 
● tools for systems maintenance and maintenance of vehicles. 
 
The software tools that run the security tests will vary according to the tests performed. The 
different classes of tools include: 
 
● static and dynamic code analysers; 
● network traffic analysers; 
● vulnerability scanners; 
● fuzzers; 
● brute forcing software; 
● hardware debuggers; 
● interface scanners; 
● application automation software; 
● proof of concept exploit checkers. 
 
There are many tools used by security researchers, including the same tools used by the 
system attackers. Many tools are sold and supported by commercial companies. A wide range 
of open source tools123 exist to support security testing and research. Customised and 
technology specific tools will be required to supplement the readily available tools. Engineers 
that can write software will be a necessity when investigating the security of the wide range of 
technologies in use with the CAV ecosystem. 
 
The software and systems to test different views of the CAV ecosystem will vary based on the 
technology being tested and the executed tests. Testing the security of a vehicular cloud 
service will require different tools and techniques compared to testing an in-vehicle network 
which interconnects ECUs. Table 21 gives an example of different tools used to test different 
aspects of a CAV, and Table 22 show specific tests performed on one of the units, a telematics 
box30. 
 
 
123 https://sectools.org/ 
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Table 21. Example of testing different CAV components with different tools 
Test points Test tools Details 
Telematics Box (T-Box) Nmap Test security of the ports and running services opened 
ECU Defensics Fuzz testing by communication protocol 
Mobile apps JEB2 Decompile apk application 
AppScan Discover vulnerabilities, hosts and services 
Protecode 
Analyse, detect and check the known vulnerabilities of binary 
codes 
Burp Suite Intercept unencrypted data 
IDA-Pro Decompile and dynamically debug binary file 
Radio/IVI 
GNU Radio 
Capture and record signal from the wireless key fob, GPS 
spoofing 
USRP 
Capture and record signal from the wireless key fob, GPS 
spoofing 
HackRF 
Capture and record signal from the wireless key fob, GPS 
spoofing 
 
Table 22. Specific tests performed on a telematics unit 
Test points Test cases 
Telematics Box (T-Box) Check if uboot UART debug interface can be accessed to install firmware 
Check if any port is open and whether the opened port is secure 
Check if the memory can be tamper or expose 
Check if the firmware is secure 
Check if T-Box connects to a server using a secure mechanism 
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Check the GPS privacy 
Check the XSS attack 
Verify the T-Box authentication 
In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) Handling of GPS spoofing 
Malicious Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) signal injection 
Tyre Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) 
Microphone eavesdropping 
Other data connected through the IRC channel 
Jamming attack to disrupt the information 
MirrorLink protocol vulnerability 
Fake WiFi connection 
Android app to record sound 
Electronic Control Unit 
(ECU) 
Injected malicious code to OBD dongle 
Fuzz testing by sending random data to ECU 
Mobile Application (MA) Car sharing apps: user account leakage 
 
Auto diagnostic app 
XSS vulnerability - test by Burpsuite 
Radio Edge spoofing 
Spoofing trajectory data (aim at ITS) 
Bluetooth BlueBorne attacks 
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13. Procedures Around Testing 
13.1. Cyber Security Testing Services 
By taking the above discussion around the technical discovery and classification of issues, and 
combining with traditional professional services models, several potential service offerings 
arise, providing different levels of insight into the security of a system. 
 
As discussed within this document, there are various communications technologies and 
networks that will be used by a connected vehicle, and testing each of these is important. The 
offerings outlined below primarily target the C-V2X realm of communication: 
 
• These communications are based on IP-based networking; tooling for such testing is 
mature and can be automated 
• Most of these communications leave the vehicle over some form of radio data network 
(3G/4G/LTE/5G) 
• Testing facilities, such as Millbrook, are uniquely placed to offer insight into mobile 
network systems. Millbrook has a licence to operate a private mobile network and has 
the equipment. Furthermore, that equipment can be isolated from the publicly available 
networks, this will significantly aid the testing process.  
 
The proposed method via which to assess the C-V2X or V2C communications of a ‘black box’ 
system, is to perform a passive MITM capture of traffic using a private mobile network. With the 
CAV deliberately connected to the private network, all communications to and from the 
connected vehicle can be captured and inspected. The proposal is for this information to be 
captured in a standard format such as a ‘.pcap’ packet capture file, that can be processed 
automatically, as well as manually reviewed. 
 
The expectation is that the packet captures will be analysed to look for security issues 
pertaining to the protocols in use by the system, as well as its general resilience to a hostile 
network environment. These technical findings will be used to create a technical report. 
 
However, a technical report in isolation is rarely the best way to offer insight to security issues. 
It is important to contextualise the technical report with the client, for them to gain the most 
insight from the findings. In Table 23 three tiers of assessment methodology are proposed: 
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Table 23. Levels of Cyber Security Testing Services 
Cost/Time Description Deliverables 
Base • Automated analysis of C-V2X and 
V2C comms as part of a 
professional services or 
consultancy engagement  
• Technical report with 
contextualising additions 
• Discussion/workshop/presentation 
around work conducted 
Medium • Automated analysis of C-V2X and 
V2C comms as part of a 
professional services or 
consultancy engagement 
• Comprehensive threat modelling of 
the system assessed 
• Technical report with 
contextualising additions 
• Threat model document 
• Discussion/workshop/presentation 
around work conducted 
 
High (variable) • Automated analysis of C-V2X and 
V2C comms as part of a 
professional services or 
consultancy engagement 
• Comprehensive threat modelling of 
the system assessed 
• Further (manual) assessment of 
any facet of the system in 
agreement with the client 
 
• Technical report (of automated C-
V2X and V2C testing) with 
contextualising additions 
• Threat model document 
• Technical report of the manual 
assessment performed 
• Discussion/workshop/presentation 
around work conducted 
 
The above is structured such that a client can choose the appropriate level of service, without 
this having an impact on the delivery of existing work. 
 
In all cases the ’professional services engagement’ is a discussion with the client prior to the 
testing about their black box system and its purpose. This is for the service to provide the 
context necessary to fully discuss the technical issues identified. Another discussion will take 
place after the testing has been conducted in order to discuss the results as well as to answer 
any questions the client may have. 
 
It is important to note that for the high cost service offering, the cost will vary depending on the 
amount of manual testing required. 
13.2. Handling an Identified Vulnerability (Table-top Exercise)  
Whilst technical reports and contextualised security insight are useful to an organisation, 
without taking any action, this does nothing to improve a system’s security. The way in which 
an organisation deals with any vulnerability, determines how much improvement to security 
occurs. Indeed, certification processes (see Section 14) will require evidence of audits and 
exercise of company procedures to ensure proficiency in addressing identified vulnerabilities, 
including the current management of security incidents. 
 
It is proposed to offer a ’vulnerability workshop’ exercise as a standalone/add-on to the above 
services. This would, at a high level, revolve around various representatives of an organisation 
discussing how they would respond to a proposed scenario. This allows an organisation to 
better understand their processes and procedures in such a situation, to build relationships with 
key individuals that will have to work together in difficult circumstances, as well as to identify 
where individual’s responsibility may end, overlap, or be entirely absent. 
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In a ‘table-top exercise’ (conducted onsite at the testing facility), where the appropriate 
representatives of the client organisation are presented with a variety of cyber security incident 
scenarios, to which they must respond as an organisation. 
 
Examples of such scenarios could include: 
 
• The remediation of issues from a technical report (which could be from the previously 
discussed services) 
• The appearance of a zero-day exploit on the system, discovered via social media 
• Leaking of customer data from what appears to be an internal system 
• A denial of service condition, caused by an issue with a third-party supplier 
 
The organisation will respond to the situation (being prompted by the consultant), which will 
evolve as the scenario progresses. Given the nature of the scenarios that can be used, a wide 
range of representatives from an organisation should be present, which can include:  
 
• System engineers 
• Management 
• Security 
• Network Operations 
• Legal 
• Human Resources 
• Public Relations 
• Customer Support 
 
The workshop will highlight any strengths or weaknesses in an organisation’s current policies and 
procedures, as well as gaps which require additional investment. It will also serve as a “fire drill” for 
such policies. At the end of the workshop, the organisation should have a much better idea of how 
well equipped it is to deal with a range of cyber security scenarios, as well as how it could improve 
its response in the case of any future, real, incidents. 
13.3. Ongoing Testing and Diagnosis 
Most of the standards, best practices and guidelines recommend the ongoing test and 
diagnosis, for example, PAS 1885124 and ENISA46 best practice. It is well-recognised that 
security assessment is not a one-time process as the security situations including the threat 
landscape and security objectives evolve. 
Evaluation on the security posture of a system relies heavily on the knowledge of attack 
surface and threat landscape. Therefore, any updates in this knowledge can change the 
assessment significantly. For example, attackers can find a new method to make a low-
likelihood threat more feasible. New vulnerabilities on software or hardware can also create 
novel surfaces for attackers to exploit the system. Given the relations between the attack 
surfaces, the occurrences of any new low-risk threats may lead to significant security attacks. 
Consequently, it is important to understand the security knowledge that the risk assessment is 
based on. This can be done firstly by maintaining a database of threats as well as their 
relations through Attack Trees. The database should provide essential information regarding 
 
124 BSI (2018) PAS 1885:2018 The fundamental principles of automotive cyber security - Specification 
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the potential techniques to launch a threat or a set of threats (via Attack Trees); which impacts 
they can create on the system; and the relevant mitigations. Secondly, any changes with the 
research literature should be reflected in the database. For example, any new threats on 
system assets; any new combination between the threats to create a significantly increased 
attack impact; any new techniques that lower the barriers to launch threats; or any new method 
that makes a mitigation invalid or less efficient. Ideally version management, or version control, 
of any knowledge base or database is maintained. Then, security assessment of a system can 
be mapped to a knowledge base version to aid analytics, testing traceability and reporting. 
Testing should indicate that security assessment of the system is based on a certain version of 
the knowledge base. Version control is important for the maintenance of other vulnerability 
databases such as CWE or NVD; however, the difference in the vehicular domain is that the 
knowledge base maintains only attacks that have significant impacts on CAV ecosystem 
security. Furthermore, the security assessment target vehicles will be recorded, as a cyber 
security risk profile, which contains all the relevant information for the risk assessment, such as 
the list of the critical assets, their functions, operating requirements, and the relevant threats. 
When there are updates in the knowledge database, the risk profiles need to be scanned to 
see whether the previous risk assessment assumptions are still hold. The overall attack 
surfaces should be reassessed to identify any new risks. Meanwhile, the impacts of relevant 
threats, assets, functions, and mitigation also need to be reconsidered. If there are significant 
changes in the risk assessment results, the testing centre needs to inform the relevant entities 
(manufactures, vehicle owner, service providers, application developer, etc.) that the previous 
risk assessment is not valid anymore. The testing centre can suggest an update of the new risk 
assessment if a theoretical analysis is reliable; or it can schedule a reassessment if needed. 
When maintaining the vulnerability databases and risk profiles, the number of test cases will 
grow, possibly exponentially. Automated software can be used to manage the proactive threat 
monitoring procedure. It is also essential to represent the system architecture, threat and risk 
assessment by a standard modelling language (see Section 4.2.5) so that it can be useful for 
the software.  
14. Certification 
There are different ways to define rules. For example, they can be laid down in laws, trade bodies 
regulations, standards or specifications. Rules are important in many aspects of modern 
economies. They are primarily present to ensure human safety and fair treatment for all, but also 
exist to ensure the interoperability of systems and smooth running of processes. Certification is the 
common mechanism to ensure, or attempt to ensure, the repeatable application of rules. 
Certifications provide benchmarks to indicate that correct processes, specifications, or 
competencies are present in organisations, products, or professionals. 
14.1. Summary of Current Vehicle Certification 
The use of certification is well established throughout the lifecycle of a vehicle. In the UK the 
Vehicle Certification Authority (VCA) is responsible for type approval for new vehicles. Type 
approval, which may be referred to as homologation, ensures that a vehicle meets correct 
regulations and standards with regards to their construction for environmental and safety 
reasons. However, type approval cannot guarantee that a vehicle is free of design defects. 
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Design defects may emerge once vehicles enter the marketplace. When a design defect has 
an impact on safety, a vehicle manufacturer will issue a recall notice to get the defect rectified. 
 
Without the recall process, manufacturers would be open to many more liability issues. Vehicle 
manufacturers, and their component suppliers, may be liable if a product is defective and 
causes death, injury, loss or damage. This is the reason that a new vehicle will undergo an 
extensive pre-production testing program, to ensure the vehicle is safe, thereby reducing 
liability. 
 
There are thousands of tests performed during the pre-production testing program of a new 
vehicle. A large proportion of the tests will relate to the electronic and computerised functions 
of the vehicle systems. All the vehicles currently manufactured rely upon the use of 
computerised systems, and these systems are now connected to external networks and the 
devices that vehicle occupants carry. How these vehicle systems function can impact vehicle 
safety, and thus manufacturer liability. 
 
To address the testing of vehicle systems, manufacturers use the internationally agreed 
standard ISO 26262, Functional Safety for Road Vehicles. It is used by manufacturers and their 
suppliers for functional safety testing and risk reduction in their complex electrical and 
electronic systems. However, this was originally implemented before the age of the connected 
car. The primary impact of vehicle connectivity on safety is the cyber security threat. 
Researchers have demonstrated proof-of-concept cyber attacks on vehicular systems and 
infrastructure, and real-world examples of attacks have occurred. This raises the consideration 
of whether some form of cyber security certification in the automotive, communication and 
related industries can help maintain low cyber security risks. 
14.2. The Pros and Cons for Vehicular Cyber Security 
Certification 
Certification is not an unknown quantity for an organisation. Many organisations achieve ISO 
9001 certification to demonstrate to customers a commitment to quality control125, often 
required in supplier contracts. Conformance to standards related to the security of traditional 
enterprise Information Technology (IT) systems also exist, for example, the ISO/IEC 27000 
family of standards for Information Security Management, another example of cyber security 
certification, for the UK, is the Cyber Essentials scheme from the National Cyber Security 
Centre126. However, certification in no way guarantees security, as the regular reports of 
security breaches demonstrate127. What cyber security certification does achieve is to raise 
awareness of security issues and systematically apply a best practice process, especially when 
it comes to a management process when needing to handle a cyber attack. Thus, the real aim 
for certification is to reduce the risk of a cyber attack occurring and to reduce the 
consequences of a cyber attack when it does occur. 
 
One downside of certification is the addition of a business cost. The certification uses 
resources that could otherwise be used within the core day-to-day business function. However, 
 
125 ISO. ISO 9001:2015 Quality management systems — Requirements. 2015. url: https://www.iso.org/ 
standard/62085.html 
126 National Cyber Security Centre. Cyber Essentials. 2014. url: https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov. uk/ 
127 Paolo Passeri. Hackmageddon. 2020. url: https://www.hackmageddon.com/ 
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the economic consequences for an organisation in not having good cyber security practices in 
place may be a lot higher. The same argument applies to the automotive domain, where proof-
of-concept and real-world cyber attacks have been deployed, therefore, there is the need to 
address the cyber security of vehicular systems and the communications links to infrastructure. 
 
Another issue with certification is the possibility of becoming complacent with regards to 
security. Once certification against a standard has been obtained, an organisation needs to be 
proactive in maintaining the procedures and adapting designs and processes. This is to cater 
for changes in technology, business operations, suppliers, standards, and regulations that 
affect an organisation's products and services. Certification is not a line the sand but a moving 
target that should always be in sight, otherwise security risk can increase. The point to be 
made is that cyber security is not a fixable problem, instead, it is an ongoing process of risk 
reduction and incident handling. This raises a discussion on the type of certification that would 
be applicable for handling the cyber security testing of vehicular systems and communication 
infrastructure. 
14.3. Automotive Domain Cyber Security Testing Processes 
Certification 
The ultimate objective of a TARA process is to enable a reduction in a system’s attack 
footprint. For a complex system-of-systems, such as the CAV ecosystem, this need to be done 
efficiently to maximise the benefit from the limited costs (time and resources). Our proposed 
Security Framework can provide the systematic guidance required for efficient use of 
resources. As discussed in the previous section, the nature of cyber security means that 
certification is unable to be prescriptive with regards to technology. Indeed, the technical 
organisations that issue standards for interoperability will have their test regimes for equipment 
compatibility. In the CAV ecosystem, such organisations include: 
 
• ITU - International Telecommunication Union 
• ETSI - European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
• IEEE - Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
• SAE - SAE International (previously Society of Automotive Engineers) 
 
In 2017 the UK Government issued the report The Key Principles of Cyber Security for 
Connected and Automated Vehicles128. It listed eight high-level principles that organisations 
should follow to reduce security issues. This was soon followed by the British Standards 
Institute's (BSI) PAS 1885:2018124, The fundamental principles of automotive cyber security - 
Specification, in 2018. The latter references some of the eight principles listed in the former. 
These publications are not standards in themselves and involve no certification, they do 
provide guidelines on the process of managing the security of a CAV throughout its lifetime, 
highlighting the need to take a proactive approach to security throughout an organisation, from 
the board to the product designers, where the security considerations are embedded into a 
CAV's design from the outset of its life cycle. The forthcoming international standard ISO SAE 
2143442, Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering, currently in draft status, is security 
process focused. This new joint ISO/SAE standard supersedes the previous SAE J3061, 
 
128 HM Government (2017) The Key Principles of Cyber Security for Connected and Automated Vehicles. 
Tech. rep. 
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Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems2 which covered security 
practices from concept design to decommissioning. 
 
It is not surprising that ISO is developing a standard for cyber security in road vehicles. The 
ISO standard ISO 26262, Road vehicles - Functional safety129 is the international standard 
used by vehicle manufacturers and their supplies to analyse and reduce risks in the functional 
operation of cars and their components. It is widely used within the automotive industry and 
has matured through different versions. ISO 26262 is intended to be applied to safety-related 
systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems that are installed in 
series production road vehicles. The latest 2018 version of ISO 26262 acknowledges the 
intersection with cyber security and is aware of the need to separately address the topic, it 
references the forthcoming ISO SAE 21434. This new joint ISO/SAE cyber security engineering 
standard considers the required cyber security management processes within an organisation: 
 
• overall cyber security management - covering governance, culture, risk management, 
audits, information sharing and security, and managing tools; 
• product cyber security management - covering requirements, recommendations, 
responsibilities, planning, reuse, components, and assessments; 
• continuous cyber security activities - covering monitoring, requirements, recommendations 
and assessment of events 
 
ISO SAE 21434, thoroughly developed over some years, is likely to become the go-to standard 
for vehicle manufacturers needing to implement cyber security practices within their 
organisation and product development processes, just as ISO 26262 became the go-to 
standard for functional safety. However, adherence to the ISO standard is not intended to be 
measured through a certification process. As for ISO 26262, organisations will have personnel 
trained on the provisions of the standard, who can apply it to the organisations’ processes. An 
industry exists around ISO 26262 for training to provide personnel with the relevant capabilities 
to apply the standard. Some of the companies that provide ISO 26262 training do offer exams 
as a form of competency assessment, it is a form of self-certification. A similar industry is likely 
to emerge for the ISO SAE 21434 standard. However, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) is incorporating certification in its proposed assessment of a 
manufacturer’s Cyber Security Management System (CSMS). 
 
UNECE hosts the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, the forum is coded 
as, and commonly known as, WP.29. The forum is used for provisioning global regulations on 
vehicle safety and environmental issues. A WP.29 document is "proposing provisions for the 
approval of cyber security management systems as well as of vehicles with regard to cyber 
security"130. The UNECE proposals will require vehicle manufacturers to obtain a Certificate of 
Compliance for Cyber Security Management System. This will be achieved through the existing 
vehicle Type Approval processes, in the UK that would be through the VCA. However, it is 
worth noting that UNECE provisions do not override national regulations and laws. 
 
 
129 ISO (2018) ISO 26262-2:2018 Road vehicles - Functional safety - Part 2: Management of functional 
safety. Geneva 
130 Task Force on Cyber Security Issues and Over-The-Air Software (2020) ‘New UN Regulation on uniform 
provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regard to cyber security and of cybersecurity 
management systems’  
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The CSMS proposed by UNECE will require a manufacturer to document their cyber security 
management processes, and the processes used to assess the cyber security of the vehicle 
which is seeking cyber security type approval. Manufacturers will need to apply for a Certificate 
of Compliance for CSMS, with the application assessed by the appropriate Approval Authority 
(AA) (the VCA in the UK). The AA will verify that the CSMS complies with the proposed 
UNECE regulations, and if approved it will be valid for three years. The CSMS must cover 
several areas of the organisation's processes and vehicle cyber security testing, including: 
 
• the life cycle of a vehicle - development, production, post-production; 
• the organisation's cyber security management process; 
• risk management identification of risks to a vehicle, their assessment, categorisation 
and treatment; 
• security testing processes; 
• ongoing risk assessment; 
• monitoring, detecting and responding to cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities; 
• management of dependencies with third parties and other organisational divisions; 
• handling of aftermarket software, services, and data; 
• modifications after being granted type-approval; 
• conformity in production. 
 
As for ISO 23232 and ISO SAE 21434, the UNECE CSMS is not prescriptive on tools and 
techniques that need to be used. The UNECE proposal does have an annexe that lists threats, 
and possible mitigation techniques, but these are at a high descriptive level. This makes sense 
as they need to allow for changes in technology and testing techniques.  
 
The UNECE proposal on cyber security is still changing and can be viewed on the UNECE 
W.29 website131, though it can be easier to find the latest version on the website 
GlobalAutoRegs.com132. 
14.4. Certification Conclusion and Recommendation 
The point was made that vehicle certification, commonly called type approval, exists to ensure 
that vehicles are safe to use, and safe for other road users. Increased connectivity and 
computerisation have introduced new threats to safety due to the possible interruption of 
operation from the risk of a cyber attack. The industry has responded to the threat with the new 
ISO SAE 21434 standard and the UNECE CMS proposal. They both recognise that unlike a 
technical specification, for example, an implementation of a particular version of 
communications protocol, cyber security is not a fixed target. Therefore, they look at the 
process of risk mitigation, to ensure that cyber security risk assessment and mitigation best 
practice is deployed. The nature of cyber security does not allow for a completely protected 
device; however, a ‘best effort’ must be undertaken by manufacturers, and this is what ISO with 
SAE and UNECE are trying to achieve. 
 
 
131 UNECE (2020) ‘World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29)’ url: https://www. 
unece.org/trans/main/welcwp29.html 
132 GlobalAutoRegs (GAR) (2020) ‘WP.29 Rulemaking Project Draft Recommendation/UN Regulation on 
Cyber Security’, url: https://globalautoregs.com/documents?rule_id=226 
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The development of the ISO/SAE standard and the UNECE CSMS is complementary. The 
processes in ISO SAE 21434 are covered by the requirements of the CSMS, though 
differences may be present as they are both still in development. It can be envisaged that, as 
for ISO 23232, ISO SAE standard will become the benchmark for vehicle manufacturers 
assessing the cyber security of their new models. Then the CSMS certification for type 
approval will be issued based on manufacturers demonstrating their competence with ISO SAE 
21434, not only in applying it to the management of the cyber security engineering process but 
to the cyber security engineering of new vehicle models. 
 
Use of ISO SAE 21434 and the UNECE CSMS in the UK should happen as part of the normal 
UK type-approval process through the VCA, or at least the UK Government should ensure it 
happens. However, to aid the strengthening of cyber security within the UK CAV ecosystem, 
stakeholder organisations should also implement general cyber security schemes, these 
include the UK's Cyber Essentials programme133, and the VCA may want to include such 
schemes within the requirements for the UNECE CSMS certification. The UK VCA should also 
encourage CAV stakeholders to engage with the various cyber security committees and 
proposing organisations to ensure that any standard, proposal or scheme addresses the UK's 
requirements. That work should also include a gap analysis to determine where differences 
exist and how those differences could be reduced or handled. 
 
  
 
133 National Cyber Security Centre (2014) ‘Cyber Essentials’, url: https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc. gov.uk/ 
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15. Summary and Recommendations 
Connected computational systems see an ever-increasing role within society, this includes CAVs. 
There are benefits to be gained from a fully mature CAV ecosystem, however, it crosses two of the 
thirteen designated CNIs, communications and transport, and cyber attacks are a threat to CNIs. 
Whilst successfully executed cyber attacks may impact operational infrastructure and 
organisations, they may also impact all of us as individuals. Access to online services, privacy 
issues, travel disruption, online fraud, identity theft and data loss are all possible. Such issues are 
well established cyber crimes and the CAV ecosystem is another platform on which criminals may 
perform them. Whenever and wherever networked systems operate the need for cyber security 
vigilance is required. 
 
CAV ecosystems are complex super-systems with vehicles, communication and roadside 
infrastructure, cloud-based services, legislative and certification concerns, and associated services 
and management. Cyber threat risk reduction could be seen to be overwhelming. However, by 
approaching it systematically, through the application of a Security Framework (see Figure 2 for 
the high-level overview), it can be addressed. The information and arguments presented in this 
report provide a foundation for the full development and implementation of the Security 
Framework, with input from relevant stakeholders (see Section 1.3), and it can, and should, evolve 
as technology and threats change. 
 
Security considerations must be taken into account when a new engineering endeavour begins, 
threat modelling can take place early in the design cycle. The whole process can begin with 
excellent engineering from the beginning of the initial concept for a new vehicle or associated 
system, together with systematic cyber security testing and risk assessment from the outset. The 
stakeholders in the UK’s emerging CAV ecosystem can achieve that with the aid of cyber security 
centres, virtual and physical proving grounds and other physical CTFs. Within these facilities, the 
engineers and consultants can apply the Security Framework for the efficient execution of TARAs, 
practical security tests and results reporting. The framework enables efficient use of the technology 
and communications infrastructure within a cyber security centre. The framework can facilitate the 
dissemination of security and testing knowledge and encourage best practice. Systematic 
application of the framework, covering the topics presented in this report, can reduce the cyber 
threats to the CAV ecosystem. 
15.1. Specific Recommendations 
The BeARCAT project partners have identified several recommendations to make from this 
report (repeated in the Executive Summary): 
 
• Future investment in a CAV security testbed would be beneficial to the UK’s emerging 
CAV industry and ecosystem, and to the communications and cyber security domains. 
The investment would provide a foundation for world-leading research in CAV and 
communications security assessments, risk reduction and cyber resilience techniques. 
• Communications infrastructure and cloud services are areas of the CAV industry that 
are identified as requiring focus for cyber security investment. There has been and 
continues to be, substantial interest in the cyber security issues related to in-vehicle and 
sensor systems. This continues to be important, however, the CAV communications 
and cloud services technologies would benefit from equal attention as they become 
increasingly part of the marketplace. 
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• Investment in the design and development of a CAV cyber testing Security Framework 
to benefit the UK’s transport and communications CNIs. 
• It is important to realise that C-V2X may yet become the global automotive connectivity 
standard and we need to prepare for that, with testing, evaluation and development of 
the standards. 
• It is not certain how C-V2X will interact with DSRC, if at all, but further research is 
required in this area to establish the best way forward for the UK. 
• A special focus should be given to the communication system required to support real-
time V2V, which is unlikely to be C-V2X or DSRC in the near term.   
• Certification of the cyber security testing process is required. Procedures based around 
ISO SAE 21434, which can be regarded as a superset of the UNECE CSMS, are likely 
to be embraced by vehicle manufacturers. 
 
The several areas that would benefit from research investment to accelerate the adoption of a 
CAV and communications testing Security Framework are: 
 
• Investment to research and develop the Security Framework for the CAV ecosystem. 
• Investment in new software tooling to support, disseminate and keep relevant the 
framework. 
• Investment to research and develop a CAV ecosystem security testing knowledge base 
as part of the framework. 
• Investment to encourage stakeholders to engage and network to exchange information 
and resources on cyber security threats to the CAV ecosystem. 
 
The UK is a leader in cyber, vehicle and communications technology and can provide, and does 
provide, centres of excellence in understanding, testing and countering threats. That skill base can 
be used to protect the CAV ecosystem, and aid the development of the UK CAV industry, and 
contribute to the overall UK cyber security expertise. This report provides the relevant stakeholders 
with the baseline information to fully develop an industry-relevant Security Framework. The overall 
goal of the Security Framework is to keep the cyber security risks in the CAV ecosystem to a 
residual level, maintaining CAV cyber resilience. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations 
This glossary can be used to lookup the meaning of an abbreviation within the report text. When an 
abbreviated term is first used it will be written in full immediately followed by the bracketed 
abbreviation. Subsequent use of the term will be the abbreviated version. 
 
1G First Generation 
2G Second Generation 
3G Third Generation 
3GPP Third Generation Public Partnership 
3GPP AAA 3GPP Authentication, Authorization, Accounting 
3GPP TS 3GPP Technical Specification 
4G Fourth Generation 
5G Fifth Generation 
6G Sixth Generation 
AD Automated Driving 
ADAS Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
AES Advanced Encryption Standard  
AN Access Node 
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
AuC Authentication Centre 
BSC Base Station Controller 
BRAM Block Random Access Memory 
BSI British Standards Institute 
BTS Base Transceiver Station 
CAM Connected and Automated Mobility 
CAN Controller Area Network 
CAV Connected and Autonomous Vehicle or Connected Automated Vehicle 
CC Conventional Communications 
CC Country Code 
CGI Cell Global Identity 
CI Cell Identity 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
C-ITS Cellular Intelligent Transport Systems 
CMPv2 Certification Management Protocol v2 
CN Core Network 
CNI Critical National Infrastructure 
CPNI Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 
CPRI Common Public Radio Interface 
CPS Cyber-Physical System 
CSMS Cyber Security Management System 
CTF Cyber Test Facility 
C-RNTI Cell Random Network Temporary Identifier 
C-V2N Cellular Vehicle-to-Network 
C-V2X Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service 
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DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
Diameter 4G protocol, replaces the RADIUS signalling protocol 
DNS Domain Name System 
DoDAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DoS Denial of Service 
DoS Denial of Service 
DREAD Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability 
DSRC Dedicated Short-Range Communications 
DUT Device Under Test 
ECU Engine Control Unit 
ECU Electronic Control Unit (a vehicle computer) 
EDGE Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution 
EIR Equipment Identity Register 
eNodeB Evolved NodeB 
EPC Evolved Packet Core 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
E-UTRAN Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network 
EVITA E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications 
GERAN GSM EDGE Radio Access Network 
GPRS General Packet Radio Service 
GSM Global System for Mobile communications 
GUTI Globally Unique Temporary Identifier  
HLR Home Location Register 
HSDPA High Speed Downlink Packet Access 
HSS Home Subscriber Server 
IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange v2 
IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity 
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem 
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
IoT Internet of Things 
IP Intellectual Property 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPsec IP Security Protocol 
ISO International Standards Organisation 
ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems 
ITS-G5 ITS 5 GHz Access Layer 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IVI In-vehicle Infotainment 
IVN In-vehicle Network 
LAC Location Area Code 
LSP Label Switched Paths 
LTE Long Term Evolution 
LTE-A LTE Advanced 
MAP Mobile Application Part 
MAPSec MAP Security Protocol 
MBSE Model Based Systems Engineering 
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ME Mobile Equipment 
MIB Master Information Block 
MitM Man-in-the-Middle 
MME Mobility Management Entity 
MNC Mobile Network Code 
MODAF Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework 
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching 
MSC Mobile Switching Centre 
NAF NATO Architecture Framework 
NAS Non-Access Stratum 
NodeB 3G base station 
NGTP Next Generation Telematics Patterns 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PASTA Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis 
PDN GW Packet Data Network Gateway 
PGW Packet Gateway 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network 
RA Reference Architecture 
RAN Radio Access Network 
RUP Rational Unified Process 
S1 The interface between eNodeB and MME/SGW 
SAE SAE International (previously Society of Automotive Engineers) 
SBA Service-Based Architecture 
SEG  Security Gateway 
SGW Serving Gateway 
SIB System Information Block 
SIM Subscriber Identity Module 
SMS Short Message Service 
SN Serving Network 
SS7 Signalling System No.7 
STRIDE 
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, DoS, Elevation of 
Privilege 
SUT System Under Test 
SysML Systems Modelling Language 
TAL Threat Agent Library 
TARA Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment 
TARA Threat Agent Risk Assessment (Intel) 
TAU Tracking Area Update 
TDM Time Division Multiplexing 
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
ToE Target of Evaluation 
UART Universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter 
Uconnect Connectivity platform used by some connected vehicle OEMs 
UE User Equipment 
UK United Kingdom 
UML Unified Modelling Language 
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UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module 
UTRAN UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network 
V2C Vehicle-to-Cloud 
V2D Vehicle-to-Device 
V2I Vehicle-to-Infrastructure 
V2P Vehicle-to-Pedestrian 
V2V Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
V2X Vehicle-to-Everything 
VAST Visual, Agile, and Simple Threat 
VLR Visitor Location Register 
VOLTE Voice Over LTE 
X1 The interface between eNodeBs 
XSS Cross Site Scripting 
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